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1
. . . scientific method, like science itself, defies definition. It
is made up of a number of operations, some mental, some
manual. Each of these, in its time, has been found useful,
first in the formulation of questions that seem urgent. . .
and then in the finding, testing, and using the answers to
them.
J. D. BERNAL

Tax Research in
Perspective
This study is designed to provide a working knowledge of tax research
methodology for the certified public accountant who is not already
a tax specialist. It introduces its readers to the research process
utilized in the tax-related work commonly performed by accountants
in public practice, and it notes, in passing, the kind of research used
to determine tax policy recommendations.1 After a careful reading of
this study and many hours of experience in implementing the
procedures suggested here, the reader should be capable of solving
most of the tax problems encountered in a public accounting practice.
This study also introduces the reference volumes necessary for a
tax library. It suggests both minimal library requirements and
methods of utilizing the more important tax reference works. This
study is not primarily intended to increase knowledge of specific
substantive tax provisions per se, but, as a secondary benefit, it may
1Accountants generally have not ventured far into the realm of tax policy. Because
of their practical experience in tax matters, accountants could play an important
role in improving our tax system. If they were to assume an active role in policy
deliberations in the future, many of the research procedures simply noted in
passing later in this chapter would have to be investigated at length.
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teach readers more than they previously knew about some tax
provisions as they study the examples offered as problem-solving
illustrations. When solving similar problems of their own, however,
readers should not rely on the conclusions reached in these examples
without updating them. Although some of the AICPA tax studies are
periodically revised, they were never intended as substitutes for a
current tax-reference service.
Meaning of Research in General
Ideally, a book devoted to tax research would begin with an unam
biguous definition of the word research. Unfortunately, no such
definition has come to the authors’ attention; therefore, we will have
to be satisfied with a general description rather than a precise
definition. This general description should adequately reveal the
nature of the process envisioned within the phrase tax research as it
is used here.
The word research is used to describe a wide variety of diverse
activities. For example, at one extreme it can include the search for
anything not presently known by the person making the search. In
that context, looking up an unknown telephone number in a directory
would constitute research. At the other extreme, a scientist might
restrict his or her use of the word research to exhaustive experimen
tation under tightly controlled conditions solely for the purpose of
revising previously accepted conclusions in light of recently deter
mined facts. Between the extremes lie infinite alternative definitions.
Thus, this tax study does not purport to deal with all forms of tax
research; except for a few introductory comments in this chapter,
this study is restricted to a description of the procedures commonly
utilized by a diverse group of professionals—including certified public
accountants, lawyers, enrolled agents, and Internal Revenue Service
personnel—to determine a defensibly “correct’’ (and in some instances
an optimal) conclusion to a tax question. Totally different kinds of
work undertaken by these individuals or by other persons might be
properly included within the meaning of the phrase tax research, but
our objective is neither to define nor to reconcile conflicting defini
tions. We desire only to place the general characteristics of the
different types of tax research in perspective. Very few persons
become expert in each of the research methodologies noted. Never
theless, anyone deeply engaged in any facet of tax work should at
least be generally aware of what other individuals working in the
same general field are doing. With increasing frequency, those expert
2

in one facet of taxation are asked to express an informed opinion on
a wholly different aspect of taxation. In these circumstances it is
especially desirable that the expert be aware of what others have
done and thereby move with appropriate caution in dealing with tax
matters with which he or she is not intimately familiar.
Perhaps the easiest and most desirable way to place the different
types of tax research in meaningful perspective is to create a general
classification system based on the purpose of the inquiry. Although
other possible classification systems are evident—for example, one
could easily construct a classification scheme based on the character
of the methodology employed—one based upon the purpose behind
the research effort seems to be most useful for this statement of
perspective. At least three distinct purposes for tax research come
immediately to mind: implementation of rules, policy determination,
and advancement of knowledge.
Research for Implementation of Rules

Much tax research is undertaken to determine the applicability of
general tax laws to specific fact situations. After a tax law is enacted,
implementation of the law is the responsibility of the taxpayer.
Although we have what purports to be a self-assessment tax system
in this country, both tax rules and business practices have become
so complex that many taxpayers seek the assistance of specially
trained individuals to ensure not only their compliance with the tax
rules, but also their achievement of that compliance at minimal tax
cost.
Five elementary steps constitute a total research effort: (1) estab
lishing the facts, (2) from the facts, determining the question, (3)
searching for an authoritative solution to that question, (4) determining
the import of the frequently incomplete and sometimes conflicting
tax authorities located, and (5) communicating the conclusion to the
interested party. Although a thorough examination of what each of
these five steps involves must be deferred to later chapters, we can
briefly describe each step at this juncture.
Establishing the Facts Most tax laws and related administrative
regulations are necessarily written in general terms. Effective rules
must be stated in terms that adequately describe the vast majority
of factual circumstances envisioned by those who determine the rules.
Rules stated too broadly invite conflicting interpretation; those stated
too narrowly often fail to achieve their intended objective. However,
no matter how carefully the words of a statute are selected, general
3

rules cannot possibly describe every conceivable factual variation that
might be subject to the intended rules. Consequently, the first step
in implementation-oriented research necessarily involves the process
of obtaining all of the facts so that the researcher can determine
which tax rule or rules might apply to those particular events.
Determining the Question Questions arise when specific fact
situations are examined in light of general rules or laws. Complex tax
questions frequently evolve through several stages of development.
Based on prior knowledge of tax rules, a researcher usually can state
the pertinent questions in terms of very general rules. For example,
the tax researcher may ask whether the facts necessitate the recog
nition of gross income by the taxpayer, whether the facts permit the
taxpayer to claim a deduction in the determination of taxable income,
or whether a gain should be reported as ordinary income or as capital
gain. After making an initial search of the authorities to answer the
general question, the researcher often discovers that one or more
specific technical questions of interpretation must be answered before
the general question can be resolved. These secondary questions
frequently involve the need to determine the exact meaning of certain
words and/or phrases as they are used in particular tax rules. For
example, the tax researcher may have to determine if the fact situation
under consideration is “ordinary,” “necessary,” or “reasonable” as
those words are used in various sections of the code. Alternatively
he or she may have to determine the meaning of the word “primarily”
or, perhaps, the meaning of the phrase “trade or business. ” Once the
general question is restated in this more specific way, the researcher
often must return briefly to the process of collecting more facts. From
a study of the authorities, the researcher learns that facts initially not
considered important may be critical to the resolution of the revised
question. After obtaining all necessary facts and resolving the more
technical questions, the tax researcher may discover that the general
question is also resolved. If, however, the answer to the general
question is negative, very often an answer to a related question must
be resolved before the researcher can proceed to a conclusion. For
example, even if a tax researcher determines that a particular
expenditure is not tax deductible, he or she may have to determine
whether or not the expenditure can be capitalized (that is, added to
the tax basis of an asset) or whether it must simply be ignored in the
tax determination procedure.2 In effect, raising collateral questions
2 In a tax-planning situation, of course, the tax adviser may recommend an alternative
way of structuring the transaction to achieve the most desirable tax result.
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returns the researcher to the beginning of the second step in the
research process. This procedure continues until all pertinent ques
tions have been satisfactorily answered.
Searching for Authority Authority in tax matters is legion. It nearly
always begins with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended,
but it quickly expands to include Treasury regulations, judicial
decisions, administrative pronouncements, and, sometimes, congres
sional committee reports. Judicial decisions in federal tax disputes
are rendered by U.S. district courts, the Tax Court, the Court of
Claims, the several circuit courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court.
Administrative pronouncements are issued as revenue rulings, rev
enue procedures, technical information releases, and general counsel
memoranda. Reports of the House Ways and Means Committee, the
Senate Finance Committee, and the Joint Committee may be
pertinent to the resolution of a tax question. Obviously the task of
locating all of the potential authority before reaching a conclusion can
be a very demanding and time-consuming task. As previously ex
plained, the search for authority often raises additional questions that
can only be answered after the determination of additional facts. Thus
the research process often moves back from step three to step one
before it proceeds to a resolution of the general question.
Resolving the Question After locating, reading, and interpreting all
of the pertinent authority, a tax adviser must be prepared to resolve
the many questions that have been raised. The taxpayer client must
make the final decision about what course of action to take, but, in
most circumstances, the taxpayer’s decision is guided by and often
dependent on the conclusions reached by the adviser. The taxpayer
looks to an adviser for guidance. Even when working with questions
to which there appear to be no ready answers, a tax adviser must be
prepared to say to a client, “If I were you, I would do this.’’ Thus,
a tax adviser really must resolve the questions to his or her own
satisfaction before recommending action to anyone else.
Communicating the Conclusion Having thoroughly researched the
tax problem and having reached a conclusion, a tax adviser must
communicate all pertinent factors to the interested parties. Drafting
tax communications is unusually difficult. Very often, highly technical
questions must be phrased in layman’s language. Positions sometimes
must be carefully hedged without omitting or misstating any critical
fact or any applicable rule. At the same time, tax advisers must take
5

sufficient care to protect their own rights and professional integrity.
These considerations sometimes are conflicting constraints in drafting
an appropriate communication; therefore, great care must be exer
cised in this final step of the implementation-oriented research
procedure.
The arrangement of the material in this tax study follows the
sequence of steps suggested above. That is, chapter 2 is concerned
with the search for facts; chapter 3 is a discussion of the process by
which a tax researcher prepares a statement of the pertinent questions.
Chapter 4 explains how a researcher can systematically go about
locating possible authority; chapter 5 suggests what to do if the
authority is incomplete or conflicting. Chapter 6 describes the many
factors that must be considered in drafting the communication that
will convey the results of the research effort to the concerned persons.
Finally, chapters 7 and 8 give detailed examples of this tax research
process under two different circumstances: Chapter 7 illustrates the
research process in a compliance setting, chapter 8, in a planning
situation.
Research for Policy Determination

Our tax laws are enacted by Congress to produce federal revenues
and to achieve designated economic and social objectives. For
example, the general objectives of the investment credit and the
rapid depreciation provisions include stimulating investment spend
ing and economic growth. The domestic international sales corporation
provisions are intended to stimulate foreign sales of domestically
produced goods and thus to aid in the solution of U.S. balance of
payments (currency) problems. These and many other tax provisions
should be investigated thoroughly to determine whether they are
efficiently achieving the intended objectives. The research method
ology common to such investigations draws heavily from the discipline
of economics. Econometric models must be constructed and much
aggregate data obtained to formulate tax policy.
Similarly, our government representatives should have factual
information about voter preferences. They should know, for example,
whether a majority of the voters prefers to deal with problems of
pollution through fines and penalty taxes, through incentive provisions
in the tax laws, or through wholly nontax legislation. Similarly, those
who enact laws should know how the voters feel about funding public
medical care, employee retirement programs, mass transit systems,
interstate highways, and a host of other government projects. The
6

research methodology common to determining voter preferences
draws heavily on survey techniques best understood by sociologists,
demographers, and other social scientists.
Every change in tax law has a direct impact on the federal budget
and on monetary policies, the magnitude and direction of which
should be determined as accurately as possible before the law is
finalized. Operations research techniques and computer technology
are most useful in making such determinations. Some of the research
techniques used to make these predictions are similar to those used
by the econometrician in building models that tell us whether or not
a law can achieve its intended objectives; in other ways the techniques
utilized are quite different. The point is simply that, even within the
confines of the work that must be undertaken to provide tax policy
prescriptions, the procedures that must be utilized to make those
determinations vary substantially. Yet all of these diverse procedures
are commonly referred to as tax research.
Research for Advancement of Knowledge

Another purpose for undertaking tax research is the advancement of
knowledge in general. Research undertaken to determine a preferable
tax policy, as well as that undertaken to implement tax rules, has a
pragmatic objective. The researcher in each instance has a very
practical reason for wanting to know the answer. Some research, on
the other hand, is undertaken solely for the purpose of disseminating
general knowledge. There is, however, no single common method
ology for such research. Rather, the methodology selected depends
entirely upon the nature of the investigation being undertaken. If it
involves economic predictions, economic modeling is necessary. If
it involves taxpayer attitudes and/or preferences, surveys based on
carefully selected statistical samples are equally mandatory. And if
it involves compliance considerations, a studied opinion of pertinent
authority is just as essential.
Tax practitioners, as well as academicians, government employees,
and foundation personnel, often engage in tax research work intended
solely for the advancement of knowledge. The results are published
in journals and presented in proceedings that appeal to two funda
mentally different audiences. Policy-oriented journals and proceed
ings primarily attract persons who are economists by education and
training. Implementation-oriented journals and proceedings primarily
attract those who are either accountants or lawyers by education and
training. Academicians are found in both camps.
7

Examples of Tax Research

Chapter 7 is an example of implementation-oriented tax research.
The objective of chapter 7 is simply to illustrate how a tax researcher
might determine the “correct” tax treatment of the act of incorporating
a sole proprietorship under stated fact conditions. Chapter 8 dem
onstrates how tax planning can be utilized to minimize the tax dangers
and maximize the tax opportunities implicit in a different fact setting.
Before we turn all of our attention to the details of this form of
research in subsequent chapters, however, let us pause very briefly
to note a few examples of policy-oriented tax research. Some knowl
edge of this literature should be helpful to any certified public
accountant undertaking a policy-oriented research project. Although
individual CPA firms tend to do little of this work, a few accountants
may be in for a new adventure because of the expansion of the
AICPA’s role in tax policy, approved by the executive committee in
the fall of 1969. Several task forces have been appointed, and research
has begun. The first statement of tax policy was issued by the AICPA
in 1974.3 Five additional statements of tax policy were issued in the
next six years.
A relatively recent example of a policy-oriented tax study is entitled
Must Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice?4 This book, by Charles E.
McLure, Jr., is one of a long and distinguished series of studies in
government finance. It is specifically concerned with the double
taxation of corporate profits.
An example of a more theoretical study is found in the work of
Joseph Pechman and Benjamin Okner entitled Who Bears the Tax
Burden?5 It attempts to determine the distribution of all taxes
combined by income classes. It demonstrates nicely the complexity
of tax policy studies by presenting its results under eight different
assumptions of tax incidence. Further, the authors do not express a
preference for any one result, in recognition of the fact that no
conclusive empirical evidence has been found to justify making a
single selection.
A third example of policy-oriented research can be found in the
published proceedings of The 19th Annual Institute o f Petroleum
3 See Taxation o f Capital Gains (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1974), 28 pages.
4 This 262-page book, published in 1979, is available from The Brookings Institution,
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036, for $2.50
5 This 119-page booklet, published in 1974, is also available from The Brookings
Institution.
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Exploration and Economics. There, on pages 323-47, Thomas R.
Stauffer discusses the major current issues in the international taxation
of oil production.6
A thorough review of an important segment of tax research was
made by Carl Shoup in Quantitative Research in Taxation and
Government Expenditure.7 In this work, Shoup appraises the need
for further quantitative research and suggests outlets for such work.
Literally hundreds of other excellent examples of tax research could
be cited here, although to do so would lead far afield from the
objectives of this study.
In summary, the phrase tax research is commonly used to refer
to widely divergent processes. All are legitimate, socially productive
endeavors that may be included in a definition of tax research. A
broad outline of the different processes are mentioned in this
perspectives chapter for two reasons: first, to give the reader some
idea of what is and what is not to be described in the study, and
second, to suggest to accountants and others, who by their own
inclination are implementation-oriented, the kinds of efforts that
should be included in policy-oriented projects they might undertake.
In closing this chapter, the authors join many others who have
called for a broader participation of tax-interested persons in the
determination of tax policy. In the past, the tax research efforts of
theoreticians have all too often wholly ignored all practical conse
quences, including the behavioral adaptation of those most directly
affected by their recommendations. On the other hand, the policy
prescriptions rendered by the implementation-oriented groups have
often overlooked important empirical evidence accumulated in the
more theoretical studies. Stanley Surrey, a Harvard law professor
interested in taxation and a former assistant secretary of the treasury
for tax policy, made these observations in 1966:
We must be aware that the apparent certitude offered by the mass of
numbers computers can generate or the conclusions that the ranks of
econometric equations can produce do not lull us into a false security.
There is still room, as the computer technology develops, for a
constructive two-way dialogue between the computer technologists
and those whose insights come from experience and accumulated
6 These proceedings were published by The Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas,
Tex., in 1979.
7 Shoup’s paper was published as Public Expenditures and Taxation, Colloquium IV
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1972), 16 pages.
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wisdom. Working together they can offer great hope and promise for
an improved tax system capable of fully bearing its share of respon
sibility for achieving the Great Society we are seeking.8

An important first step in this hoped-for cooperation is the acquaint
ance of each with the aims and the methodologies of the other. This
volume should help to describe the tax research methodology com
monly utilized by the more implementation-oriented group.

Stanley S. Surrey, “Computer Technology and Federal Tax Policy,” National Tax
Journal (September 1966): 257-58.
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2
The Moving Finger writes; and having writ,
Moves on; nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.
OMAR KHAYYAM

The Critical Role
of Facts
A tax result is dependent upon three variables: the pertinent facts,
applicable law, and an administrative (and occasionally judicial)
process. An accountant not trained in the practice of law is apt to
underestimate the significance of facts to the resolution of a tax
question. Most laypersons’ study of law, including the accountant’s
study of business law, tends to concentrate on general rules. For the
accountant turned tax adviser, however, general rules will not suffice.
It is essential that every tax adviser understand why a thorough
knowledge of all the facts is critical to the resolution of any tax
question.
The Importance of Facts to Tax Questions
As used here, the word fact means an actual occurrence or an event,
a thing having real existence; facts are the who, what, when, why,
where, and how of daily existence. From the facts, questions arise.
A tax adviser must be able to distinguish a conclusion from a fact. For
example, a statement that an individual is married really is a
11

conclusion rather than a fact. The facts that support such a conclusion
may include such real-world events as these:
• On June 9, 1956, that person appeared with a member of the
opposite sex before a third person duly authorized to perform
marriages.
• That person exchanged certain oral vows with the specified
member of the opposite sex.
• The person authorized to perform marriages made certain
declaratory statements to those present.
• The exchange of vows and the declaratory statements were made
in the presence of a designated number of witnesses.
• Certain documents were signed by designated parties to this
ceremony, and those documents were filed in a specified re
pository.
• No events that might change this relationship have subsequently
transpired.
Change any one of these facts, and the conclusion—that is, that a
person is married—may no longer be valid. A statement of pertinent
facts is virtually always much longer and clumsier than is a simple
statement of the conclusion drawn from them. Consequently most of
the time we tend to converse in words, sentences, and thoughts
based on conclusions rather than on elementary facts.
In tax work it often is necessary to pursue facts at length to be
certain of the validity of a particular tax conclusion. To continue the
foregoing illustration, a person cannot file a joint income tax return”
unless he or she is married. Obviously, most people know if they are
married or not, and most tax advisers accept their client’s word on
this important conclusion. If, in the course of a conversation or in an
investigation related to the preparation of a tax return, it becomes
apparent that there is reason to doubt the validity of the client’s
conclusion, then a full-scale investigation of all of the facts is necessary.
For example, a client may state that he has recently gotten a divorce.
This simple statement should be sufficient to cause an alert tax adviser
to make further investigations, because a person may be deemed to
be married for tax purposes even after he believes that he once again
is single. By the same token, the tax adviser must know that persons
who never in their lives have exchanged marriage vows may be
deemed to be married for tax and other purposes by virtue of their
actions (that is, by virtue of “the facts”) and the law of the state in
which they reside. The tax adviser also knows that persons married
to nonresident aliens may not be eligible to file joint income tax
12

returns, in unusual circumstances, even though they are obviously
married.
Tax work is often made difficult and risky precisely because the
taxpayer may not understand the significance of the pertinent facts,
and a tax adviser often cannot spend the time to verify every alleged
fact without charging an exorbitant fee. When a tax adviser is (or
reasonably should be) alerted to the possibility that a further inves
tigation of the facts may lead to a significantly different conclusion in
a tax determination, however, it is the tax adviser’s professional
obligation to investigate those facts in sufficient depth to permit a
correct determination of a tax conclusion. In situations involving
aspects of the law beyond the confines of taxation—as in the marriage
example—the accountant may very well find it necessary for a client
to engage legal counsel before proceeding with the client’s tax
problem.
No one engaged in tax practice should ever underestimate the
importance of factual detail. Virtually every authoritative reference
on tax practice stresses this important conclusion. Bickford says, “It
would be impossible . . . to overemphasize the importance of knowing
all the facts of a case, down to the last detail, figure and date.
Freeman and Freeman put it this way: “Facts determine the law.
Law is really facts. Shape the facts and you have planned the law.
Facts have to be found. Be a detective. Find not some of the facts
but all of the facts. ”2 Implied in the latter quotation is the important
distinction between events that have already taken place and those
that are yet to occur. Tax planning is based on this critical distinction.
Facts— Established and Anticipated
Taxpayer compliance and tax planning constitute two major portions
of any successful tax adviser’s work. The initial and critical difference
between these two phases of tax practice is simply a difference in the
state of the facts. In compliance work, all of the facts have already
transpired and the tax adviser’s only task—assuming that he or she
already knows what the facts are—is the determination of the tax
result implicit in those facts. In planning work, the tax adviser
researches alternative ways of achieving established goals and rec
o m m en d s to a c lie n t th o se actions th a t will— co n sid erin g all opera1 Hugh C. Bickford, Successful Tax Practice, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 14.
2 Harrop A. Freeman and Norman D. Freeman, The Tax Practice Deskbook (Boston:
Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1973), p. 2-1.
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tional constraints, personal and financial objectives, and personal and
business history—minimize the resulting tax liability. In other words,
the tax planner must determine an optimal set of facts from the
standpoint of tax results, given certain personal and financial con
straints. The operational procedures applied in these two phases of
tax practice are quite different.
After-the-Facts Compliance

The first step in taxpayer compliance work is a determination of the
facts that have already taken place. The procedures used to determine
facts differ significantly depending upon the relationship existing
between the tax adviser and the taxpayer. The less personal the
relationship, the greater the amount of time that must be devoted to
a discovery of facts. In most instances, the fact discovery process can
be divided into at least four distinct steps: initial inquiry, independent
investigation, additional inquiry, and substantiation.
Initial Inquiry At one extreme, the tax adviser will not have known
the taxpayer prior to the request for services. In that event, if the
initial request is for tax return preparation services, it is common for
the tax adviser to complete a predetermined checklist of facts during
(or immediately following) an initial interview. Many firms have
devised their own forms to facilitate this information-gathering
process; others utilize standard forms prepared by tax return computer
services or other agencies. If the initial request is for assistance in an
administrative proceeding, a less structured interview is typically
used. In every instance the objective of the inquiry is the same: to
establish all of the facts essential to an accurate determination of the
tax liability.
Tax advisers who are intimately familiar with their clients’ affairs
often are able to extract sufficient factual information from existing
files and personal knowledge to allow them to avoid extended personal
contact with the taxpayer while making an investigation comparable
to the initial inquiry. For example, the certified public accountant
who regularly maintains and/or audits all of a client’s financial records
will require only minimal additional contact with the client to establish
the information necessary to determine the correct tax liability.
Independent Investigation Regardless of the extent of personal
contact involved in the initial inquiry, all but the simplest taxpayer
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compliance engagements require some independent investigation on
the part of the tax adviser. The specific reason for undertaking such
an independent investigation varies from one situation to another,
but all stem from the need for additional facts to determine a tax
result. Sometimes the impetus for getting more facts comes from
something the client said; at other times, from what he or she did not
say. At still other times, the need for further facts becomes apparent
when the tax adviser begins to examine the client’s financial records.
For example, a canceled check made payable to an unknown Dr.
Jones may or may not be tax deductible. The return preparer must
determine what kind of doctor Jones is and what service was rendered
to the taxpayer before deciding whether or not the payment can be
deducted.
Whatever the cause, the tax adviser frequently engages in what
might be described as detective work to determine necessary facts.
An independent investigation may involve a detailed review of
financial records, old files, correspondence, corporate minutes, sales
agreements, bank statements, and so forth; it may involve interviews
with friends, family, employees, business associates, or others; and,
in some cases, that search may extend to reviews of general business
conditions and practices. Because of the relatively high cost of some
investigations, it is common to defer incurring those costs until they
are absolutely necessary. Usually this means deferring them from the
time of the initial act of taxpayer compliance to the time of a dispute,
that is, from the time of filing the tax return to the time at which the
Internal Revenue Service challenges a tax conclusion previously
reported by the taxpayer on the basis of rather tenuous facts. Because
less than 3 percent of all tax returns filed are challenged in an. average
year, the reason for delaying a costly in-depth investigation is obvious.
Nevertheless, the competent tax adviser should always be alert for
situations that are apt to require further investigation later. Often it
is easier and cheaper to obtain facts and to assemble related evidence
at the time events transpire than it is to reconstruct them at a later
date; occasionally facts may become impossible to determine if too
much time has elapsed between the events and the inquiry. A tax
adviser’s services are often more efficient and less costly if the client
collects much of the necessary evidence to support the facts. Again,
the probability of the client’s doing this successfully is much greater
if facts relate to recent events. Deferring an investigation of pertinent
facts nearly always increases the costs. The trade-off is clear: Incur
a smaller cost now at the risk of its being unnecessary, or incur
greater cost later in the unlikely event that it is needed.
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Additional Inquiry Even in those situations in which an in-depth
investigation of the facts has been completed, the tax adviser
frequently will need to make further factual inquiries after beginning
a search of the law. A search for the tax law applicable to a given set
of facts often uncovers the need for information not originally deemed
relevant by the taxpayer or the tax adviser. By reading revenue
rulings and judicial decisions in situations similar to that of the client,
an adviser may become aware of the importance of facts not originally
considered. Being alerted to their possible importance, the tax adviser
must return to the fact determination process once again. In highly
complex situations, this process of moving between fact finding and
law determination may repeat itself several times before the tax
question is finally resolved.
Substantiation of Facts Determining what the facts are and proving
those facts are two entirely different things. The nature and quality
of the proof that is required varies significantly, depending on who
is receiving proof. In tax matters, the person who must be convinced
of the authenticity of the facts can be anyone from an Internal
Revenue Service agent to a Supreme Court justice. The methods
used to substantiate facts vary tremendously. Generally, fact sub
stantiation procedures are much less formal in dealings with an
administrative agency such as the IRS than in dealings with a court,
and even within the judicial system, the rules of evidence vary from
one court to another. Obviously, the closer one moves to formal
litigation the greater the need for the opinion and the assistance of
a qualified trial attorney. Only such a professional can adequately
assess the hazards of the litigation procedure, including the rules of
evidence and the burden-of-proof problems.
The certified public accountant engaged in tax practice should not
lose sight of the fact that the vast majority of all tax disputes are
settled at the administrative level.3 Therefore it is necessary for the
CPA to be fully prepared to determine, present, and substantiate all
of the facts critical to the resolution of a tax dispute in any adminis
trativ e p ro c eed in g . In d o in g this, th e C PA m u st exercise d u e caution

to avoid stipulation of any fact that might prove to be detrimental to
the client in the unlikely event that a dispute should move beyond
3 Government publications fail to provide precise data on the percentage of
settlements at different levels. However, according to recent Annual Reports o f
the Commissioner o f Internal Revenue, approximately 99 percent of all proposed
adjustments are settled outside the courtroom.
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administrative hearings and into the courts. Because of this ever
present danger, the CPA should consult with a trial attorney at the
first sign of significant litigation potential.
Before-the-Facts Planning

If events have not yet transpired, the facts have not yet been
established, and there is opportunity to plan anticipated facts carefully.
As noted earlier, tax planning is nothing more than determining an
optimal set of facts from the standpoint of tax results. The procedures
followed in making such a determination differ significantly from the
procedures utilized in taxpayer compliance work.
Determination of the Preferred Alternative The first step in the
determination of the tax-preferred alternative involves a client inter
view. In this instance, however, the purpose of the interview is not
to determine exactly what has happened in the past but, rather, to
determine (1) the future economic objectives of the client and (2) any
operative constraints in achieving those objectives. If the tax planner
is to perform successfully, all of the client’s hopes, dreams, ambitions,
prejudices, present circumstances, and history must be fully under
stood. That kind of information can seldom be obtained in a single
interview. Ideally, it is derived through a long, open, and trusting
relationship between client and tax adviser. When tax planning is
based on such an on-going relationship, any particular client interview
may be brief and directly to the point. Even relatively major plans
can sometimes be developed, at least initially, with no more than a
simple telephone conversation.
When the tax adviser fully understands a client’s objectives and
constraints, he or she should spend a considerable amount of time
simply thinking about alternative ways of achieving the objectives
specified by the client before beginning the research. Generally there
are diverse ways to achieve a single goal; failure to spend enough
time and effort in creative thinking about that goal usually results in
taking the most obvious route to the solution. In many instances the
most obvious route is not the preferred alternative. A vivid imagination
and creative ability have their greatest payoff in this “thinking step. ’’
Although in all probability no one can do much to increase his or
her native imagination or creative ability, many people simply do not
take advantage of that which they already possess. By far the most
common cause of unimaginative tax planning is the failure of the
adviser to spend sufficient time thinking about alternative ways to
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achieve a client’s objectives. A common tendency is to rush far too
quickly from the initial inquiry to a search of the law for an answer.
By rushing to a solution, we very often completely overlook the
preferred alternative.
An example of creative imagination appears in John J . Sexton, 42
T.C. 1094 (1964), where a taxpayer successfully defended the right
to depreciate a hole in the ground. The facts of the case are both
interesting and instructive. The taxpayer was an operator of refuse
dumps. He acquired land with major excavations primarily to use in
his dumping business, and he allocated a substantial portion of the
purchase price of the land to the holes. As the holes were filled, he
depreciated the value so allocated. Because the taxpayer carefully
documented all the pertinent facts in this case, the court allowed the
deduction. Many less imaginative persons might have totally over
looked this major tax advantage simply because it is unusual and
because they did not spend enough time just thinking about the facts
of the case.
After a tax adviser has determined a client’s objectives, and after
thinking about alternative ways of achieving those objectives, the tax
adviser should systematically go about researching the tax rules and
calculating the tax result of each viable alternative. The preparation
of a “decision tree’’ is very often helpful in determining which of
several alternatives is the tax-preferred one (see chapter 8, page 217).
It forces the adviser to think through each alternative carefully, and
it demonstrates vividly the dollar significance of the tax savings in the
preferred set of facts. Obviously, however, it is up to the client to
implement the plan successfully.
Substantiation of Subsequent Events The client and the tax adviser,
working together, must take every precaution to accumulate and
preserve sufficient documentation of the facts to support the tax plan
selected. In relatively extreme circumstances, a court will not hesitate
to apply any one of several judicial doctrines—most notably the
doctrine of substance-over-form—to find that an overly ambitious tax
plan is not a valid interpretation of the law. If, however, the tax
adviser exercises reasonable caution against plans that lack substance,
and if he or she takes sufficient care to document each step of the
plans, the chance of succeeding is considerably improved. Of course,
the process of substantiating carefully selected facts is primarily the
responsibility of the taxpayer. The tax adviser, however, will often
supervise the process of implementation to make certain that the
intended events actually transpire in the sequence intended, and
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that the proof of these events will be available when and if it is
needed.
Some Common Fact Questions
Most tax disputes involve questions of fact, not questions of law. In
working with fact questions, a tax adviser’s job is to assemble, clarify,
and present the facts in such a way that any reasonable person would
conclude that they conform to the requirements outlined in the tax
law. Demonstrating that degree of fact clarity is often next to
impossible. Some fact questions are necessarily much more involved
and difficult to prove than others. Following are brief examples of
common but difficult questions of fact.
Fair Market Value The determination of the fair market value of
a property is probably the most commonly encountered fact question
in all of taxation. It arises in connection with income, estate, and gift
taxes. The applicable law common to many of these situations is
relatively simple if we could but determine the fair market value of
the properties involved. For example, section 61 of the code provides
that “gross income means all income from whatever source derived, ”
and Treasury Regulations section 1.61-2(d)(1) goes on to state, “The
fair market value of the property or services taken in payment (for
services rendered) must be included in income.’’ Generally, the
application of this law is simple enough once the valuation question
is settled.
The legal definition offair market value, stated concisely in Estate
Tax Regulations section 20.2031-1(b), follows.
The fair market value is the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts.

Fact problems are involved in making that brief definition operational.
What is a willing buyer? A willing seller? A compulsion to buy? A
compulsion to sell? Reasonable knowledge? A relevant fact? Only in
the case of comparatively small blocks of listed securities and in the
case of selected commodities do we have access to an organized
market that will supply us with ready answers to those questions. In
all other instances we must look to all of the surrounding facts and
circumstances to find an answer.
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Books have been written in attempts to delineate the fact circum
stances that must be considered in determining fair market value.
Unfortunately, even a cursory review of those books must remain
outside the scope of this tax study.4 Suffice it to observe here that
valuation is a fact question and that, ordinarily, the party to any tax
valuation dispute who does the best job of determining, clarifying,
and presenting all of the pertinent facts is the party who wins that
dispute.
Reasonable Salaries The determination of what constitutes a rea
sonable salary has long been a troublesome tax problem. With the
introduction of the maximum tax on earned income in 1971, that
question became critical. As usual, the applicable law is relatively
simple if we could but determine what is reasonable within a particular
fact setting.
In determining reasonableness, both Internal Revenue Service
agents and judges often look, for comparison, to such obvious facts
as salaries paid to other employees performing similar tasks for other
employers, any unique attributes of a particular employee, the
employee’s education, the availability of other persons with similar
skills, and prior compensation paid to the employee. In addition, tax
authorities trying to determine the reasonableness of salaries also
look to the dividend history of the employer corporation, the relation
between salaries and equity ownership, the time and method of
making the compensation decision, the state of the economy, and
many other facts. Again, we cannot examine here all of the detailed
facts that have been important to reasonable salary decisions in the
past.5 We need only observe that the question of reasonableness is
a fact question. The taxpayer who marshals all of the pertinent facts
and presents them in a favorable light stands a better chance of

4 See G. D. McCarthy and R. E. Healy, Valuing a Company (New York: Ronald
Press, 1971), and J. R. Krahmer and T. D. Henderer, Valuation o f Shares o f
Closely Held Corporations, Tax Management Portfolio 221.
5 See C. C. Halsey and M. E. Peloubet, Federal Taxation and Unreasonable
Compensation (New York: Ronald Press, 1964), for an excellent survey of nearly
200 cases on this topic. See also H. Steutzer, Jr., “Reasonable Compensation,”
N.Y.U. Institute on Federal Taxation 25 (New York: N.Y.U., 1967): 49-508; E. L.
Kellett, “Reasonableness of Compensation Paid to Officers or Employees, so as to
Warrant Reduction Thereof in Computing Employer’s Income Tax, ” 10 Ad.L. 3d
125 (1966); and J. P. Holden and A. L. Suwalsky, “Reasonable Compensation,” Tax
Management Portfolio 202-3d.
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winning an IRS challenge of unreasonable salaries than does the
taxpayer who ignores any critical facts. The best reason for carefully
studying regulations, rulings, and cases in such a circumstance is to
make certain not to overlook the opportunity to determine and prove
a fact that could be important to the desired conclusion.
Casualty and Theft Losses Noncorporate taxpayers frequently lose
their right to claim a casualty or theft loss deduction for income tax
purposes because they did not take sufficient care to establish the
facts surrounding that loss. The law authorizes a tax deduction for
losses sustained on property held for personal use only if the property
is damaged or destroyed by a casualty or theft. Thus, the loss
sustained because of the disappearance of a diamond ring will not
give rise to a tax deduction unless the taxpayer can prove that the
disappearance is attributable to a casualty or theft, rather than to
carelessness on the part of the owner. If the taxpayer has photographs,
newspaper accounts, police reports, testimony of impartial persons,
and/or other evidence that a casualty or theft has occurred, he or she
will have relatively little trouble in convincing a skeptical internal
revenue agent or a judge of the right to claim that deduction. It is
the facts that count, and the taxpayer generally has the burden of
proving the facts in a tax dispute.
Gifts Section 102 provides that receipt of a gift does not constitute
taxable income. In many situations, however, it is difficult to
determine whether a particular property transfer really is a gift or
compensation for either a past or a contemplated future service. Once
again the facts surrounding the transfer are what will control that
determination. Facts that demonstrate the intent of the transferor to
make a gratuitous transfer—that is, one without any expectation of
something in return—are necessary to the determination that the
transfer was a gift. Relationships existing between the transferor and
the transferee may be important; for example, it generally will be
easier to establish the fact that a gift was made if the two involved
persons are closely related individuals (for example, father and son).
On the other hand, if the two are related in an employer-employee
relationship, it will be especially difficult to establish the presence
of a gift. Although the broad outline of many other abstract but
common fact questions could be noted here, let us consider in
somewhat greater detail a few examples of some real-world tax
disputes that were based on fact questions.
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Illustrative Fact Cases
To better illustrate the critical role of facts in the resolution of tax
questions, examinations of four previously litigated tax cases follow.
The four cases can be divided into two sets of two cases each. One
set deals with the question of distinguishing between a gift and
income for services rendered; the other set deals with the propriety
of deducting payments made by a taxpayer to his parent. None of the
four cases is particularly important in its own right, but together they
serve to illustrate several important conclusions common to tax
research and fact questions. The court decisions in these cases are
relatively brief, and the facts involved are easy to comprehend.
Gift or Income?

Both the 1939 and 1954 Internal Revenue Codes include a rule
providing that gifts do not constitute an element of taxable income.
The present rule is stated in section 102 of the 1954 code as follows:
“(a) General Rule.—Gross income does not include the value of
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.” The first
two cases to be examined consist largely of judicial review of the facts
necessary to determine whether or not particular transfers or property
constitute gifts or taxable income for services rendered.
The first case involves a taxpayer named Margaret D. Brizendine
and her husband, Everett. The case was heard by the Tax Court in
1957, and the decision, rendered by Judge Rice, reads in part as
follows.
Everett W. Brizendine

Findings o f Fact
Petitioners were married in 1945 and throughout the years in issue
were husband and wife and residents of Roanoke, Virginia. They filed
no returns for the years 1945 through 1949, inclusive, but did file
returns for 1950 and 1951 with the former collector of internal revenue
in Richmond.
Prior to the years in issue, petitioner, Margaret D. Brizendine, was
convicted and fined on five separate occasions for operating a house
of prostitution, or for working in such a house. Petitioner, Everett W.
Brizendine, prior to the years in issue, had served a term in the
penitentiary. During the years in issue, he was convicted and fined
seven times for violation of the Roanoke City Gambling Code, for
operating a gambling house, and for disorderly conduct.
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Prior to the years in issue, petitioner. Margaret D. Brizendine, met
an individual in a Roanoke, Virginia, restaurant with whom she became
friendly. The individual promised her that if she would discontinue
her activities as a prostitute he would buy her a home and provide for
her support. In 1945, the individual paid Margaret $2,000 with which
sum she made the down payment on a house; he also arranged for her
to secure a loan to pay the balance of the purchase price. From 1945
and until the time of his death in March 1950, the individual provided
money with which Margaret made payments on such loan. In addition,
he paid her approximately $25 per week in cash and also paid her
money to provide for utilities, insurance, furniture, and clothing. In
1946, he paid her $500 which she used to buy a fur coat.
In determining the deficiencies herein, the respondent arrived at
petitioners adjusted gross income by adding annual estimated living
expenses in the amount of $2,000 to the known expenditures made by
them. The amounts of adjusted gross income so determined were as
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951

.............................................$4,784.80
............................................ 3,300.70
............................................ 2,645.00
.......................................... 2,978.62
.......................................... 2,763.37
............................................ 4,812.82
............................................ 3,641.57

Petitioners’ living expenses did not exceed $1,200 in addition to the
known personal expenditures made by them during each of the years
Petitioners' failure to file returns for the years 1945 through 1949
inclusive, was not due to reasonable cause. The deficiencies in issue
were due to petitioners’ negligence or intentional disregard of rules
and regulations. The petitioners’ failure to file declarations of estimated
tax was not due to reasonable cause and resulted in an underestimate
of estimated tax.

Petitioners contended that the amount received by Margaret from
the individual, with which she made a down payment on a house, as
well as all other amounts received from him until the time of his death
in 1950, were gifts to her and, therefore, did not constitute taxable
income. The respondent, while accepting petitioner’s testimony as to
the source of the sums, argues that she has not established that the
amounts received from the individual were really gifts. He further
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points out that Margaret testified that the payments received from the
individual were in consideration of her forbearance to refrain from
engaging in prostitution, and to grant him her companionship, and
argues that her promise constituted valid consideration for the pay
ments which causes them to be taxable as ordinary income.
Both petitioners testified at the hearing in this case. Their demeanor
on the stand, coupled with their long criminal records, leaves consid
erable doubt in our mind that the payments from the individual to
Margaret were the only source of petitioner’s income during the years
in question, or that such amounts as the individual paid to Margaret
were gifts. Since petitioners thus failed to establish that those amounts
were in fact gifts, we conclude that such amounts were correctly
determined by respondent to be taxable income which petitioners
received during the years in issue. We further think that there is
considerable merit to the respondent’s argument that Margaret' s
promise to the individual to forbear from engaging in prostitution, and
to grant him her companionship, constituted sufficient consideration
for the money received from him to make it taxable to her.
We think, on the basis of the whole record, that respondent’s
estimate of personal living expenses in the amount of $2,000 was
excessive. Many of the known expenditures which petitioners made
during the years in issue were for living expenses, and pursuant to our
findings we are satisfied that an additional $1,200 adequately covers
all of their personal living expenses.

The second case involved a taxpayer named Greta Starks. The case
was heard by the Tax Court in 1966, and the decision, rendered by
Judge Mulroney, reads in part as follows.
Greta Starks, T.C.M. 1966-134

Findings o f Fact
Petitioner, who was unmarried during the years in question, lives
at 16900 Parkside. Detroit, Michigan. She filed no Federal income tax
returns for the years 1954 through 1958. She was 24 years old in 1954
and during that year and throughout the years 1955, 1956, 1957 and
1958 she received from one certain man, amounts of money for living
expenses, and a house (he gave her the cash to buy it in her name),
furniture, an automobile, jewelry, fur coats, and other clothing. This
man was married and about 55 years old in 1954.
Respondent in his notice of deficiency stated that he determined
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that the property and money petitioner received each year constituted
income received by petitioner “for services rendered” and in his
computation he held her subject to self-employment tax. He explained
his computation of the deficiency for each year by reference to Exhibit
A which was attached to the notice of the deficiency. Page 13 of this
Exhibit A is as follows:
Analysis of Living Expenses and Assets Received for Services
Rendered
Year 1954
1955 Oldsmobile automobile
Weekly allowance ($150.00 x 20 weeks)
Total

Year 1955
16900 Parkside
Roberts Furs
Saks Fifth Avenue
Piano and furniture
Weekly allowance ($150.00 x 52 weeks)
Total

Year 1956
Roberts Furs
Saks Fifth Avenue
Miscellaneous household expense
Total

Year 1957
Furs by Roberts
Saks Fifth Avenue
Living expenses
Total

Year 1958
Furs by Roberts
Saks Fifth Avenue
Living expenses
Total

$ 3.000.00
3,000.00
$ 6,000.00
$22,211.08
5,038.00
828.18
6,000.00
7,800.00
$41,877.26
$ 1,570.00
3,543.17
1.500.00
$ 6,613.17
$

121.00
1,353.19
4,000.00

$ 5,474.19
$

35.00
978.79
4,000.00

$ 5,013.79

The money and properly received by petitioner during the years
in question were all gifts from the above described man with whom
she had a very close personal relationship during all of the years here
involved.
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Opinion
The question in this case is whether the advancements made by
respondent’s witness were gifts under section 102. Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. or in some manner payments that would constitute
taxable income. The question is one of fact.
There were two witnesses in this ease. Petitioner took the stand
and testified she was not gainfully employed during the years here
involved except for an occasional modeling job in 1954 for which her
total receipts did not exceed $600. She said she had no occupation and
was not engaged in any business or practicing any profession and had
no investments that yielded her income during the years in question.
She in effect admitted the receipt of the items of money and property
recited in respondent’s notice; of deficiency but said they were all gifts
made to her by the man she identified as sitting in the front row in
the courtroom. She testified that this man gave her money to defray
her living expenses, and about $20,000 cash to buy the house at 16900
Parkside in 1955. She testified that she mortgaged this house for about
$9,000 and she and this man lived for a time off of the proceeds of this
loan. She said that this man gave her the furniture, jewelry, and
clothing but she never considered the money and property turned
over to her by this man as earnings. She said she had during the years
in question, love and affection for this man and a very personal
relationship.
The only other witness in the case was the alleged donor who sat
in the courtroom during all of petitioner’s testimony. He was called
to the stand by respondent. He admitted on direct examination (there
was no cross-examination) that he had advanced petitioner funds for
the purchase of a house, clothes, fur coat, and furniture for the house.
He was asked the purpose of the payments and he replied: “To insure
the companionship of Greta Starks, more or less of a personal
investment in the future on my part." The only other portion of his
testimony that might be said to have any bearing on whether the
advancements were gifts or not is the following:
Q. In advancing Greta Starks monies to purchase the properties I
previously mentioned, what factors did you take into consideration
pertaining to your wish or desire of securing the permanent compan
ionship of Greta Starks?
A. The monies were advanced as I considered necessary. The
purchase of a house was considered a permanent basis to last ten.
twenty years not for a short while.
Respondent, of course, asks us to believe the testimony of his
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witness for respondent’s counsel stated he was not to be considered
a hostile witness. The witness was only asked a few questions. He had
heard all of petitioner’s testimony to the effect that the money, home,
ear, furniture, clothing, etc. were gifts by him to her. It is somewhat
significant that he was not asked the direct question as to whether the
advancement of money and property, which he admits he made, were
gifts by him to her. We have quoted the only two statements he made
that throw any light at all on the issue of whether the advancements
were gifts or earnings. Such passages in his answers to the effect that
he was making a “personal investment in the future” or the house
purchase was “considered a permanent basis” are incomprehensive
and rather absurd as statements of purpose. His testimony, in so far
as it can be understood at all, tends to corroborate petitioner. He
gives as his purpose for making the advancements “to insure the
companionship” of petitioner. This can well be his purpose for making
the gifts. It certainly serves no basis for the argument advanced by
respondent on brief to the effect that her “companionship” was a
service she rendered in return for the money and property she
received. Evidently respondent would argue the man paid her over
$41,000 for her companionship in 1955 and $5,000 or $6,000 for her
companionship in the other years.
We are not called upon to determine the propriety of the relations
that existed between petitioner and her admirer during the five years
in question. He testified he had not seen her for five or six years.
Petitioner was married in 1961 and is now living with her husband and
mother. It is enough to say that all of the circumstances and the
testimony of petitioner and even of respondent’s witness support her
statement that she received gifts of money and property during the
five years in question and no taxable income.

A Comparison of Facts Even a cursory examination of these two
Tax Court memorandum decisions reveals that the two cases have
many facts in common. In both instances a female taxpayer received
substantial sums of money and other valuable property each year for
several years, from a specific male person, in exchange for the
taxpayer’s companionship.
On the other hand, the two decisions also suggest several fact
differences between the two cases. For example:
1. The names, dates, and places of residence of the principal
parties differed in the two instances.
2. The woman involved in the one case was, throughout the years
in question, married; the other woman was single.
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3. One of the male companion/transferors had died prior to the
legal action; the other was alive and testified at the trial.
4. One of the taxpayer/transferees had a criminal record as a
prostitute prior to the years in question; the other had no such
record.
Because the pertinent tax issue is the same in both cases, the question
is whether the facts common to the two cases are sufficiently alike to
demand a common result or whether facts are sufficiently dissimilar
to justify opposite results. Ms. Brizendine had to report taxable
income; Ms. Starks was found to have received only gifts and,
therefore, had no taxable income to report. The law was the same in
both instances; therefore, the different results must be explained
either by the differences in the facts or by differences in the judicial
process. Theoretically, the judicial process should work equally well
in every case; if so, the different results can only be explained by
different facts.
An Analysis of the Divergent Results The published decision
rendered by any court is, quite obviously, much less than a complete
transcript of judicial proceeding. It is, at best, a brief synopsis of
those elements of the case deemed to be most important to the judge
who has the responsibility of explaining why and how the court
reached its decision. A review of the two judicial decisions under
consideration here suggests at least two hypotheses that might explain
adequately the divergent results reached in these two cases.
On the one hand, the fact that Margaret Brizendine was found to
have received taxable income rather than gifts may be attributable
primarily to the fact that she had a record of prior prostitution. The
fact that during the years 1945 through 1951 she elected to “discon
tinue her activities as a prostitute” may suggest that the taxable status
of her receipts really had not changed all that significantly. Prior to
1945 her receipts apparently were derived from numerous parties;
thereafter, from one individual. If the same explanation for the
receipts is common to b o th tim e p erio d s, th e tax re su lts sh o u ld not
differ simply because of the number of transferors involved. If,
however, the explanation for those transfers differed materially during
the two time periods, a history of prostitution should have no material
impact on the present decision.
An alternative hypothesis that might also adequately explain the
divergent results in these two cases would emphasize the differences
in the judicial process rather than the differences in the facts. In
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most tax litigation the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the tax
liability determined by the commissioner of internal revenue is
incorrect. If the taxpayer fails to present such proof, the contentions
of the IRS are deemed to be correct. Perhaps the attorney for Ms.
Brizendine simply failed to prove the client’s case.
Two adjacent statements in Brizendine support each of the above
hypotheses. Judge Rice first says, “Since petitioners thus failed to
establish that those amounts were in fact gifts, we conclude that such
amounts were correctly determined by respondent to be taxable
income which petitioners received during the years in issue.’’ This
sentence clearly suggests that Ms. Brizendine’s primary problem was
one of inadequate proof. In the next sentence, however, the judge
suggests the alternative hypothesis in the following words: “We
further think that there is considerable merit to the respondents’
argument that Margaret’s promise to the individual to forebear from
engaging in prostitution, and to grant him her companionship,
constituted sufficient consideration for the money received from him
to make it taxable to her. ’’
The ultimate basis for a judicial decision often is not known with
much certainty. Any impartial reading of Brizendine could not pass
lightly over the judge’s observation that the taxpayers’ “demeanor on
the stand, coupled with their long criminal records, leaves consid
erable doubt in our mind that the payments from the individual to
Margaret . . . were gifts.’’ Although initially it may be difficult to
understand how courtroom behavior or criminal records relate to the
presence or absence of a gift, those facts may help to establish the
credibility of any statements made by a witness. The process of
taxation is, after all, not a laboratory procedure but a very human
process from beginning to end. Any attempt to minimize the
significance of the human element at any level of the taxing process
runs the risk of missing a critical ingredient.
Starks may be viewed as further evidence of the importance of the
human element in the taxing process. This time, however, the record
suggests that human sympathies were running with the taxpayer and
against the IRS. Judge Mulroney seems to have been less than
pleased with the performance of the government’s attorney. The
judge, commenting on the government’s interrogation of the male
transferor, observes, “He was not asked the direct question as to
whether the advancements of money and property, which he admits
he made, were gifts by him to her. We have quoted the only two
statements he made that throw any light at all on the issue of whether
the advancements were gifts or earnings. Such passages in his answers
29

to the effect that he was making a ‘personal investment in the future’
or the house purchase was ‘considered a permanent basis’ are
incomprehensive and rather absurd as statements of purpose. His
testimony, in so far as it can be understood at all, tends to corroborate
petitioner.’’ In summary, even though the taxpayer technically once
again had the burden of proving the IRS wrong, the failure of the
government’s attorney to ask the obvious question and to pursue
related questions when a witness gave “incomprehensive’’ answers
seems to have influenced the judge in this instance. In any event,
the court did conclude that “all of the circumstances and the testimony
of petitioner and even of respondent’s witness support her statement
that she received gifts of money and property during the five years
in question and no taxable income.’’
Lessons for Tax Research Even though the specific technical tax
content of these two cases is trivial, a tax adviser can learn several
things from these two cases. History—that is, facts that took place
well before the events deemed to be critical in a given tax dispute—
may significantly influence the outcome of the decision. Therefore,
in gathering the facts in a tax problem, the tax adviser can never be
too thorough in getting all of the facts of a case.
A study of these two cases also reveals the intricate balance
between facts and conclusions. If the trier of facts—IRS agent,
conferee, or judge—can be convinced of the authenticity or even the
reasonableness of the facts presented for consideration, he or she has
ample opportunity to reach the conclusion desired by the taxpayer.
If those facts are not presented or are presented inadequately, the
decision-maker cannot be blamed for failing to give them full
consideration. Disputes are often lost by the party who fails to
capitalize on the opportunity to know and present all pertinent facts
in the best light.
Finally, some further reflections on these two cases are instructive
for tax planning generally. If the parties to this litigation had correctly
anticipated their subsequent tax problems, what might they have
done to reduce the probabilities of an unfavorable result? For
example, would the results have differed if neither party had included
a “weekly allowance’’ in their financial arrangements? Or if all
transfers had been made on such special occasions as a birthday, an
anniversary, Christmas, Yom Kippur, Saint Valentine’s Day, or some
other holiday? If gift cards had accompanied each transfer and those
cards saved and “treasured” in a scrapbook? If gift tax returns had
been filed by the transferor? Obviously, each of the additional facts
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suggested here would lend credence to the conclusion that the
transfers were indeed gifts. At some point the evidence—perhaps
the filing of the gift tax return—would be so overwhelming that no
one would question the conclusion in anything but the most unusual
circumstances.
The important point of this review is, of course, that the tax adviser
often plays a critical role in settings very remote from the courtroom.
If the tax adviser correctly anticipates potential problems, it may be
easy to recommend the accumulation of supporting proof that will
almost ensure the conclusion a client is interested in reaching,
without going to court. Even when the tax adviser has been consulted
only after all of the facts are “carved in stone, ” the thoroughness with
which those facts are presented is often critical to the resolution of
the tax question. And no one can make a good presentation of the
facts until all of the facts are known, down to the very last detail. A
study of two more cases can yield additional insight into the critical
role that facts play in tax questions.
Deductible or Not?

In general, we know that income earned from the rendering of a
service must be reported by the person who rendered the service
and that income from property must be reported by the person who
owns the property. If a taxpayer arranges for someone else to pay to
one of his parents a part of the value that was originally owed to him
for services rendered, generally that payment would still be taxed to
the individual rendering the service, and the payment would not
ordinarily be deductible by him. Payments made to parents, like
payments made to anyone else, would be deductible for income tax
purposes only if the parent had rendered a business-related service
to the child and the payment made for such a service were reasonable
in amount. But what exactly do those words mean?
The third case to be reviewed here involves a professional baseball
player named Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr. The case was heard by
the Tax Court in 1967, and the decision, rendered by Judge Hoyt,
reads in part as follows.
Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr. 48 T.C. 339 (1967)

Findings o f Fact
The stipulated facts are found accordingly and adopted as our
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Cecil Randolph Hundley. Jr. (hereinafter referred to as petitioner),
filed his 1960 income tax return with the district director ol internal
revenue, Richmond, Va. Martinsville, Va., was his legal resilience at
the time petitioner filed the petition herein. Petitioner is a professional
baseball player and at the time of trial was a catcher for the Chicago
Cu bs of the National League.
Petitioner's father, Cecil Randolph Hundley, Sr. (hereinafter re
ferred to as Cecil), is a former semiprofessional baseball player, and
he has also been a baseball coach. Cecil played as a catcher throughout
his baseball career, and received numerous injuries to his throwing
hand while using the traditional two-handed method of catching. This
is a common problem of catchers. A few years before Cecil retired
from active participation in baseball as a player, he developed a onehanded method of catching which was unique and unorthodox. This
technique was beneficial because injuries to the catcher's throwing
hand were avoided. Cecil became actively engaged in the construction
and excavation business in 1947 and was still engaged in that business
at time of trial.
Petitioner attended Bassett High School near Martinsville. Va.,
from which he graduated in June of 1960. During 1958 petitioner was
a member of his high school baseball team and the local American
Legion team. He played catcher for both teams and was an outstanding
player. In the spring of 1958, while a sophomore in high school,
petitioner decided that he wanted to become a good major league
professional ball player. Petitioner believed that Cecil was best
qualified to coach and train him for the attainment of this goal. After
discussing his ambition with Cecil, an oral agreement was reached
between petitioner and Cecil. Cecil agreed to devote his efforts to a
program of intensive training of petitioner in the skills of baseball, to
act as petitioner’s coach, business agent, manager, publicity director,
and sales agent in negotiating with professional baseball teams for a
contract. His role may best be described in petitioner s own words
when he first asked Cecil to handle things for him in 1958. “Daddy,
do the business part and let me play the ball.”
As compensation for Cecil s services, it was agreed that Cecil would
receive 50 percent of any bonus that might be received under the
terms of a professional baseball contract if one should later be signed.
This contingent payment agreement was thought to be fair and
reasonable by the parties since it was unknown at that time whether
petitioner would ever develop into a player with major league potential
or sign a professional baseball contract or receive a bonus for signing.
Moreover, petitioner could not sign a baseball contract while still a
minor without his parent’s consent or until he graduated from high
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school. The size of baseball bonuses obtainable at some unknown time,
years in the future, was extremely conjectural. A rule limiting bonuses
to $4,000 for signing baseball contracts had been suspended in 1958
and its reinstatement was a definite possibility before 1960. It was not
expected by petitioner or Cecil at that time that an exceptionally large
bonus would ever be received. Later on they estimated that at most
$25,000 might be paid to petitioner as a bonus.
Between the spring of 1958 and petitioner’s graduation from high
school in 1960. Cecil devoted a great deal of time to petitioner’s
development into the best baseball player possible. Cecil became
petitioner’s coach and taught petitioner the skill of being a one-handed
catcher. While this method is advantageous, it is difficult to master
because it is contrary to natural instincts. The perfection of this
unorthodox technique therefore required an inordinate amount of time
and effort by the teacher and the pupil. Cecil also taught petitioner
to be a power hitter in order to enhance petitioner's appeal to
professional baseball teams. Petitioner weighted only 155 pounds during
his high school days which was a decided handicap for him both as a
hitter and a catcher hoping to break into the big leagues.
Cecil attended every baseball practice session and every home and
away game in which petitioner participated between 1958 and 1960.
On many of these occasions he met with scouts for big league teams.
By mutual agreement, Cecil relieved petitioner’s high school and
American Legion coach from any duties with respect to petitioner. It
was agreed between the coach and Ce cil that it would be in the
petitioner's interest for Cecil to be in complete charge of the training
program. Cecil supplied petitioner with baseball equipment at his own
expense during this period.
In order to obtain the best possible professional baseball contract
for petitioner. Cecil had many meetings with members of the press
during the 2-year period from the spring of 1958 to June 16, 1960, to
publicize petitioner’s skill as a baseball player. Cecil handled all the
negotiations with representatives of the many professional baseball
teams that became interested in petitioner. This undertaking involved
numerous meetings at home and out of town. Cecil left Sundays open
for such negotiations for the entire 2-year period but negotiations often
occurred on other days of the week. Cecil was never paid anything for
the considerable expenses he incurred over the 2-year period.
The amount of compensation to be received by Cecil was contingent
on the obtainment and size of a bonus to be paid petitioner for signing
a professional baseball contract. In determining the percentage of the
possible bonus to be received by Cecil, the parties also gave consid
eration to Cecil's increased expenses and the anticipated loss of time
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and income from his construction business, Cecil had to neglect his
business and he lost several substantial contracts during the period of
petitioner’s intensive training. The amount of time he devoted to bis
grading and excavating business was substantially reduced during
1958, 1959, and I960 with corresponding loss of business income.
Petitioner developed into an outstanding high school baseball player
under Cecil's tutorage and by 1960 many major league clubs bad
become interested in signing him. Due to the rule requiring high
school graduation before signing a baseball contract, extensive final
negotiation sessions with representatives of the various major league
baseball teams did not begin until after petitioner’s graduation in 1960.
The final negotiation sessions were held at Cecil's home and after
2 weeks resulted in a professional baseball contract signed by petitioner
on June 16, 1960. All of the negotiations with the many major league
clubs bidding for petitioner’s contract were handled by Cecil in such
a way that the bidding for petitioner's signature was extremely
competitive. Representatives of the various baseball teams were
allowed to make as many offers as they wanted during the 2-week
period, but the terms of any offer were not revealed to representatives
of other teams. Cecil' s expert and shrewd handling of the negotiations
was instrumental in obtaining a most favorable contract and an
extraordinarily large bonus for the petitioner.
The baseball contract finally signed by petitioner was with a minor
league affiliate of the San Francisco Giants of the National League.
The contract provided for a bonus of $110,000 to be paid over a 5-year
period at the rate of $22,009 per year. $11,000 to petitioner and
$11,000 to Cecil, and a guaranteed salary to petitioner of not less than
$1,000 per month during the baseball playing season for a period of
5 years. Cecil bargained for and insisted upon the minimum salary
provision in addition to the large bonus because of his expectation that
petitioner would be playing in the relatively low paying minor leagues
for at least 5 years. Cecil also signed the contract because under the
rules of professional baseball the signature of a minor was not accepted
without the signature of his parent.
The baseball contract contained the following pertinent provisions:
1. The Club hereby employs the Player to render, and the Player
agrees to render, skilled services as a baseball player in connection
with all games of the (dub during the year 1960, including the Club s
training season, the Club's exhibition games, the Club's playing season,
any official series in which the Club may participate, and in any game
or games in the receipts of which the Player may be entitled to share.
The Player covenants that at the time he signs this contract he is not
under contract or contractual obligation to any baseball club other
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than the one party to this contract and that he is capable of and will
perforin with expertness, diligence and fidelity the service stated and
such other duties as may be required of him in such employment.
2. For the service aforesaid subsequent to the training season the
Club will pay the Player at the rate of one thousand dollars ($1,000)
per month . . . after the commencement of the playing season . . .
and end with the termination of the Club’s scheduled playing season
and any official league playoff series in which the Club participates.
14. Player is to receive cash bonus of one hundred and ten thousand
dollars ($110,000) payable as follows:
Eleven thousand dollars ($11,000) upon approval of this contract by
the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues. Also eleven
thousand dollars ($11,000) on Sept. 15, 1961; Sept. 15, 1962; Sept. 15,
1963; Sept. 15, 1964.
The father, Cecil R. Hundley, is to receive eleven thousand dollars
($11,000) upon approval of contract by the National Association of
Professional Baseball Leagues. Also eleven thousand dollars ($11,000)
on Sept. 15. 1961; Sept. 15, 1962; Sept. 15, 1963; and Sept. 15, 1964.
The designation of $11,000 to be paid annually to Cecil for 5 years
was a consequence of the agreement between Cecil and petitioner to
divide equally any bonus received by petitioner for signing a profes
sional baseball contract. The scout for the San Francisco Giants who
negotiated the contract was aware of the aforementioned agreement
before the contract was written, and the terms of the contract reflected
the prior understanding of the contracting parties with respect to the
division of the bonus payments. Petitioner’s high school coach also
knew of the 50-50 bonus agreement between petitioner and Cecil and
had been aware of it since its inception in 1958.
During the 1960 taxable year which is in issue, petitioner and Cecil
each received $11,000 of the bonus from the National Exhibition Co.
pursuant to the terms of the contract. Petitioner did not include the
811,000 payment received by Cecil in his gross income reported in his
income tax return for 1960. Cecil duly reported it in his income tax
return for that year.
The notice of deficiency received by petitioner stated that income
reported as received from the National Exhibition Co. was understated
by the amount of $11,000. The parties are apparently in agreement
that petitioner understated his income for 1960 in the determined
amount, but petitioner contends that an offsetting expense deduction
of $11,000 should have been allowed for the payment received by
Cecil as partial compensation for services rendered under the 1958
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agreement between petitioner and Cecil. Respondent s position on
brief is that only a $2,200 expense deduction, 10 percent of the total
bonus payment in 1960, is allowable to petitioner in 1960 as the
reasonable value of services performed by Cecil.
The contract between Cecil and petitioner was made in 1958: it was
bona fide and at arm’s length, reasonable in light of the circumstances
existing when made and in the taxable year before us. The payment
of 50 percent of petitioner's bonus thereunder to Cecil in 1960 was
compensation to him for services actually rendered to petitioner. He
received and kept the $11,000 of the bonus paid directly to him by the

Respondent’s determination that an additional $11,000 should have
been included in petitioner's income for 1960 is based upon section
61(a) which provides that gross income includes compensation for
services and section 73(a) which provides that amounts received in
respect of the services of a child shall be included in the child’s gross
income even though such amounts are not received by the child.
It is beyond question and on brief the parties agree that the $11,000
received by Cecil actually represented an amount paid in consideration
of obtaining petitioner s services as a professional baseball player.
Petitioner, while agreeing with the foregoing conclusion, argues that
a deduction in the amount of $11,000 should be allowed for 1960 under
section 162 or 212. Respondent has conceded that such a deduction
should be allowed but only in the amount of $2,200.
Section 162 provides that a deduction shall be allowed for an ordinary
and necessary expense paid during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business including a reasonable allowance for compensation
for personal services actually rendered. Section 212 provides that an
individual may deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year for the production or collection of
income.
Respondent argues there is insufficient evidence to establish an
agreement in 1958 to share any bonus equally and that even if there
were such an agreement no portion paid for Cecil's services to
petitioner prior to 1960 is deductible because prior to his graduation,
petitioner was not in the trade or business of being a baseball player.
He contends that the only service performed by Cecil for which
petitioner is entitled to a deduction was the actual negotiation of the
June 16, 1960, contract. He concedes on brief that a reasonable value
for the services rendered by Cecil during the 2-week period from
graduation to signing the contract is $2,200, 10 percent of the total
bonus paid in 1960.
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Petitioner has introduced persuasive and convincing evidence that
the agreement was in fact reached in the spring of 1958, and we have
so found. This finding is essential to petitioner’s position that a
deduction for an ordinary and necessary business expense deduction
in the amount of $11,000 should be allowed in 1960. He argues that
a contingent right to 50 percent of any bonus obtained was a reasonable
value for services rendered by Cecil between the spring of 1958 and
the signing of the contract in 1960, and that payment for such services
was therefore an ordinary and necessary expense associated with his
business of professional baseball.
We agree that the 50 percent contingent compensation agreement
was reasonable in amount. Section 1.162-7(b)(2) of the regulations sets
forth a test for the deductibility of contingent compensation which we
have accepted as correct in Roy Marilyn Stone Trust, 44 T.C. 349
(1965). We apply the test here.
The primary elements considered by petitioner and Cecil in deter
mining Cecil' s contingent compensation were the amount of time that
would be spent in coaching, training, and representing petitioner
during the uncertain period between 1958 and an eventual contract.
Cecil's exclusive handling of all publicity and contract negotiations and
the income that would probably be lost due to less time spent on
Cecil’s construction business were also important factors. In addition
to the foregoing considerations, emphasis should be placed on the fact
that the ultimate receipt of a bonus of any kind was uncertain and
indefinite. The amount was indeterminable and in 1958 neither
petitioner, Cecil, nor the high school coach who was aware of the
agreement had any notion that an exceptionally large bonus would be
paid 2 years hence. Petitioner might well never have become a
professional ballplayer, nor was it at all certain that he would be paid
a bonus in the future. Viewing the circumstances at the time the
agreement was made in the light of all of the evidence before us we
conclude and hold that the test of reasonableness has been met even
though the contingent compensation may be greater than the amount
which might be ordinarily paid.
While it is true that an agreement of this sort between a father and
his minor son cannot possess the arm’s-length character of transactions
between independent, knowledgeable businessmen and must be most
carefully scrutinized, the agreement here stands every searching test.
Independent and trustworthy witnesses verified its existence since
1958. It was in our judgment and in the opinion of both petitioner
and Cecil, then and at trial, fair to both parties. See Olivia de Havilland
Goodrich. 20 T.C. 323 (1953).
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Respondent contends further, however, that even if the bonus
splitting agreement arose in 1958 and was intended to ultimately result
in a reasonable amount of compensation for services rendered through
out the 2-vear period, the full amount received by Cecil is still not
deductible because petitioner was not engaged in a trade or business
or any other income-producing activity until graduation from high
school when he became eligible to sign a professional baseball contract.
In order for an expenditure to qualify for deductibility under section
162 or 212, it must have been paid or incurred in carrying on any
trade or business or for any other income producing or collecting
The contingent compensation agreement was so closely bound up
with the existence of the petitioner s business activity of professional
baseball that payments made thereunder must be considered as paid
in carrying on a trade or business. If petitioner had never entered the
business of professional baseball or had not been paid a bonus therefor,
no payments would have been made to or received by Cecil. The
whole basis of the agreement was the ultimate existence and estab
lishment of the contemplated business activity and the collection of a
bonus. We therefore conclude that payments made under the terms
of the agreement were paid for services actually rendered in carrying
on a business. The obligation to make the payments to Cecil was an
obligation of the business since there would be no obligation without
the business. If the business were entered without payment of a bonus
there also would be no obligation to share it with Cecil. The unique
relationship of Cecil' s compensation to the professional baseball con
tract and petitioner’s income derived therefrom in I960 is most
persuasive of the deductible nature of the compensation payment
made that year.
Respondent’s final argument, raised herein for the first time on
brief, is based on the premise that the service's rendered prior to high
school graduation were basically educational in nature, and that
educational expenditures are personal and nondeductible if undertaken
primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new position or substantia]
advancement in position. See sec. 1.162-5(b), Income Tax Regs. We
have previously held that claimed deductions for educational expend
itures of the foregoing type are not allowable. Mary O . Furner, 47
T.C. 165 (1966); Joseph T. Booth III, 35 T.C. 1144 (1961); and Arnold
Namrow, 33 T.C. 419 (1959), aff’d. 288 F.2d 648 (C.A. 4. 1961).
However, petitioner is not claiming a deduction in the amount of
$11,000 for educational expenditures, and indeed he could not. It is
clear that a significant portion of Cecil's compensation was not for
coaching and training petitioner in the skills of baseball, if that be
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deemed education, but for other services rendered throughout the 2year period.
We hold, therefore, that whereas respondent acted correctly in
including the entire $22,000 bonus in petitioner s taxable income,
petitioner should be nevertheless allowed a deduction in the amount
of $11,000 in 1960 as a business expense for the portion of the bonus
paid directly to Cecil for his personal services actually rendered with
such rewarding financial results for both petitioner and his father.

The last case to be reviewed in this chapter involves another
professional baseball player named Richard A. Allen. His case was
heard by the Tax Court in 1968, and the decision, rendered by Judge
Raum, reads in part as follows:
Richard A. Allen, 50 T.C. 466 (1968)

Findings o f Fact
Some of the facts have been stipulated and, as stipulated, are
incorporated herein by this reference along with accompanying ex
hibits.
Petitioners Richard A. and Barbara Allen are husband and wife,
who at the time of the filing of the petitions and amended petitions
herein resided in Philadelphia, Pa. Richard A. Allen filed his individual
returns for the calendar years 1960, 1961, and 1962, and a joint return
with his wife Barbara Allen for 1963, on the cash receipts and
disbursements method of accounting, with the district director of
internal revenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. Barbara Allen is a party to this
proceeding solely by virtue of the joint return filed for 1963, and the
term ‘petitioner’ will hereinafter refer solely to Richard A. Allen.
Petitioner was born on March 8, 1942. In the spring of 1960
petitioner, then age 18, was living with his mother. Mrs. Era Allen,
in Wampum, Pa., and was a senior at a local high school. Mrs. Allen
had been separated from her husband since 1957. She had eight
children, of whom three, including petitioner, were dependent upon
her for support during 1960. She received no funds from her husband,
and supported her family by doing housework, sewing, or laundry
work.
In the course of his high school years, petitioner acquired a
reputation as an outstanding baseball and basketball player. He was
anxious to play professional baseball, and had even expressed a desire
to leave high school for that purpose before graduation, but was not
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permitted to do so by his mother. During the petitioner’s junior year
in high school, word of his athletic talents reached John Ogden
(hereinafter “Ogden”), a baseball “scout for the Philadelphia National
League Club, commonly known and hereinafter referred to as the
Phillies. Ogden's attention was drawn to petitioner through a news
paper article about petitioner which, while primarily describing him
as a great basketball player, also mentioned that he had hit 22 “home
runs” playing with a men’s semiprofessional baseball team the summer
before his junior year in high school, and that the player who had
come closest to his total on this team, which otherwise comprised only
grown men, had hit only 15 home runs. Ogden’s function as a scout
for the Phillies was to select baseball talent capable of playing in the
major leagues, i.e., with the Phillies, and after reading this article he
made up his mind to see petitioner.
Ogden had himself played baseball for around 16 to 18 years, was
general manager of one baseball club and owner of another for 7 or 8
years, and at the time of the trial herein had been a baseball scout for
the preceding 28 years—a total of about 52 years in professional
baseball. After interviewing petitioner and watching him play basketball
and baseball, Ogden determined that petitioner was the greatest
prospect he had ever seen. He conveyed this impression to John
Joseph Quinn (hereinafter “Quinn" ), vice president and general
manager of the Phillies, and told Quinn that petitioner was worth
"whatever it takes to get him. Quinn thereupon gave Ogden authority
to “go and get” petitioner, i.e., to sign him to a contract to play
baseball for the Phillies.
From this point on. Ogden became very friendly with petitioner's
family. He hired Coy Allen, petitioner's older brother of about 36 or
37 who had played some semiprofessional baseball in the past, as a
scout for the Phillies. He also signed Harold Allen, another brother
of petitioner to a contract to play baseball in the Phillies organization.
He visited the Allen home often, and talked to petitioner about playing
baseball. He did not, however, attempt immediately to sign petitioner
to a contract because of a rule adhered to by the Phillies and other
baseball teams prohibiting the signing of any boy attending high school
to a baseball contract until after his graduation.
Ogden, as well as representatives of a dozen or more other baseball
teams that also desired petitioner s services, discussed petitioner's
prospects with his mother. Era Allen. She was the head of the family,
and she made all the family decisions. Although petitioner discussed
baseball with the various scouts, he referred them to his mother in
connection with any proposed financial arrangements, and he felt
"bound” to play for whichever club his mother might select.

40

Era Allen conducted all negotiations with Ogden in respect of the
financial arrangements that might he made for petitioner if it should
be determined that he would play for the Phillies. However, she knew
nothing about baseball, particularly the financial aspects of baseball,
and she relied almost entirely upon advice from her son Coy Allen.
After petitioner had entered into a contract to play for the Phillies
organization, as hereinafter more fully set forth. Era Allen paid Coy
$2,000 in 1960 for his services out of the funds which she received
under that contract, and she deducted that amount from her gross
income on her 1960 individual income tax return.
One of the principal items of negotiation with Ogden was the amount
of “bonus” to be paid for petitioner’s agreement to play for the Phillies
organization. Such bonus was in addition to the monthly or periodic
compensation to be paid petitioner for services actually rendered as
a ballplayer. The purpose of the bonus was to assure the Phillies of the
right to the player s services, if he were to play at all, and to prevent
him from playing for any other club except with permission of the
Phillies. Scouts for other teams had made offers of a bonus of at least
$20,000 or $25,000. During the course of the negotiations Ogden made
successive offers of a bonus in the amounts of $35,000, $50,000, and
finally $70,000. The $70,000 offer was satisfactory to petitioner's
mother, but she wanted $40,000 of that amount paid to her and
$30,000 to petitioner. She thought that she was entitled to a portion
of the bonus because she was responsible for his coming into baseball
by her hard work, perseverance, taking care of petitioner, and seeing
that he “did the right thing." Although it had been informally agreed
prior to petitioner’s graduation that he would go with the Phillies, the
contract was presented to and signed by petitioner some 30 or 40
minutes after he had received his high school diploma on June 2,
1960.
The contract was formally between petitioner anti the Williamsport
Baseball Club, one of six or seven minor league teams affiliated with
the Phillies through a contractual arrangement known as a “working
agreement ”whereby, in general, the Phillies were entitled, in exchange
for a stated consideration, to "select" the contracts of any of the players
on the Williamsport Club for their own purposes and under which the
Phillies further agreed, among other things, to reimburse the Williams
port Club for any bonus paid to a player for signing a contract with
that club. The Williamsport (dub was under the substantial control of
the Phillies, and the contract between petitioner and the Williamsport
Club was signed on behalf of the latter by an official of the Phillies,
who was in charge of all the Phillies’ minor league clubs, or what was
called their “farm system," and who was authorized to sign on behalf
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of the Williamsport Club. The contract was on the standard form
prescribed by the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues. Since petitioner was a minor, his mother gave her consent
to his execution of the contract by signing her name under a printed
paragraph at the end of the form contract entitled “Consent of Parent
or Guardian.” Such consent was given explicity [sic] “to the execution
of this contract by the minor player party hereto, ” and was stated to
be effective as to any assignment or renewal of the contract as therein
specified. She was not a party to the contract. The Phillies, in
accordance with their usual practice, would not have entered into any
such contract, through the Williamsport Club or otherwise, without
having obtained the consent of a parent or guardian of the minor
player.
In addition to providing for a salary of $850 per month for petitioner’s
services as a ballplayer, the contract provided for the $70,000 bonus
payable over a 5-year period, of which $40,000 was to be paid directly
to petitioner’s mother and $30,000 to petitioner. The contract provided
in part as follows:
1. The Club hereby employs the Player to render, and the Player
agrees to render, skilled services as a baseball player in connection
with all games of the Club during the year I960. . . . The Player
covenants that at the time he signs this contract he is not under
contract or contractual obligation to any baseball club other than the
one party to this contract and that he is capable of and will perform
with expertness, diligence and fidelity the service stated and such
other duties as may be required of him in such employment.
2. For the service aforesaid subsequent to the training season the
Club will pay the Player at the rate of eight hundred fifty dollars per
month.
5. (a) The Player agrees that, while under contract and prior to
expiration of the Club’s right to renew the contract, and until he
reports to his club for spring training, if this contract is renewed, for
the purpose of avoiding injuries he will not play baseball otherwise
than for the Club except that he may participate in postseason games
as prescribed in the National Association Agreement.
(b) The Player and the Club recognize and agree that the Player’s
participation in other sports may impair or destroy his ability and skill
as a baseball player. Accordingly, the Player agrees he will not engage
in professional boxing or wrestling and that, except with the written
consent of the Club, he will not play professional football, basketball,
hockey or other contact sport.
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Player is to receive bonus of $6,000
Do ..............................$8,000
Do ..............................$8,000
Do .............. ..............$4,000
Do ..............................$4,000

payable
. . do . .
. . do . .
. . do . .
. . do . .

June
June
June
June
June

2,
1,
1,
1,
1,

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $16,000 payable
June 2, 1960
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $ 10,000 payable
June 1, 1961
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $6,000 payable
June 2, 1962
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $4,000 pavable
June 2, 1963
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $4,000 pay able
June 2, 1964
Total bonus seventy thousand dollars guaranteed.
It was generally the practice in baseball to have the signature of a
parent or guardian when signing a player under the age of 21 to a
contract, and a contract lacking such signature would probably not
have been approved by the president of the National Association of
Professional Baseball Leagues.
The installments of the $70,000 bonus agreed to by the Williamsport
Baseball Club in its contract with petitioner were actually paid by the
Phillies under their "working agreement” with the Williamsport Club.
The Phillies viewed such bonus arrangements as consideration to
induce a player to sign a contract which thus tied him to the Phillies
and prevented his playing baseball for any other club without the
consent of the Phillies. These bonus arrangements represented a
gamble on the part of the Phillies, for a player might not actually have
the ability to play in the major leagues, or might decide on his own
that he no longer wanted to play baseball. The Phillies could not
recover bonus money already paid, and as a matter of baseball practice
felt obligated to pay a bonus, once agreed to, in all events, even if
some part of the bonus still remained unpaid when the player left or
was given his unconditional release by the club. Nevertheless, in light
of petitioner’s future potential and ability, Ogden, who negotiated
petitioner’s bonus, and Quinn, who had the final say in these matters,
felt that $70,000 was a fair price to pay to “get" the right to petitioner's

services as a professional baseball player. It was a matter of indifference
to them as to whom the bonus was paid or what division was made of
the money. The previous year, in 1959, the Phillies had paid a bonus
of approximately $100,000 to one Ted Kazanski and in 1960, at about
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the same time they signed petitioner, the Phillies paid a bonus of
approximately $40,000 to one Bruce Gruber.
Following the execution of the foregoing contract in June 1960 with
the Williamsport Club, petitioner performed services as a professional
baseball player under annual contracts for various minor league teams
affiliated with the Phillies until sometime in 1963. From that time, he
has performed his services directly for the Phillies, and in 1967 his
annual salary as a baseball player was approximately $65,000.
Petitioner (and his wife Barbara Allen in the taxable year 1963)
reported as taxable ordinary income in his (their) Federal income tax
returns for the taxable years 1960. 1961, 1962, and 1963 the bonus
payments received by petitioner in each of said years, as follows:
1960
1961
1962
1963

......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................

8 6.000
8,000
8,000
4.000

Petitioner’s mother. Era Allen, reported as taxable ordinary income
in her Federal income tax returns for the taxable years 1960, 1961,
1962, and 1963 the payments received by her in each of said years,
as follows:
1960 ...................................... $16,000
1961 ......................................
10,000
1962 ......................................
6,000
1963 ......................................
4,000
In his notice of deficiency to petitioner in respect of the taxable
years 1961 and 1962, and his notice of deficiency to petitioner Richard
and his wife Barbara Allen in respect of the taxable year 1963. the
Commissioner determined that the bonus payments received by
petitioner’s mother in 1961, 1962. and 1963 represented amounts
received in respect of a minor child and were taxable to petitioner
under sections 61 and 73 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; he
increased petitioner's taxable income in each of those years accordingly.
1. Inclusion o f Bonus in Petitioner's Gross Income. (a) Petitioner
was only 18 years old when the events giving rise to the bonus
payments in controversy took place. Accordingly, if the payments
made during the years in issue (1961-63) by the Phillies to Era Allen,
petitioner’s mother, constitute “amounts received in respect of the
services’ of petitioner within the meaning of section 73(a). I.R.C.
1954, then plainly they must be included in petitioner's gross income
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rather than in that of his mother. Although petitioner contends that
the statute does not cover the present situation, we hold that the
payments made to his mother during the years in issue were received
solely in respect of petitioner’s services, and that all such amounts
were therefore includable in his income.
Petitioner argues that the payments received by his mother, totaling
$40,000 over a 5-year period, were not part of his bonus for signing
a contract to play baseball for the Phillies organization, but rather
represented compensation for services performed by her, paid by the
Phillies in return for her influencing petitioner to sign the contract
and giving her written consent thereto. But there was no evidence of
any written or oral agreement between the Phillies and Era Allen in
which she agreed to further the Phillies' interests in this manner, and
we shall not lightly infer the existence of an agreement by a mother
dealing on behalf of her minor child which would or could have the
effect of consigning her child’s interests to a secondary position so that
she might act for her own profit. Moreover, we think the evidence in
the record consistently points to the conclusion that the payments
received from the Phillies by Era Allen were considered and treated
by the parties as part of petitioner's total bonus of $70,000. This sum
was paid by the Phillies solely to obtain the exclusive right to
petitioner's services as a professional baseball player: no portion thereof
was in fact paid for his mother s consent.
We note, first of all. that there was no separate written agreement
between the Phillies and Era Allen concerning the payment of $40,000
to her, and that in fact the sole provision of which we are aware for
the payment of this sum appears in the contract between petitioner
and the Williamsport Baseball Club, a minor league baseball club
affiliated with the Phillies under a “working agreement which entitled
the Phillies to claim the contract and the services of any player on the
club at any time. Petitioner’s contract, a uniform player’s contract
standard in professional baseball, contained a paragraph requiring the
parties to set forth any “additional compensation" (aside from the
regular payment of salary) received or to be received from the club
“in connection with this contract” and it is in the space provided for
such “additional compensation” that all the annual installments of
petitioner’s bonus, both those payable to petitioner and those payable
to his mother, are set forth. After a description of all such installments,
identifying the payee (petitioner or his mother), the amount and the
date due, appear the words: “Total bonus seventy thousand dollars
guaranteed.” Moreover, if further proof be needed that the Phillies
did not consider any part of the $70,000 bonus as compensation for
Era Allen s services it is provided by the testimony of John Ogden, the
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baseball scout responsible for petitioner's signing a contract with the
Phillies organization. Although Ogden resisted being pinned down,
the clear import of his testimony was that the total bonus paid was
determined solely by petitioner’s ability to play baseball and his future
prospects as a player, that the Phillies considered $70,000 a fair price
to pay for the right to petitioner’s services, and that it made little
difference to them whether petitioner’s mother received any part of
the bonus so determined.
Era Allen herself did not claim to be entitled to $40,000 by virtue
of any services performed for or on behalf of the Phillies, and in fact
made clear in her testimony that she bargained, as one would expect,
“for whatever was best for my son." Rather, she insisted upon a large
portion of petitioner’s bonus because she felt that petitioner would
never have reached the point at which he was able to sign a lucrative
contract with a professional baseball team had it not been for her hard
work and perseverance in supporting him. And indeed, as the mother
of a minor child, one who by the fruits of her own labor had contributed
to the support of her minor child without the help of the child's father,
she appears to have been entitled to all petitioner’s earnings under
Pennsylvania law. Pa. Slat. lit. 48, sec. 91 (1965).
Prior to 1944, the Commissioner’s rulings and regulations “required
a parent to report in his (or her) return the earnings of a minor child,
if under the laws of the state where they resided the parent had a right
to such earnings,” even if none or only part of the child's earnings
were actually appropriated by the parent. . . . Because parents were
not entitled to the earnings of their minor children in all States, and
because even in those States following this common-law doctrine the
parents' right to the earnings of a minor child could be lost if it was
found that the child had been emancipated, the result of the Com
missioner s policy was that:
for Federal income tax purposes, opposite results obtain(ed)
under the same set of facts depending upon the applicable State
law. In addition, such variations in the facts as make applicable
the exceptions to the general rule in each jurisdiction tend(ed)
to produce additional uncertainty with respect to the tax treat
ment of the earnings of minor children.
H. Rept. No. 1365, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 21 (1944); S. Rept. No.
885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 22. To remedy these defects. Congress
in 1944 enacted the substantially identical predecessor of section 73
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. providing the easily determin
able and uniform rule that all amounts received “in respect of the
services of a child” shall be included in bis income. “Thus, even though
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the contract of employment is made directly by the parent and the
parent receives the compensation for the services, for the purpose of
the Federal income tax the amounts would be considered to be taxable
to the child because earned by him.” H. Rept. No. 885, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess., p. 22, 23. We think section 73 reverses what would have
been the likely result in this ease under pre-1944 law wholly apart
from the contract, and that the $70,000 bonus is taxable in full to
petitioner.
Petitioner stresses the fact that the $70,000 bonus paid by the
Phillies did not constitute a direct payment for his "services as a
professional baseball player, which were to be compensated at an
agreed salary of $850 per month, for the $70,000 was to be paid in all
events, whether or not petitioner ever performed any services for the
Phillies organization. Therefore, it is argued, the bonus payments
could not have constituted compensation for services which alone are
taxed to a minor child under section 73. Cf. Rev. Rul. 58-145, 19581 C.B. 360. This argument misreads the statute, which speaks in terms
of “amounts received in respect o f the services of a child,” and not
merely of compensation for services performed. True, petitioner
performed no services in the usual sense for his $70,000 bonus, unless
his act of signing the contract be considered such, but the bonus
payments here were paid by the Phillies as an inducement to obtain
his services as a professional baseball player and to preclude him from
rendering those services to other professional baseball teams; they
thus certainly constituted amounts received “in respect o f "his services.
(b) Even if amounts in issue were not received “in respect of the
services of a child under section 73, we think that the bonus
installments paid to petitioner’s mother during the tax years 1961-63
are nevertheless chargeable to him under the general provisions of
section 61. It has long been established that one who becomes entitled
to receive income may not avoid tax thereon by causing it to be paid
to another through “anticipatory arrangements however skillfully
devised. Lucas v. Earl. 281 U.S. 111, 114-115; Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112: Helvering v. Eubank. 311 U.S. 122: Harrison v.
Schaffner. 312 U.S. 579.
As indicated above, the entire $70,000 bonus was paid as consid
eration for petitioner’s agreement to play baseball for the Phillies or
any team designated by the Phillies. We reject as contrary to fact the
argument that part of that amount was paid to his mother for her
consent to the contract. It was petitioner, and petitioner alone who
was the source of the income and it is a matter of no consequence that
his mother thought that she was entitled to some of that income
because of her conscientious upbringing of petitioner. . . .
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2. Petitioner's Alternative Contention— Deduction o f Bonus Pay
ments Prom His Gross Income. Finally petitioner argues alternatively
that if his entire $70,000 bonus is includable in his income, he should
be allowed to deduct the bonus payments received by his mother as
an “ordinary and necessary expense incurred in carrying on his trade
or business as a professional baseball player. He places great reliance
in this argument upon Cecil Randolph Hundley, J r .,48 T.C. 339. acq.
19(57-2 C.B. 2, a ease recently decided by this Court in which a
professional baseball player was allowed to deduct that portion of his
bonus for signing a baseball contract which was paid directly to his
father, the result of an agreement entered into some 2 years before
the contract was signed as a means of compensating the father for his
services as a baseball coach and business agent. However, the special
facts in Hundley, which supported a finding of reasonableness for the
amount of the deduction claimed and warranted the conclusion that
the amounts paid there in fact represented a bona fide expense
incurred in carrying on the taxpayer’s trade or business of being a
professional baseball player, are almost entirely absent here.
It is unnecessary to determine the exact sum which would have
constituted a reasonable payment to Era Allen for her services, though
we note that only $2,000 was paid to her son Coy Allen for the advice
she so greatly relied on, for we are certain that in any ease it could
not have exceeded the $16,000 received by her in 1960. Although the
year 1960 is not before us in these proceedings, we can and do take
into account the payment made to her in that year in determining
whether the deductions now claimed by petitioner for payments made
to her in the years 1961, 1962, and 1963 are reasonable in amount and
deductible as “ordinary and necessary” business expenses. We think
they clearly are not, and hold that petitioner is not entitled to
deductions in any amount for payments made to his mother in those
years.

A Comparison of the Facts Once again even a cursory examination
of these two Tax Court decisions reveals that the cases have several
facts in common. In both instances
1. A professional baseball player arranged to have a portion of a
sizable bonus paid to one of his parents.
2. Both the parent and the ball-playing minor child signed the
professional contract.
3. The bonus payments actually were made by the ball club to the
parent over several years.
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4. The parent reported the amount received as ordinary taxable
income and paid the tax liability thereon.
The two cases also differ in several factual respects.
1. The names, dates, amounts, and places of residence of the
principal parties differed in the two cases.
2. The parent involved in one case was the baseball player’s father;
the other case involved his mother.
3. One parent was knowledgeable about, and deeply involved in,
training the child in the skill of ball playing; the other parent
knew relatively little about baseball.
4. One parent-child pair had a prior oral agreement about how
they would divide any bonus that might eventually be received;
the other parent-child pair had no such prior agreement.
Once again, it is pertinent to inquire whether or not the common
facts are sufficient to require a common result or whether the different
facts justify different results. The decisions of the court again were
very different. Cecil Hundley, Jr., was allowed to deduct the portion
of the bonus paid to his father; Richard Allen was denied the right
to deduct the portion of the bonus paid to his mother. Because the
law was the same in both cases, and because there is little basis in
the reported decisions to conclude that differences in the judicial
process had much influence on these results, we must conclude that
the different facts adequately explain the divergent results.
An Analysis of the Divergent Results Judge Hoyt makes it clear
that the decision in Hundley is critically dependent on the existence
of the oral agreement between the father and the son. He states,
“Petitioner has introduced persuasive and convincing evidence that
the agreement was in fact reached in the spring of 1958, and we have
so found. This finding is essential to petitioner’s position. . . .” Judge
Raum makes it equally clear in Allen that he could find no contractual
agreement in that case. He states, “Petitioner argues that the
payments received by his mother . . . were not part of his bonus for
signing a contract to play baseball for the Phillies organization, but
rather represented compensation for services performed by her, paid
by the Phillies in return for her influencing petitioner to sign the
contract and giving her written consent thereto. But there was no
evidence of any written or oral agreement between the Phillies and
Era Allen in which she agreed to further the Phillies’ interests in this
manner, and we shall not lightly infer the existence of an agreement
by a mother dealing on behalf of her minor child. . . . ”
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One cannot help but wonder exactly how it is possible for a person
to present convincing evidence of an oral agreement made between
a father and his tenth-grade son some nine years prior to the litigation.
Two brief statements in the reported decision provide the only clues.
One statement notes that the high school coach knew of the oral
agreement since its inception; the other statement suggests that the
scout for the San Francisco Giants, who negotiated the Hundley
contract, also knew of the oral agreement since its inception. We can
only conclude, therefore, that these statements are either based on
an oral examination of witnesses at the trial or that written depositions
were obtained from these persons and submitted as evidence at the
trial to substantiate the existence of the oral contract.
Lessons for Tax Research For the student of tax research, perhaps
the most instructive aspect of the last two cases is their demonstration
of the importance of favorable testimony by impartial witnesses.
Proper preparation of a tax file sometimes may include the need to
provide supporting evidence available only from disinterested third
parties. The longer one waits to locate such a party, the greater the
difficulty in finding one capable of giving the testimony needed. To
the maximum extent possible, considering economic constraints, the
tax adviser should anticipate the importance of all supporting docu
ments, including sworn statements from third parties. If strong
evidence of one or two critical facts can be provided to an IRS agent
or to a conferee, the probability of litigation may be significantly
reduced.
A careful reading of these two decisions also reveals that very
similar fact situations may sometimes be argued on radically different
grounds. In other words, even though the facts are similar, the
questions raised may be different. Although this observation really
is more pertinent to the next chapter of this tax study than it is to the
present chapter, and even though the more unusual argument did
not prove to be fruitful in this instance, we observe in passing that
Allen argues for a favorable result in the alternative. First, the
taxpayer contends that the payments made to his mother were not
for his services as a ballplayer. Only later, should the first argument
fail, does he argue that the payments to his mother are deductible
business expenses. In Hundley, on the other hand, the taxpayer
never raised the former issue. The fact that both questions deserve
consideration stems directly from a careful review of the facts and the
law.
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In Allen the argument is made that a bonus payment really is not
a payment for services rendered. At least in part, that payment really
is to compensate the ballplayer for not rendering services (to a
competitor club).
The pertinent statutory provisions refer to “amounts received in
respect o f the services o f a child” (emphasis added). The question
raised, then, deals with whether a ballplayer’s bonus properly falls
within the meaning of the “in respect o f" clause. After reviewing the
congressional intent behind those words, the court determined that
it did and thus rejected the taxpayer’s first line of argument.
Nevertheless, this observation should remind the tax adviser to
consider the facts of a case in every possible way before selecting a
single line of argument. The next chapter examines in greater detail
the subtle relationship between the facts and a statement of the
pertinent questions.
For the tax adviser, a knowledge of the statutes alone is insufficient.
An adviser must carefully delineate facts important to the tax question
and recognize the need to document significant facts in the event
that they must be retrieved and substantiated during a later audit.
The next chapter addresses the task of extracting or anticipating tax
questions from the fact situation.
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3
. . . there is frequently more to be team’d from the
unexpected Questions of a Child, than the Discourses of
Men, who talk in a Road, according to the Notions they
have borrowed, and the Prejudices of their Education.
JOHN LOCKE

The Elusive Nature of
Tax Questions
Tax questions arise when a unique set of facts is examined in light of
general rules of tax law. Learning to identify and phrase the critical
tax questions implicit in any set of facts is no small accomplishment
for, in many instances, the most important questions are by no means
obvious. The more experienced the tax adviser, the easier it is to
identify and ask the right questions. For the beginner, asking the
right question is often the most difficult part of tax research. Even
the most seasoned tax veteran can easily overlook a very important
question, and for this reason successful tax practitioners make it a
general practice to require an internal review of all tax research
before stating an opinion to anyone outside the firm. This precaution
sometimes is extended to include even the preparation of a written
record of all oral responses made to informal inquiries received. The
probability of overlooking either an important tax question or a part
of the law is simply too great to permit any less thorough procedure.
The difficulty experienced in properly identifying and stating the
pertinent tax questions is largely attributable to the high degree of
interdependence that exists between the facts, questions, and law.
If the tax adviser fails to determine all of the pertinent facts, the
chance of overlooking a critical question is greatly increased. Similarly,
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even if the tax adviser has determined all of the critical facts, the
failure to consider a critical part of the law may also lead to the
overlooking of a critical question. Finally, even if the tax adviser
knows all of the facts and all of the law pertinent to a case, he or she
still may overlook an obvious question simply because of human
error.
Errors in stating questions are often related to either (1) failure to
think originally or creatively about tax problems or (2) failure to pay
sufficient attention to detail. A veteran tax adviser will seldom fail to
heed detail; on the other hand, precisely because of long years of
experience, a tax adviser may be prone to overlook new and different
ways of viewing recurrent problems.1 In some instances, therefore,
it is desirable to have the most complex tax situations reviewed by
inexperienced as well as experienced personnel. The former individ
uals might ask the obvious question that otherwise would be over
looked, but only the latter individuals can fully appreciate the
significance of even the obvious question once it has been asked.
Frequently, one good tax question raises two or more related
questions, and before long the tax result depends on a network of
closely related but separate questions.
Initial Statement of the Question
The resolution of a tax problem often evolves through several stages
of development. In many instances the initial statement of the
question may be only remotely related to the questions that turn out
to be critical to its solution. The greater the technical competence of
the researcher, the fewer steps in the evolution of an answer. The
technical competence of tax researchers is, in all likelihood, normally
distributed on a continuum ranging from little or no competence to
very great expertise. Any attempt to separate these individuals into
discrete groups is obviously unrealistic. Nevertheless, for purposes
of discussion of the difficulties encountered in identifying tax ques
tions, tax advisers could be categorized as falling into one of three
groups, namely, those with “minimal” technical competence, those
with “intermediate” technical competence, and those with “extensive”
technical competence relative to the subject at hand. Technical
1 For example, in Allen (see chapter 2) it would have been very easy to overlook the
first of the two alternative arguments considered, i.e., what exactly was Allen
being paid for in the bonus? If it was for not rendering a service, a different result
might apply. Admittedly, that argument was not successful in that particular case,
but it was pertinent and could have been important.
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competence in one area of taxation does not guarantee equal com
petence in other areas. Individuals who have an extensive technical
knowledge in one aspect of taxation must move with a beginner’s
caution when approaching another area of the law; although the
problems are often similar, the applicable rules are sometimes quite
different. As was stated earlier, a final tax result depends upon three
variables: facts, law, and an administrative (and/or judicial) process.
Just as the facts of one case may differ from another, so also may the
law.
Minimal Technical Competence

A tax adviser with minimal technical competence usually can state
tax questions in only the broadest of terms. After reviewing the facts,
the neophyte typically is prepared to ask such general questions as
the following:
1. Must gross income be recognized “in these circumstances”?
a. If so, how much income must be recognized?
b. If so, in which year should that income be reported?
2. Can a deduction be claimed “in these circumstances”?
a. If so, how much can be deducted?
b. If so, in which year can the deduction be claimed?
c. If not, can something be added to the tax basis of an asset?
3. If income must be recognized, is that income ordinary income
or capital gain?
a. If capital gain, is it long- or short-term?
b. If ordinary income, is it earned income?
4. What is the tax basis of a specific asset?
In any real situation, of course, the actual facts of the case must be
substituted for the phrase “in these circumstances” in the hypothetical
questions posed above. For example, in the first question suggested
above, the facts might justify this question: “Must gross income be
recognized if a taxpayer transfers appreciated property to his ex-wife
in settlement of any claims that she might have against him arising
from a divorce?” Or, in the second hypothetical question, the facts
might justify a question like this: “Can an accrual basis corporate
taxpayer claim an income tax deduction in the current year for an
unpaid note given as a bonus to a cash basis employee who is also the
corporate employer’s sole stockholder?” Observe that even the initial
statement of a tax question should be very carefully phrased to
include what appear to be all of the important facts of the situation.
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Because beginning staff members typically enter the tax depart
ments of accounting firms with minimal technical competence, they
usually are prepared to ask only broad, general questions. If properly
phrased, however, the broad questions posed by the new staffperson
are ultimately the same questions that the more knowledgeable tax
adviser seeks to answer. The more senior adviser tends, however, to
phrase initial questions in somewhat different terms.
Intermediate Technical Competence

The tax adviser with an intermediate level of technical competence
often can review a situation and state the pertinent questions in terms
of specific statutory authority. For example, the first question already
considered for the beginning adviser might be verbalized by a person
with more experience in words like this: “Has any gross income been
realized within the meaning of section 61 or 1001 if a taxpayer
transfers appreciated property to his former spouse as part of a
divorce settlement in the state of Maryland?” Or, in the second
question previously considered, a journeyman adviser may ask, “Does
section 267 disallow the current deduction for a bonus, otherwise
deductible under sections 162 and 461, which is payable by a
corporation to a cash basis employee who is the corporate employer’s
sole stockholder, if the corporate obligation is evidenced by a note
due six months following the end of the employer’s tax year?”
A comparison of the same two hypothetical questions, as phrased
by the person with minimal competence versus that phrased by the
person with an intermediate level of competence, reveals several
interesting differences.
First, the more experienced person generally understands the
statutory basis of authority applicable to the tax questions. Or, to put
this same difference in another way, the more experienced person
(1) knows that most tax questions have a statutory base and (2) knows
which code sections are applicable to the facts under consideration.
In still other words, the experienced person knows that correct tax
results do not stem from secondary reference books, which all too
frequently state “rules” ad infinitum without revealing the source of
authority for their conclusions.
Second, the tax adviser with intermediate technical competence
often phrases questions in such a way that they imply the answer to
a more general question, subject only to the determination of the
applicability of one or more “special provisions” to the facts under
consideration. For example, the phrasing of the first question sug
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gested earlier for the person with intermediate-level skills may really
imply something like this: “The stated facts will result in the
recognition of income under the general rules of section 61 and/or
1001, unless some other authority can be found to support a contrary
conclusion.” Note that questions phrased by the person with greater
technical competence frequently suggest where the answers can be
located. If a researcher knows which code sections are applicable to
a given fact situation, the task of locating pertinent authority is greatly
simplified.
Third, the more competent tax adviser is apt to include more facts
in any statement of the question than is the beginning adviser. Thus,
for example, the adviser may imply the importance of state law to a
federal income tax result by adding a phrase such as “in the state of
Maryland. ” This tendency to add more facts to the statement of the
question is the result of experience. The more experienced person
often recognizes, in a statement of the question, some of the
apparently innocent facts that can so critically modify a tax result.
In daily tax practice, a person with minimal technical tax compe
tence acquires a great deal of knowledge by seeking answers to the
specific questions posed by more competent colleagues. This saves
valuable and expensive time by directing the neophyte to look in the
right places. Without this assistance, the beginner must spend many
hours just locating the general authority that is pertinent to a question.
(The various methods of locating authority are described in chapter
4.) We might note, however, that the beginner typically prepares
working papers detailing the research steps undertaken to answer
the questions posed by supervisors. These working papers both
permit the supervisor to review the adequacy of the staffperson’s
conclusions and leave a permanent record of the facts and the
authorities that were considered in solving any given tax problem.
These records may prove to be invaluable should the IRS later
question the way the tax adviser handled a particular tax problem.
Extensive Technical Competence

The tax adviser with an extensive level of technical competence in
a given area can often review a situation and state the pertinent
question in a still more refined manner. For example, the tax expert
may ask a question like this: “Is there any reason why Davis would
not apply ‘to this situation ?” Or, “Are all of the conditions stipulated
in Revenue Ruling 55-608 satisfied ‘in this case ?” By stating a
question in this way, the expert implies not only the general statutory
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authority for an answer, but also specific interpretative authority that
would in all likelihood apply to the facts under consideration. The
expert often needs only to determine the most recent events to
resolve a tax question. Unless something new has happened, this
phrasing of the question suggests that a very specific answer can be
found to the general but unstated question. Thus, the expert’s
question—“Is there any reason why Davis would not apply?”—may
in reality be the same question that the beginner phrased this way:
“Must gross income be recognized if an ex-husband transfers appre
ciated property to his ex-wife in settlement of any claims she might
have against him arising from a divorce?” The former question implies
that the answer to the latter question can be found in the Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
Similarly, the bonus question may imply that the answer to the
current deduction may be found in Revenue Ruling 55-608, 1955-2
C.B. 546. The phrasing of the expert’s question recognizes, however,
that there may be ample reason why specific interpretative authority
would not apply. For example, the facts of the two cases may differ
in some material way—perhaps the taxpayer in the divorce case lived
in a community property state, whereas the Davis decision involved
a taxpayer in a non-community-property state—or the Davis decision
may have been otherwise modified by a regulation, ruling, or judicial
decision issued after 1962. If one knows his way around a tax library,
it obviously will require even less time to answer the question posed
by the expert than it will to answer the question posed by the adviser
with intermediate competency. Unfortunately, however, not all tax
questions are so easily stated or resolved, even by the expert.
Restatement of the Initial Question
After Some Research
In some circumstances even an expert must move cautiously from
facts to questions to authority and thence back to more facts, more
questions, and more authority before resolving a tax problem. The
search for authority to resolve an initial question sometimes leads to
the realization that facts previously deemed unimportant are critical
to the resolution of the problem. In that event the tax adviser returns
to the fact determination procedure before looking any further for
answers. At other times the initial search suggests considering other
tax rules rather than isolating more facts. Sometimes it suggests the
need to determine both additional facts as well as the need to consider
additional rules. Before reaching the administrative or judicial proc58

Figure 3.1

EVALUATION
PROCESS

ess, the tax adviser has only two raw materials with which to work:
facts and rules. Therefore, the tax adviser must learn how to identify
and phrase pertinent questions by examining facts in light of rules.
That microscopic examination is what reveals the need for further
facts and/or rules. The tax research process is not complete until all
of the facts have been fully examined in light of all of the rules and
all pertinent questions have been resolved to the extent possible.
This “research procedure” is illustrated conceptually in figure 3.1.
The spiral line shows how the researcher proceeds from an initial
statement of the facts (F1), to an initial statement of the questions
(Q1), to an initial search for authority (A1). If the initial authority
suggests new and different questions (Q2), as it often does, the
researcher continues by making additional fact determinations (F2)
and/or by considering additional authority (A2). This procedure
continues over and over until all the facts are known, all the authorities
are considered, and all the questions are answered—at least tenta
tively. At this juncture the tax adviser evaluates the facts and
authorities just unearthed and reaches a conclusion.
Dangers Inherent in Statements of Questions
The danger of overlooking pertinent alternatives is greatly increased
if tax questions are stated too narrowly. This danger is particularly
acute for the more experienced tax adviser because, as noted earlier,
he or she generally knows where to begin looking. Once the search
for pertinent authority is restricted to a particular segment of the
code, for all practical purposes all other alternatives are eliminated.
This danger has been vividly demonstrated to the authors time
and time again. While teaching a university course in tax research
methodology, it is, of course, necessary to design sample cases that
will lead students to make important discoveries of their own. A large
number of the sample cases are drawn from “live” problems suggested
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by various tax practitioners. In more cases than we care to admit, the
very best solutions have been those never considered by either the
authors or by those who initially suggested the problems to us.
Beginning students, unhampered by predilection and blessed by
natural curiosity and intelligence, have managed on more than one
occasion to view the problem in an entirely different light. This is
mentioned in order to stress the importance of imagination and
creativity in tax research and planning. As was noted in chapter 2,
the “thinking step,” the point at which the practitioner spends time
considering facts, alternatives, and options, is an indispensible seg
ment of the research process.
A second danger inherent in the statement of the question is the
tendency to phrase the question using conclusions rather than
elementary facts. The important distinction between conclusions and
facts was noted in the prior chapter. The use of conclusions in stating
questions is hazardous because conclusions tend to prejudice the
result by subtly influencing the way one searches for pertinent
authority. If, for example, one begins to search for authority on the
proper way to handle a particular expenditure for tax purposes, the
question might ask, Should the expenditure of funds for “this-andthat” be capitalized? The answer probably will be affirmative. On the
other hand, if the same question is rephrased in terms something
like this—Can the expenditure of funds for “this-and-that” be de
ducted?—the answer, once again, will probably be affirmative. Ob
viously, if the facts are the same (that is, if the “this-and-that” in the
two questions are identical), both answers cannot be correct. The
explanation for the conflicting results probably can be traced to the
place where the researcher looked for authority. The prior question
would tend to lead the researcher to decisions in which section 263
was held to be of primary importance, whereas the latter question
would lead to decisions in which section 162 was found to be of
greater importance.2 Ideally, the index of reference volumes would
include citations to both decisions in both places, but the cost of
duplication quickly becomes prohibitive, and the human element in
any classification system is less than perfect. Consequently, the
2 Section 263 reads in part as follows: “No deduction shall be allowed for—(1) Any
amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments
made to increase the value of any property or estate.” Section 162 reads in part
as follows: “There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business. . . . ” Obviously, reasonable men can and do differ in their application
of these rules to specific fact situations.
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statement of the question may assume unusual importance in asking
a leading question of a witness. To the maximum extent possible, tax
questions should be phrased neutrally and without conclusions to
permit the researcher greater freedom in finding the best possible
authority for resolving the question.
A Comprehensive Example
The remainder of this chapter is a detailed review of a relatively
simple, yet comprehensive, example that demonstrates the elusive
nature of tax questions. In the process of developing this example,
we shall attempt to illustrate the way in which facts, rules, and
questions are inextricably entwined, one with the other, in tax
problems. In following this example, the reader should not be
concerned with the problem of locating pertinent authority. The next
chapter will explain how the reader might have found that same
authority had he or she been working alone on this problem. To
begin, let us assume the following statement of facts.
On February 10, 1981, Ima Hitchcock, a long-time client of
your CPA firm, sold one-half of her equity interest in General
Paper Corporation (hereafter, GPC) for $325,000 cash. Ms.
Hitchcock had owned 60,000 shares (or 20 percent) of the
outstanding common stock of GPC since its inception in 1951.
During the past twenty years, she had been active in GPC
management. Following this sale of stock, however, she planned
to retire from active business life. Her records clearly reveal
that her tax basis in the 30,000 shares sold was only $25,000
(one-half of her original purchase price).
Given no additional facts, both the beginner and the seasoned tax
adviser would be likely to conclude that Ms. Hitchcock should report
a $300,000 long-term capital gain in 1980 because of her sale of the
GPC stock. The case appears to be wholly straightforward and without
complication, as long as no one asks any questions or volunteers any
additional information. Although few persons would ask for it in this
case, the statutory authority for the suggested conclusion would rest
upon sections 1001, 1012, 1221, 1222, and 1223. Section 1221 would
establish that the stock is a capital asset; sections 1222 and 1223 would
determine the long-term status of the capital gain realized; section
1012 would specify the cost basis of the shares sold; section 1001
would define the gain realized as the difference between the $325,000
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received and the $25,000 cost basis surrendered and would require
that the entire $300,000 realized gain be recognized. If, however,
someone happened to ask who purchased Ms. Hitchcock’s shares,
problems could arise quickly.
Diagraming the Facts

Before this example is considered in more detail, a simple stick figure
diagram may be made of the transaction just described. In the
authors’ opinion, every tax adviser should become accustomed to
preparing such simple diagrams of the essential facts of any case
before beginning to ask any questions or to search for any authority.
In addition to diagraming the critical transaction itself, the practitioner
should diagram a simple portrayal of the fact situation as it existed
both before and after the transaction under examination. Each person
can create his own set of symbols for any problem; this illustration,
however, uses only a stick figure to represent an individual taxpayer
(Ima Hitchcock) and a square to represent a corporate taxpayer
Figure 3.2

BEFORE

THE T R A N S A C TIO N

AFTER
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(General Paper Corporation). These simple symbols are used to
diagram the before- and after-fact situations, as well as the transactions
under analysis, as follows.
The diagram of this deceptively simple tax problem is the first
critical step toward asking the necessary questions.
First Questions Call for Additional Facts

As is evident in the diagram, the first two critical questions appear
to be: (1) Who owns the other 80 percent of GPS stock? and (2) Who
purchased the shares from Ms. Hitchcock? The answers to these two
questions obviously call for the determination of more facts, not for
additional authority.
Suppose the CPA knew from prior work with this client that GPC
is a closely owned corporation; that is, it has been equally owned by
five local residents (including Ms. Hitchcock) since its inception in
1951. Knowing these facts, one of the two questions has already been
answered. However, the CPA might be curious about who purchased
the stock, how the value of $325,000 was determined, and so on.
Under these circumstances, we can easily imagine a conversation
between Ms. Hitchcock and her CPA as follows:
CPA:

Who purchased your stock in GPC, Ms. Hitch
cock?

Ms. H:

Ghost Publishing, Incorporated.

CPA:

That is a name that I have not heard before. Is
it a local firm?

Ms. H:

Yes, it is my grandson’s corporation.

From there this conversation would proceed to establish the facts
that Ghost Publishing, Incorporated (hereafter, GPI) was indeed a
small but very profitable corporation whose stock was entirely owned
by Ms. Hitchcock’s favorite grandson, Alvred Hitchcock. GPI decided
to purchase the GPC stock both to guarantee its own supply of paper
and because Alvred was convinced that GPC was a sound financial
investment.
The discovery of these additional facts would begin to separate the
beginner from the more experienced tax adviser. In all probability,
the beginner quite possibly would not modify the prior conclusion
concerning Ms. Hitchcock’s need to report a $300,000 long-term
capital gain in 1981. The more seasoned tax adviser would know at
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least that sales between related parties are often subject to special
scrutiny and would begin to search for possible authority that might
modify the prior conclusion.
Before we proceed to examine possible authority, we should stop
and observe two apparently innocent facts that have vital importance
to the resolution of this tax problem: (1) The GPC shares were
purchased from Ms. Hitchcock by GPI, and (2) GPI is owned by Ms.
Hitchcock’s grandson. Unless these two facts are discovered, and
their importance fully appreciated, this problem simply could not
proceed any further. We might also pause briefly to rediagram both
our transaction and the after-the-transaction situation to accommodate
the new facts that we have just determined. The new diagrams might
look as follows.
Figure 3.3

10% of GPC stock
GPI

THE TR AN SA C TIO N
$325,000 c a s h

Once again this diagram should serve to highlight the potential
problems that lie ahead of us.
An e x p e rie n c e d re s e a rc h e r w ould realize th e d a n g e r im p licit in

sales between related parties and would begin to look for some
authority that might modify his conclusion. The tax adviser with
extensive technical competence in the taxation of corporations and
corporate shareholder relations might be able to turn directly to
section 304 to determine the next appropriate question—that is,
Does section 304 apply to Ms. Hitchcock’s sale of 30,000 shares of
GPC stock to GPI?
64

The Authority

Understanding section 304 may be difficult. It reads as follows.
SEC. 304. REDEMPTION THROUGH USE OF RELATED COR
PORATIONS.
(a) Treatment of Certain Stock Purchases.—
(1) Acquisition by related corporation (other than subsidiary).—
For purposes of sections 302 and 303, if—
(A) one or more persons are in control of each of two
corporations, and
(B) in return for property, one of the corporations acquires
stock in the other corporation from the person (or persons) so
in control, then (unless paragraph (2) applies) such property
shall be treated as a distribution in redemption of the stock of
the corporation acquiring such stock. In any such case, the
stock so acquired shall be treated as having been transferred
by the person from whom acquired, and as having been
received by the corporation acquiring it, as a contribution to
the capital of such corporation.
(2) Acquisition by subsidiary.—For purposes of sections 302 and
303, if—
(A) in return for property, one corporation acquires from a
shareholder of another corporation stock in such other corpo
ration, and
(B) the issuing corporation controls the acquiring corporation,
then such property shall be treated as a distribution in
redemption of the stock of the issuing corporation.
(b) Special Rules for Application of Subsection (a).—
(1) Rule for determinations under section 302(b).—In the case of
any acquisition of stock to which subsection (a) of this section
applies, determinations as to whether the acquisition is, by reason
of section 302(b), to be treated as a distribution in part or full
payment in exchange for the stock shall be made by reference to
the stock of the issuing corporation. In applying section 318(a)
(relating to constructive ownership of stock) with respect to section
302(b) for purposes of this paragraph, sections 318(a)(2)(C) and
318(a)(3)(C) shall be applied without regard to the 50 percent
limitation contained therein.
(2) Amount constituting dividend.—
(A) Where subsection (a)(1) applies.—In the case of any ac
quisition of stock to which paragraph (1) (and not paragraph
(2)) of subsection (a) of this section applies, the determination
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of the amount which is a dividend shall be made solely by
reference to the earnings and profits of the acquiring corpo
ration.
(B) Where subsection (a)(2) applies.—In the case of any ac
quisition of stock to which subsection (a)(2) of this section
applies, the determination of the amount which is a dividend
shall be made as if the property were distributed by the
acquiring corporation to the issuing corporation and immedi
ately thereafter distributed by the issuing corporation.
(c) Control—
(1) In general.—For purposes of this section, control means the
ownership of stock possessing at least 50 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, or
at least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock.
If a person (or persons) is in control (within the meaning of the
preceding sentence) of a corporation which in turn owns at least
50 percent of the total combined voting power of all stock entitled
to vote of another corporation, or owns at least 50 percent of the
total value of shares of all classes of stock of another corporation,
then such person (or persons) shall be treated as in control of such
other corporation.
(2) Constructive ownership.—Section 318(a) (relating to the con
structive ownership of stock) shall apply for purposes of determining
control under paragraph (1). For purposes of the preceding
sentence, sections 318(a)(2)(C) and 318(a)(3)(C) shall be applied
without regard to the 50 percent limitation contained therein.

Although the beginner might require assistance in interpreting and
applying this code section to the facts of Ms. Hitchcock’s sale, every
beginner must learn how to read and understand the language of the
code if he or she is ever to succeed as a tax adviser. Certainly the
beginner might take comfort in knowing that even such a distinguished
jurist as Learned Hand found this to be a formidable assignment. He
once said
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for
example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession:
cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception—couched
in abstract terms that offer no handles to seize hold of—leave in my
mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully
concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within
my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time.3
3Learned Hand, “Thomas Walter Swan,” Yale Law Journal 57 (December 1947):
169.
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Perhaps the final line of the quotation is the most telling. Learning
how to understand the code is most certainly a time-consuming
process. Even a beginner will realize, after any careful reading of
section 304, that certain words and phrases deserve special attention.
For example, understanding section 304 necessarily requires (1) an
understanding of sections 302 and 303, (2) the ability to distinguish
between an acquisition by a “related corporation that is not a
subsidiary” and an acquisition by a subsidiary corporation, and (3) an
understanding of the way in which the constructive ownership rules
of section 318 are applied to determine control. For both the beginner
and the person with an intermediate level of tax skills, these
determinations may well constitute the next pertinent set of questions.

The Third Set of Questions

Although this conclusion is not obvious at the outset, the last of the
determinations suggested in the preceding paragraph is the one that
must be solved first. In reverse order, then, those determinations
can be stated as questions like this:
1. After the sale of 30,000 shares of GPC common stock to GPI,
what shares does Ms. Hitchcock own, directly or indirectly, for
purposes of section 304, giving full consideration to the con
structive ownership rules of section 318?
2. Can the sale of 30,000 shares of GPC stock to GPI by Ms.
Hitchcock be considered, for purposes of section 304, as either
(a) an acquisition by a related (but not subsidiary) corporation
or (b) an acquisition by a subsidiary corporation?
3. If the answer to either question in (2), above, is affirmative,
what is the tax effect of section 302 and/or 303 on this disposition
of stock?
To solve these three questions we must turn to more authority. Our
first stop will be at section 318, the constructive ownership rules,
which apply to section 304 according to paragraph (2) of subsec
tion (c).
More Authority

Fortunately, section 318 does not, at least at the outset, appear to be
as confusing as section 304. Section 318 reads in part as follows.
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SEC. 318. CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP OF STOCK.
(a) General Rule.—For purposes of those provisions of this subchapter
to which the rules contained in this section are expressly made
applicable—
(1) Members of family.—
(A) In general.—An individual shall be considered as owning
the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for—
(i) his spouse (other than a spouse who is legally separated
from the individual under a decree of divorce or separate
maintenance), and
(ii) his children, grandchildren, and parents.
(B) Effect of adoption.—For purposes of subparagraph (a)(ii),
a legally adopted child of an individual shall be treated as a
child of such individual by blood.
(2) Attribution from partnership, estates, trusts, and corpora
tions.—
• • • •
(C) From corporations.—If 50 percent or more in value of the
stock in a corporation is owned, directly or indirectly, by or
for any person, such person shall be considered as owning the
stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for such corporation,
in that proportion which the value of the stock which such
person so owns bears to the value of all the stock in such
corporation.
(3) Attribution to partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations.—
• • • •
(C) To corporations.—If 50 percent or more in value of the
stock in a corporation is owned, directly or indirectly, by or
for any person, such corporation shall be considered as owning
the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for such person.
• • • •
(5) Operating rules.—
(A) In general.—Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and
(C), stock constructively owned by a person by reason of the
application of paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4), shall, for purposes
of applying paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4), be considered as
actually owned by such person.
(B) Members of family.—Stock constructively owned by an
individual by reason of the application of paragraph (1) shall
not be considered as owned by him for purposes of again
applying paragraph (1) in order to make another the constructive
owner of such stock.
(C) Partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations.—Stock
constructively owned by a partnership, estate, trust, or cor-
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poration by reason of the application of paragraph (3) shall not
be considered as owned by it for purposes of applying paragraph
(2) in order to make another the constructive owner of such
stock.

A reexamination of the facts already known about GPC in light of the
rules of section 318 suggests the need to determine some additional
facts before proceeding toward a solution.
More Questions and More Facts

A careful reading of section 318 suggests that we must make absolutely
certain who it is that owns the other 80 percent of GPC. Earlier it
was stated that GPC was “equally owned by five local residents.”
After reading the quoted portion of section 318, it should be obvious
that we must ask if any of the other four GPC owners are related to
Ms. Hitchcock within any of the family relationships described in
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of section 318. At the same time, we
probably should make certain that none of the other four original
owners has sold any of their original stock in GPC. If they have, we
would also have to determine who purchased those shares and
determine the relationship, if any, between those purchasers and
Ms. Hitchcock. To simplify the remaining task just a little, let us
assume that we can quickly determine that none of the other four
owners of GPC are in any way related to Ms. Hitchcock and that all
of the other four original owners continue to own all of their shares
in GPC. Having determined this, we can now reach our first tentative
conclusions.
First Tentative Conclusions

Specifically, we are now prepared to answer the first of the three
questions suggested on page 67: After the sale of 30,000 shares of
GPC common stock to GPI, what shares does Ms. Hitchcock own,
directly or indirectly, for purposes of section 304, giving full consid
eration to the constructive ownership rules of section 318? By
operation of section 318(a)(l)(A)(ii), Ms. Ima Hitchcock constructively
owns any shares of stock owned by her grandson, Alvred. Conse
quently, Ms. Hitchcock is deemed to own 100 percent of GPI, the
corporation that purchased the 30,000 shares of GPC stock from her.
Furthermore, by operation of section 318(a)(2)(C), Ms. Hitchcock’s
grandson Alvred is indirectly deemed to own any stock owned by
GPI, and section 318(a)(1) says that effectively Ms. Hitchcock must
pretend that she owns not only what her grandson owns directly but
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also that which he owns indirectly.4 This means, of course, that Ms.
Hitchcock is, for purposes of section 304, deemed to own that which
she just sold.
Having made this determination, we can now also answer the
second of the three questions posed earlier: Does section 304 apply
to this sale of stock? Obviously that question really is two questions,
and we can separate them for purposes of further investigation. First,
we must determine if the acquisition of the 30,000 shares by GPI can
be considered to be an acquisition by a related, but nonsubsidiary,
corporation; second, we must determine if that acquisition can be
considered to be an acquisition by a subsidiary corporation. These
questions might lead us to ask another tentative question: What is
meant by a related but nonsubsidiary corporation? Section 304(a)(1)(A)
apparently is intended to provide the rules for stock acquisitions
where the seller of the stock (that is, the “one or more persons”
clause) is “in control o f" both the corporation whose stock is sold and
the corporation making the purchase. The more experienced tax
adviser will immediately recognize this as a brother-sister corporate
relationship. That relationship can be diagramed as follows.
Figure 3.4

O wner

In this ownership arrangement, corporations B and S are deemed to
be related to one another as brother and sister corporations. (The
degree of control required to establish this relationship is stated in
section 304(c)(1) as either 50 percent of the voting power or 50
percent of the value of the shares.)

4The only exception to this is stated in the operating rules of sec. 318(a)(5)(B), which
reads as follows: “Stock constructively owned by an individual by reason of the
application of paragraph (1) [that is, by family attribution] shall not be considered
as owned by him for purposes of again applying paragraph (1) in order to make
another the constructive owner of such stock. ” Since Alvred’s indirect ownership
of GPC shares comes about by application of paragraph (2)(C) of sec. 318 and not
by application of paragraph (1), sec. 318(a)(l)(A)(ii) requires that Ms. Ima Hitchcock
also include in her indirect ownership any shares that GPI owns.
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Even giving full consideration to all indirect ownership as well as
all direct ownership, Ms. Ima Hitchcock can be said to own only 20
percent of GPC. She owns 10 percent directly and another 10 percent
indirectly.5 Thus, even though Ms. Hitchcock owns 100 percent of
GPI (the acquiring corporation) indirectly, she owns only 20 percent
of GPC, and therefore the rules of section 304(a)(1) do not apply to
her disposition. In other words, Ms. Hitchcock’s sale would not be
deemed to be an acquisition by a related nonsubsidiary corporation.
We must return then to the second part of our last question: Can
the sale of GPC stock by Ms. Hitchcock to GPI be considered as an
acquisition made by a subsidiary corporation? Once again a com
monsense answer would seem to be a negative one. The acquirer
(GPI) is in no way the subsidiary of GPC (the corporation whose
stock Ms. Hitchcock sold). Be careful, however, and look again at the
simple diagram in figure 3.3. If one can impute shares one way
around an ownership circle, is it possible that the process might work
in the reverse direction as well? The answer, of course, must be
found in the wording of the code.
Ordinarily, section 318(a)(3)(C) attributes ownership from a stock
holder to a corporation only if the stockholder owns 50 percent or
more of the value of that corporation’s outstanding stock. The last
sentence of section 304(c)(2), however, says, “Sections 318(a)(2)(C)
and 318(a)(3)(C) shall be applied without regard to the 50 percent
limitation contained therein.” This seems to say, then, that for
purposes of section 304 any acquiring corporation will be deemed to
own any stock owned (indirectly or directly) by any of its stockholders.
Returning to the facts of the problem, this means that GPC owns any
stock that Ms. Hitchcock owns and, you will remember, we just
determined that Ms. Hitchcock is deemed to own 100 percent of
GPI. In effect, then, GPC owns 100 percent of GPI, making GPI
(the acquirer) a wholly owned subsidiary of the corporation whose
stock Ms. Hitchcock sold. It appears, therefore, that section 304(a)(2)
does apply to this disposition. Perhaps it would now be useful to
paraphrase that paragraph of the code, substituting the facts of our
specific situation for the exact words of the code. If we do that, the
pertinent paragraph would read something like this:
5Incidentally, the revised diagram of the facts pictured in figure 3.3 really suggests
this conclusion with much less confusion than do all of the words of the code.
Perhaps one picture can be worth a thousand words. Note that simply following
the dotted lines of that diagram back from Alvred to Ms. Hitchcock shows that the
conclusion just reached is not really so farfetched after all.
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Acquisition by subsidiary.—For purposes of sections 302 and 303, if—
(A) in return for $325,000, GPI acquired from Ms. Hitchcock stock
in GPC, and
(B) GPC controls GPI,
then the $325,000 shall be treated as a distribution in redemption o f
the stock o f GPC.

The careful reader will have observed that even at this point we have
not yet determined the correct tax treatment of Ms. Hitchcock’s stock
disposition. Before we can make that determination, we must ask
still more questions.
More Questions, More Authority

Code section 304(a)(2) simply provides that Ms. Hitchcock’s sale
should be treated as a distribution in redemption of stock, and it
suggests that we look to two additional code sections to see what that
means. Our next question, then, must be this: If Ms. Hitchcock’s
disposition of GPC stock is to be treated as a stock redemption under
section 302 and/or 303, what, if anything, do those sections say about
the tax treatment of amounts received?
On further searching we could quickly discover that section 303
deals only with distributions in redemption of stock to pay death
taxes. Clearly, the facts of our problem do not suggest anything about
Ms. Hitchcock’s making this disposition to pay death taxes; thus we
may safely conclude that section 303 is not applicable to our solution.
We turn, therefore, to section 302, which reads in pertinent part as
follows.
SEC. 302. DISTRIBUTIONS IN REDEMPTION OF STOCK.
(a) General Rule.—If a corporation redeems its stock (within the
meaning of section 317(b)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of
subsection (b) applies, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution
in part or full payment in exchange for the stock.
(b)

R e d e m p tio n s T r e a t e d as E x c h a n g e s .—

(1) Redemptions not equivalent to dividends.—Subsection (a) shall
apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
(2) Substantially disproportionate redemption of stock.—
(A) In general.—Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribution
is substantially disproportionate with respect to the share
holder.
(B) Limitation.—This paragraph shall not apply unless im-
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mediately after the redemption the shareholder owns less than
50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote.
(C) Definitions.—For purposes of this paragraph, the distri
bution is substantially disproportionate if—
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned
by the shareholder immediately after the redemption bears
to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time,
is less than 80 percent of—
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned
by the shareholder immediately before the redemption bears
to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time.
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated
as substantially disproportionate unless the shareholder’s own
ership of the common stock of the corporation (whether voting
or nonvoting) after and before redemption also meets the 80
percent requirement of the preceding sentence. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, if there is more than one class of
common stock, the determinations shall be made by reference
to fair market value.
(D) Series of redemptions.—This paragraph shall not apply to
any redemption made pursuant to a plan the purpose or effect
of which is a series of redemptions resulting in a distribution
which (in the aggregate) is not substantially disproportionate
with respect to the shareholder.
(3) Termination of shareholder’s interest.—Subsection (a) shall
apply if the redemption is in complete redemption of all of the
stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder.
(4) Stock issued by railroad corporations in certain reorganiza
tion.—
• • • •
(5) Application of paragraphs.—In determining whether a re
demption meets the requirements of paragraph (1), the fact that
such redemption fails to meet the requirements of paragraph (2),
(3), or (4) shall not be taken into account. If a redemption meets
the requirements of paragraph (3) and also the requirements of
paragraph (1), (2), or (4), then so much of subsection (c)(2) as would
(but for this sentence) apply in respect of the acquisition of an
interest in the corporation within the 10-year period beginning on
the date of the distribution shall not apply.
(c) Constructive Ownership of Stock.—
(1) In general.—Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection, section 318(a) shall apply in determining the ownership
of stock for purposes of this section.
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(d) Redemptions Treated as Distributions of Property.—Except as
otherwise provided in this subchapter, if a corporation redeems its
stock (within the meaning of section 317(b)), and if subsection (a) of
this section does not apply, such redemption shall be treated as a
distribution of property to which section 301 applies.

Obviously, this new and relatively lengthy code section simply
brings more new questions to mind. The careful reader should
observe that section 302(a) provides a general rule that any redemption
will be treated as “a distribution in part or full payment in exchange
fo r the stock” if the conditions of any one of four paragraphs are
satisfied (emphasis added). This means that if the conditions of any
one of the four subsections can be satisfied, a taxpayer from whom
stock is redeemed can treat the disposition as a sale. In most instances
this would result in capital gain treatment. The general rules of
subsection (a) say absolutely nothing, however, about the proper tax
treatment of the redemption proceeds if those conditions cannot be
satisfied. That possibility is treated in subsection (d), which says,
“Such redemption shall be treated as a distribution o f property to
which section 301 applies” (emphasis added). On further investigation
we could discover that section 301 generally provides a dividend
treatment for properties distributed by a corporation to its share
holder. This would mean, of course, that the redeemed shareholder
would have to report an ordinary income rather than a capital gain.
If we continued to examine the facts of our illustrative problem in
detail against all of the rules of section 302, we would have to proceed
through another relatively complex set of code provisions not unlike
those we have just examined in some detail. Because this procedure
is no longer new, and because we really are interested only in
demonstrating the complex relationship that exists between facts,
authorities, and tax questions, we shall discontinue our detailed stepby-step approach and state the remainder of this analysis in more
general terms. We can begin such a summary treatment of our
problem as follows:
1. Question: Is Ms. Hitchcock’s disposition a redemption within
the meaning of section 317(b), as required by section 302(a)?
Authority: Section 317(b) reads as follows:
Redemption of stock.—For purposes of this part, stock shall
be treated as redeemed by a corporation if the corporation
acquires its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property,
whether or not the stock so acquired is cancelled, retired, or
held as treasury stock.
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Conclusion: The intended meaning of this section is not obvious;
it seems to suggest only that what the acquiring corporation
does with shares it acquires from its shareholders will in no way
effect the classification of the stock acquisition as a stock
redemption. The section seems initially not to apply to our case
because it refers to a corporation acquiring its stock from a
shareholder. A more general reflection on how this section is
made applicable to related corporations through section 304
suggests, however, that these words must be stretched to
include the stock of a related corporation if the obvious meaning
of section 304 is not to be emasculated. Hence, we would likely
conclude that Ms. Hitchcock’s disposition probably is a re
demption within the meaning of section 317(b).
2. Question: Is Ms. Hitchcock’s sale (redemption) of 30,000 shares
of GPC stock to GPI a redemption that falls within the meaning
of any one of the exceptions of section 302(b)(1) through (b)(4)?
Authority: Read again section 302(b)(1) through (b)(4) as quoted
previously.
Conclusions (in reverse order):
a. Clearly the exception of section 302(b)(4) is not applicable;
that is, GPC is not a railroad corporation.
b. Clearly the exception of section 302(b)(3) is not applicable;
that is, Ms. Hitchcock continues to own directly 30,000
shares of GPC stock even after her sale of 30,000 shares to
GPI.
c. Clearly the exception of section 302(b)(2) is not applicable;
that is, considering her indirect ownership as well as her
direct ownership, Ms. Hitchcock owns after the sale exactly
what she owned before the sale, namely, 20 percent of GPC.
(Note that section 302(c) requires that the attribution rules
of section 318 be applied to stock redemptions.)
The Final Question

Without having carefully examined each of the intermediate questions
and authorities suggested above, the reader might have some trouble
in stating the final question. If you took the time to do so, however,
it would seem that Ms. Hitchcock’s final question might be stated
thus: Is Ms. Hitchcock’s sale o f 30,000 shares of GPC to GPI properly
treated as a “redemption not essentially equivalent to a dividend” as
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that phrase is used in section 302(b)(1)? The implied conclusion stems
importantly from (1) the requirement in section 304 (with assistance
from section 318) that Ms. Hitchcock’s apparent sale be treated not
as a sale at all but as a redemption of a parent corporation’s stock
when that stock is purchased by its subsidiary corporation and (2) the
requirement in section 302 that a stock redemption be treated as a
dividend unless one of the four exceptions in section 302(b) is satisfied.
Any detailed assessment of the authority that is pertinent to an
interpretation of section 302(b)(1) would lead us well into the objective
of chapter 5 of this tax study. Consequently, we shall not undertake
that assessment here. We shall note, in passing, some general
observations that would become pertinent to a resolution of the
problem were we actually to undertake a detailed assessment. First,
“the legislative history of Section 302(b)(1) . . . suggests that it is to
play a modest role in the scheme of things. ”6 Second, in the Treasury
regulations the only example of a stock redemption qualifying for
exchange treatment under section 302(b)(1) is stated in regs. section
1.302-2(a), which reads, in part, as follows: “For example, if a
shareholder owns only nonvoting stock of a corporation which is not
section 306 stock and which is limited and preferred as to dividends
and in liquidation, and one-half of such stock is redeemed, the
distribution will ordinarily meet the requirements of paragraph (1)
of section 302(b) but will not meet the requirements of paragraphs
(2), (3), or (4) of such section.’’ This example obviously lends no
support to the case at hand since the facts of Ms. Hitchcock’s
ownership are radically different from those described in this regu
lation. Third, in U .S. v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), the Supreme
Court held “that neither the absence of a tax-avoidance motive nor
the presence of a business purpose for the redemption would protect
it against dividend treatment. ”7In summary, the authority for granting
Ms. Hitchcock exchange (that is, capital gain) treatment by operation
of the exception stated in section 302(b)(1) appears to be relatively
weak. And if the exception of section 302(b)(1) cannot be made to
apply, Ms. Hitchcock must report a $325,000 dividend income by
operation of section 302(d).8
6 Boris I. Bittker and James S. Eustice, Federal Taxation o f Corporations and
Shareholders, 4th ed. (Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., 1979), pp. 9-29.
7 Ibid, pp. 9-30.
8 Our conclusion simply assumes a sufficiency of earnings and profits as required by
sec. 316, which defines the word “dividend.” In actual practice, of course, this
would constitute another critical fact determination.
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Do We Begin Again?

At this point the difference between the tax adviser with limited
technical competence and the more experienced tax adviser is once
again likely to become apparent. If the beginner actually had
discovered and understood all of the facts and all of the rules
considered thus far in our example, he or she would be very likely
to conclude that the correct tax treatment of Ms. Hitchcock’s apparent
sale is, after all, dividend treatment rather than capital gain. The
more experienced tax adviser is more likely to ask one last searching
question: Does this conclusion make any common sense? If the
answer to this one last question is negative, as it is likely to be in this
case, the expert sets off once more on yet another search for authority
to justify an apparently more reasonable conclusion.
By rethinking the facts of this illustration, a tax adviser should
observe that the tentative conclusion rests largely on the presumption
that GPI is a subsidiary of GPC when, in fact, GPC does not directly
own a single share of GPI stock. In fact, no “first generation share
holder” of GPC even owns such stock. The adviser might go on to
observe, then, that the literal application of the rules just studied
could clearly lead to potentially absurd results in some circumstances.
For example, if a stockholder who owned only a few shares of General
Motors Corporation common stock happened to sell some of these
shares to a grandson’s wholly owned corporation, the tax result would,
for the same reasons as those determined here, be held to constitute
a dividend. The grandson’s little corporation would, by some wild
stretch of the imagination and the law of the land, be made into a
subsidiary of General Motors. This observation might lead the
experienced tax adviser to look into the history of section 304, where
one would discover that it was intended to close an unintended
opportunity for owners of closely related corporations to bail out the
earnings and profits of their corporation as a capital gain rather than
the payment of dividends. Still further reflection on the intended
purpose of section 304 would suggest clearly that the section was
never intended to cover the isolated sale of a few shares of General
Motors to a very distantly related corporation and that, in all
probability, it was never intended to cover a situation like Ms.
Hitchcock’s either. A careful study of the constructive ownership
provisions required by section 304 would also yield some obvious
ambiguities in statutory construction. For example, given the literal
application of the constructive ownership rules of section 318, every
brother-sister pair of corporations is automatically a parent-subsidiary
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pair as well, although both the code and the Treasury regulations
imply that the two situations are separate and must be treated
differently. Finally, the experienced tax adviser might locate judicial
support that would suggest that courts on rare occasions refuse to
apply the code literally if the result is clearly absurd and inconsistent
with the intent of Congress.9 And last but not least, the tax adviser
may locate some secondary reference work that points up the very
problem encountered.10 All of these authorities give the experienced
tax adviser some comfort but, at the same time, leave something of
a dilemma.
A Moral Dilemma?

Any tax adviser who painstakingly has found the way through the
facts and the law of Ms. Hitchcock’s sale might be trapped in a moral
dilemma. That adviser would understand that, in all likelihood, Ms.
Hitchcock could just report the “sale’’ of stock in part II, schedule
D, Form 1040, as a routine sale and that it would not be questioned
further. After all, what is the statistical probability of an audit that
would discover who purchased the shares and reveal who it was that
owned the purchasing corporation? Beyond that, what is the chance
that an auditor would fully understand all the intricacies of sections
301, 302, 304, 317, and 318? Furthermore, there is some authority
(admittedly weak) for treating the sale-redemption as an exchange
under section 302(b)(1) anyway. If that authority is applicable, the
correct tax result is a $300,000 long-term capital gain. The tax adviser
strongly suspects that capital gain treatment really is the treatment
intended by Congress (even though no one ever really considered it)
but knows equally well that the Internal Revenue Service might
reach a contrary conclusion were it fully aware of all the facts.
Certainly, the tax adviser knows that the client intended to enter
into a sale that would produce capital gain rather than ordinary
dividend income. The real dilemma, then, may concern not the
9 For example, note the following words from the U.S. Supreme Court: “When
. . . [plain] meaning has led to absurd or futile results, this Court has looked
beyond the words to the purpose of the Act. Frequently, . . . even when the plain
meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one plainly
at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole this court has followed that
purpose, rather than the literal whole.” [U.S. v. American Trucking Association,
310 U.S. 534 (1940)]
10Relative to the parent-subsidiary relation derived solely from constructive ownership
rules, see Bittker and Eustice, Federal Taxation o f Corporations and Shareholders,
pp. 9-51/52. See also Jacob Mertens, Jr., Law o f Federal Income Taxation (Chicago:
Callaghan and Co.), vol. 1, ¶19.106, pp. 368-69.
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conclusion but the proper method of reporting all the facts that have
transpired. If the tax adviser reveals all he or she knows on the tax
return, the probability of an audit and the possibility of costly
litigation are substantially increased. If the adviser remains silent
and reports the disposition as a simple sale, and all the facts are
subsequently discovered and the dispute is litigated, the professional
reputation of the adviser is in jeopardy, and a risk of perjury (for
filing a false return) is even conceivable.
Under the circumstances described here, the tax adviser might
seek the opinion of Ms. Hitchcock’s legal counsel to obtain another
opinion about the correct treatment of the proceeds from the
disposition of the GPC stock and about the proper method of reporting
that event. The latter conclusion is particularly important if legal
counsel should state that, in his opinion, the correct treatment of the
proceeds is as a capital gain. Although an opinion of legal counsel
would not absolve the tax adviser from personal professional respon
sibility, it would lend credence to the tax treatment finally reported
and, to some extent, demonstrate a desire to perform in a profes
sionally responsible manner.
The foregoing example demonstrates the critical role of facts, the
interdependency of facts and rules, and the elusive nature of pertinent
tax questions. If all the facts are discovered and all the rules are
known and understood, apparently simple transactions have a way of
creating relatively complex tax problems in all too many situations.
The tax adviser must ask the right questions, not because he or she
desires to convert a simple situation into a complex problem and a
larger fee, but because the correct reporting of a tax result depends
so directly upon asking those questions. Questions often evolve from
fact determination to rule application. For example, in our illustration
the first critical questions were (1) Who purchased the shares? and
(2) Who owned the purchaser? Certainly those are fact questions.
Nevertheless, unless a person has some appreciation of the applicable
rules, it would be highly unlikely for a beginner to continue to ask
the right questions. After the facts were determined, the critical
questions concerned the application of rules to known facts; for
example, (1) Does section 304 apply to Ms. Hitchcock’s sale of 30,000
shares of GPC to GPI? (2) Does section 318 apply to make GPI a
subsidiary corporation of GPC? and (3) Does the exception of section
302 (b)(1) apply to this same disposition? Each question appears to
be more esoteric than the preceding one. Yet every question depends
to an important degree upon the tax adviser’s knowledge of the
authority that is applicable to the given fact situation.
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4
. . . reasons are as two graines of wheate,
hid in two bushels of chaffe;
you shall seeke all day ere you finde them . . .
W ILLIAM SHAKESPEARE

Locating Appropriate
Authority
In chapters 2 and 3 we discussed the importance of facts and the
methodology employed to delineate questions that must be answered
to solve tax problems successfully. To determine a technically correct
answer to a tax question, the tax adviser may consult statutory,
administrative, judicial, and, in some instances, editorial authority.
This process consists of two distinct phasers: (1) The tax adviser must
locate the appropriate authority, and (2) he must assess the importance
of that authority, augment it if it is found to be incomplete, and, on
occasion, choose between conflicting authorities. The following pages
will identify the various kinds of tax authorities and ways to locate
them, and chapter 5 will concentrate on the assessment of authorities.
The Tax-Legislation Process
Our present income taxing system began with the Tariff Act of
October 3, 1913. Since then numerous revenue acts have been
enacted into law. Due to their number and increasing complexity,
existing revenue acts were codified in 1939 into a single document
called the Internal Revenue Code. The Internal Revenue Code of
1939 was revised and simplified again in the Internal Revenue Code
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of 1954. All revenue acts enacted into law after 1939 have been
integrated into the extant Internal Revenue Code.
By virtue of Article I, section 7, of the Constitution, all revenue
bills must originate in the House and cannot be sent to the Senate
until the House has completed action on the bill. After introduction,
most of the actual work on a revenue bill takes place in the House
Ways and Means Committee. In the case of major bills, public
hearings are scheduled. The first and most prominent witness during
these hearings usually is the secretary of the Treasury, representing
the executive branch of the government. Upon conclusion of the
hearings, the committee goes into executive session and, after
tentative conclusions have been reached, prepares the House Ways
and Means Committee report, which includes the proposed bill
drafted in legislative language, an assessment of its effect on revenue,
and a general explanation of the provisions in the bill. The report
represents the only written document that details the reasons for the
committee’s actions, and, therefore, it constitutes an important
reference source for the courts, the Internal Revenue Service, and
practitioners in determining legislative intent in connection with each
section of the code. Upon completion of the committee report, the
bill is reported to the floor of the House for action. Prior to 1975,
revenue legislation usually was considered “privileged” business and,
as such, had priority over other matters on the floor. In the past, the
approval of the Rules Committee usually was sought before a bill was
placed on the floor. This procedure was followed so that a tax bill
could be debated under the “closed rule”; thus, amendments from
the floor were forbidden unless the Ways and Means Committee
approved them. This procedure appears to be changing, and it is
anticipated that future revenue legislation will be subject to amend
ments on the floor of the House.
After approval by the House, a tax bill is sent to the Senate, where
it is immediately referred to the Finance Committee. If it is a major
bill, the Senate Finance Committee schedules its own hearings and
prepares its own committee report. Debate on the floor of the Senate
proceeds with few restraints; consequently, Senate amendments to
a revenue bill are commonplace. Obviously, the Senate Finance
Committee report will not disclose the intent of Congress on the
amended portion of a bill. For those portions it becomes necessary
to consult the Congressional Record to understand the reasons for
the amendment.
If the House and Senate pass different versions of the same bill,
further congressional action is necessary. After the House adopts a
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motion to disagree with the Senate version of a revenue bill, a
conference committee is appointed to iron out the differences. Like
the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee, the conference committee may prepare its own com
mittee report, concentrating on the areas of disagreement. Their
report usually is rather technical and does not explain how the two
bills were reconciled. However, statements made on the floor of
either chamber prior to the final vote on the conference report are
entered in the Congressional Record. These statements often shed
light on congressional intent for the amended sections. After approval
of the conference bill by both the House and the Senate, the bill is
sent to the President to be signed.1
To illustrate how a tax adviser might utilize his or her knowledge
of the foregoing process, let us refer to the Foreign Earned Income
Act, which was signed by the President as Public Law 95-615 on
November 8, 1978, amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The act was passed in conjunction with the Revenue Act of 1978 and
the Energy Tax Act. The acts made significant changes in the tax law
and introduced a number of new provisions. Among the new
provisions is section 913, which allows a deduction for excess living
costs incurred by U.S. citizens who are residents of a foreign country
or by U.S. citizens, as well as resident aliens, who are present in a
foreign country during 510 full days out of any consecutive eighteenmonth period. The excess living costs that may qualify as a deduction
under section 913 include cost-of-living differential, housing ex
penses, schooling expenses, home leave travel expenses, and hardship
area deductions. Section 913(g) permits a deduction for home leave
by the taxpayer and his or her dependents. The section limits the
deduction to “reasonable amounts” paid or incurred for round-trip
transportation once every continuous twelve-month period from the
taxpayer’s tax home outside the United States to the taxpayer’s
residence in the United States or, if the taxpayer has no U.S.
residence, to the nearest port of entry in the continental United
States (excluding Alaska).
The tax adviser who is faced with the question of what constitutes
“reasonable amounts” might, in the absence of other authoritative
pronouncements (such as Treasury regulations or revenue rulings),
consult the committee reports. Following the legislative process of
a tax bill, the first step is to examine the House Ways and Means
1For a more complete discussion of the legislative process, see Joseph A. Peckman,
Federal Tax Policy, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971).
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Committee report for the Foreign Earned Income Act. The report
reveals that the House committee intended that “reasonable amounts”
for transportation should be limited to “coach fare when available.”2
A perusal of the Senate Finance Committee report and the conference
committee reports sheds no further light on the subject.
At this writing Treasury regulations have been issued that have
adopted the “coach fare” definition of the House Ways and Means
Committee report. However, the foregoing example demonstrates
how helpful committee reports can be when Treasury regulations are
not issued soon after the passage of a tax bill, which, incidentally, is
a rather common occurrence.
Accessing Public Documents
Committee reports can be obtained in a number of ways. The official
report of each committee (House Ways and Means, Senate Finance,
and conference) is published by the Government Printing Office
(GPO). These reports are available in the government documents
section of any library that has been designated as an official depository.
Committee reports are also reprinted in the weekly Internal Revenue
Bulletin and consequently appear in the Cumulative Bulletin; they
can also be found in the U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative
News (USCCAN), published by West Publishing Company. In
addition, major revenue acts—such as the Tax Reform Act of 1976 or
the Revenue Act of 1978—are published with partial or full texts of
the accompanying committee reports by Commerce Clearing House,
Inc., and Prentice-Hall, Inc. The editors of the Rabkin and Johnson
tax service (Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation) also typically
extract important segments of committee reports and intersperse
them among the code sections contained in the four “Code” volumes
of the service.
At times it becomes necessary to trace the history of a particular
1954 code section to the 1939 code or to previous revenue acts.
Barton’s Federal Tax Laws Correlated (FTLC), a six-volume reference
service, is an extremely useful tool to guide the researcher from the
1954 code to the 1939 code and prior acts. Barton’s FTLC gives the
researcher citations to the official committee reports, the USCCAN,
and Cumulative Bulletin where applicable segments of committee
reports can be found. A second source for references to committee
2 U.S., Congress, House, Ways and Means Committee, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978,
H. Rept. 1798, p. 15.
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reports is Seidman's Legislative History o f Federal Income Tax and
Excess Profits Tax Laws. This three-volume work contains the
legislative history of tax statutes enacted from 1861 to 1953, including
the original text of revenue acts and 1939 code sections, with excerpts
from applicable committee reports. Another source of recent leg
islative history of the code is Tax Management’s Primary Sources,
consisting of three series. Series I is a ten-volume legislative history
of the Internal Revenue Code beginning with the Tax Reform Act of
1969 and ending with 1975. Series II presents the legislative history
relating to changes and additions to the code from 1976 through 1977
in five volumes. Series III begins with the changes made after 1977
and also includes a comprehensive monthly legislation and regulation
reporting service designed to inform the reader quickly of proposed
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code.3
Well-informed tax advisers should stay abreast of congressional
activities involving tax statutes in order to determine the potential
positive and negative tax effects such developments may harbor with
respect to their clients. One effective means of keeping in touch with
such daily congressional tax activities is through Tax Notes, a weekly
newsletter published by Tax Analysts and Advocates, Washington,
D.C. For a more comprehensive listing of tax newsletters, see page
130 of this chapter.
The Internal Revenue Code
All federal statutes passed by Congress are compiled and published
in the United States Code. Title 26 of the United States Code contains
the statutes that authorize the Treasury Department, specifically the
Internal Revenue Service, to collect taxes for the federal government.
The present code, commonly known as the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, applies to taxable years beginning after 1953. Prior to 1954,
statutory authority for the collection of taxes rested with the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939. Although the Internal Revenue Code is
amended almost annually, the designation 1954 remains fixed with
the present Internal Revenue Code.

3 Walter E. Barton and Carroll W. Browning, Federal Tax Laws Correlated (Boston:
Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., 1969); J. S. Seidman, Seidman's Legislative
History o f Federal Income Tax Laws, 1938-1861 and Excess Profits Tax Laws 19531939 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall); Tax Management, Primary Sources
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs).
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The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is divided into the following
segments:
Subtitles
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

Chapters

Income Taxes
Estate and Gift Taxes
Employment Taxes
Miscellaneous Excise Taxes
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Certain Other Excise Taxes
Procedure and Administration
The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation
Financing the Presidential Election Campaigns

1-6
11-13
21-25
31-45
51-53
61-80
91-92
95-96

The bulk of the income tax provisions is found in chapter 1 of subtitle
A. Chapter 1 is divided into twenty-one subchapters, A through U.
(Effectively, however, chapter 1 currently consists of only twenty
subchapters, since subchapter Rhas been repealed.) These subchapter
designations are often used by tax practitioners as part of their
everyday vocabulary to identify general areas of income taxation. The
most frequently used designations are these:
Subchapter
C
F
J
K
N
S

Corporate distributions and adjustments
Exempt organizations
Estates, trusts, beneficiaries, and decedents
Partners and partnerships
Taxation of multinational corporations
Tax status election of small business operations

Section numbers are additional subdivisions of the Internal Rev
enue Code and run consecutively through the entire code. For
example, subchapter A, which deals with the determination of an
entity’s tax liability, includes section numbers 1 through 59. To the
extent that section numbers are unassigned, the arrangement is
suitable for future expansion of the code. The reader should also note
th a t sectio n n u m b e rs give a clue to w hich g en e ral incom e tax topic

is involved. For example, code section numbers in the 300 series
indicate that the section will deal with the topic of corporate
distributions and adjustments. Each section is further broken down
into categories (see exhibit 4.1, opposite).
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Exhibit 4.1
S E C . 117.

(a)

S C H O L A R S H IP S A N D F E L L O W S H IP G R A N T S .

General Rule.— In the case of an individual, gross income does not include—
(1) any amount received—
(A ) as a scholarship at an educational organization described in section
170(b)(1)(A )(ii), or
(B) as a fellowship grant,
including the value of contributed services and accommodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for—
(A ) travel,
(B) research.
(C ) clerical help, or
(D ) equipment.
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but only to
the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.

- — (b)

Limitations.—

(1) Individuals who are candidates for degrees.— In the case of an individual
who is a candidate for a degree at an educational organization described in section
170(b) ( 1) ( A )(ii). subsection (a) shall not apply to that portion of any amount re
ceived which represents payment for teaching, research, or other services in the na
ture of part-time employment required as a condition to receiving the scholarship
or the fellowship grant. If teaching, research, or other services are required of all
candidates (whether or not recipients of scholarships or fellowship grants) for a
particular degree as a condition to receiving such degree, such teaching, research,
or other services shall not be regarded as part-time employment within the mean
ing of this paragraph
(2) Individuals who are not candidates for degrees.— In the case of an individ
ual who is not a candidate for a degree at an educational organization described in
section 170 (b)(1)(A )(ii), subsection (a) shall apply only if the condition in subpara
graph (A ) is satisfied and then only within the limitations provided in subpara
graph (B).
(A ) Conditions for exclusion.— The grantor of the scholarship or fellowship
grant is—
(i) an organization described in section 501(c)(3) which is exempt from
tax under section 501(a).
( i i ) a foreign government,
(iii) an international organization, or a binational or multinational educa
tional and cultural foundation or commission created or continued pursuant
to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, or
(iv) the United States, or any instrumentality or agency thereof, or a
State, or a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision
thereof, or the District of Columbia.
(B ) Extent of exclusion.— The amount of the scholarship or fellowship grant
excluded under subsection (a)(1) in any taxable year shall be limited to an
amount equal to $300 times the number of months for which the recipient re
ceived amounts under the scholarship or fellowship grant during such taxable
year, except that no exclusion shall be allowed under subsection (a) after the
recipient has been entitled to exclude under this section for a period of 36
months (whether or not consecutive) amounts received as a scholarship or fel
lowship grant while not a candidate for a degree at an educational organization
described in section 170(b) 1 ( A )(ii).

Section 117
■Subsection (b)
Paragraph (2)
• Subparagraph (A)
Sub-subparagraph (ii)
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The Internal Revenue Code is published annually in paperback
editions by Commerce Clearing House, Inc. (CCH), Prentice-Hall,
Inc. (P-H), and Research Institute of America (RIA). The code is also
published in most multivolume tax services, either separately in a
loose-leaf volume or serially in several volumes. In the latter case,
the volume includes editorial comments arranged on a topical and/or
section number basis.
Administrative interpretations
Within the executive branch, the Treasury Department has the
responsibility of implementing the tax statutes passed by Congress.
This function is specifically carried out by the Internal Revenue
Service division of the Treasury Department. The duties of the
Internal Revenue Service are two-fold: First, the statutes must be
interpreted according to the intent of Congress, and, second, the
statutes must be enforced.
The interpretive duties of the Treasury and the IRS range from
the general to the specific. Treasury regulations are written in broad,
general terms to explain the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Revenue rulings, on the other hand, interpret the code only with
respect to specific facts and are inapplicable to fact situations that
deviate from those stated in a particular revenue ruling.
Treasury Regulations

Section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code gives the secretary of the
Treasury or his delegate a general power to prescribe necessary rules
and regulations to administer the tax laws as passed by Congress. In
addition to section 7805, specific reference is made throughout the
code to the effect that the secretary or his delegate shall prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of a
specific chapter or section.
Treasury regulations may be divided into regulations that are
almost statutory and those that are interpretive. Examples of
“statutory regulations” are those promulgated under section 1502
(formerly section 141(b), Internal Revenue Code of 1939) dealing with
consolidated tax returns. Because of the complexity of the subject,
Congress failed to legislate in detail in the area of consolidated tax
returns and delegated this responsibility to the secretary of the
Treasury or his delegate. Apparently, in 1954, Congress had second
thoughts concerning the delegation of legislative power to the
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secretary. Had the 1954 code been enacted in the form in which it
passed the House of Representatives, the consolidated return regu
lations actually would have been written into the statute. The Senate
Finance Committee disagreed, however, and in the conference
committee the view of the Senate prevailed.4 Due to the complexity
and detail involved in the consolidated return regulations, Congress
apparently felt that revisions and amendments should be left under
the purview of the Treasury.
Taxpayers electing to file consolidated returns must execute a
consent form in which they agree to be bound by the provisions of
the regulations.5 Presumably, such an agreement leaves almost no
appeal from the provisions of the consolidated return regulations and,
in that sense, gives them a position more nearly “statutory” than the
interpretive regulations.
The purpose of the interpretive regulations is to clarify the language
of the code as passed by Congress. Although the wording of the
regulations is sometimes almost identical to the language of the code
and of little assistance, in recent years the Treasury has made frequent
attempts to add helpful examples to the regulations.
In effect, even the interpretive regulations may come to have the
force of law; however, technically, if they contradict the intent of
Congress, they can be overturned by the courts.6 Nevertheless, the
odds are very much against the taxpayer or his or her representative
who tries to win a case against the Internal Revenue Service solely
by attempting to declare a specific Treasury regulation to be in
conflict with the code or the intent of Congress. For a more complete
discussion on the status of Treasury regulations, see chapter 5.
According to the Administrative Procedure Act, regulations must
be issued in proposed form before they are published in final form.
Proposed regulations for a new or existing part of the code may begin
with the formation of a special task force that may include represen
tatives of the Internal Revenue Service, the American Bar Association,
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and other
knowledgeable individuals, as was the case with the regulations under
section 1502. Usually, however, regulations are prepared solely by
members of the Treasury Department. Interested parties generally
are given thirty days from the date the proposed regulations appear
4 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1954, S.
Rept. 1622, p. 120.
5 Treas. regs. sec. 1.1502-75(h)(2) (1966).
6 See, for example, W. W. Marett, 325 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963).
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in the Federal Register to submit objections or suggestions. De
pending upon the controversy surrounding a proposed regulation, it
will, after the given time period, be either withdrawn and issued in
permanent form or amended and reissued as a new proposed
regulation.
Permanent regulations are initially published as official Treasury
Decisions (T.D.) and appear in the Federal Register. They subse
quently are reprinted by the Government Printing Office in codified
form and are officially cited as Title 26 of the Code o f Federal
Regulations (26 C.F.R. . . .). Commerce Clearing House and Pren
tice-Hall publish paperback editions of the Treasury regulations
periodically.
The identifying number of a specific part of the regulations can be
divided into three segments, as follows:
Treas. regs. sec. 1.1245-2 (a)(3)(h)
Segment I II

III

Segment I indicates that the regulation deals either with a specific
tax or with a procedural rule. Title 26 of the Code o f Federal
Regulations uses the following designations as the identification
numbers for what we call “segment I” of a correct citation of a
Treasury regulation:
Part 1
Part 20
Part 25
Part 31
Parts 48 and 49
Part 301
Part 601

Income Tax
Estate Tax
Gift Tax
Employment Tax
Excise Taxes
Administrative and Procedural
Statement of Procedural Rules

Segment II simply coincides with the specific code section that the
regulation interprets. Thus, in the above example, one can determine
that the regulation cited (1) deals with the income tax (because of the
prefix 1) and (2) refers specifically to section 1245 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Segment III represents the sequence of the regulation
and a breakdown of its content. Thus, segment III in the example
refers to section 1245, second section, paragraph (a), subparagraph
(3), subdivision (ii). Generally, there is no direct correlation between
the sequence designation of the Internal Revenue Code and the
organization of a Treasury regulation. For instance, code section
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1245(c) discusses “Adjustment to Basis,’’ while the interpretive
discussion of the same topic is found in Treasury regulations section
1.1245-5.
Frequently, there is a considerable delay between the time a
particular section is added to the code and the time when the
Treasury issues proposed or permanent regulations. A case in point
is found in connection with section 385, which was added by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. Proposed regulations were not issued until
March 24, 1980. The proposed regulations have created some protests
among taxpayers and their representatives. It will, therefore, be
interesting to observe when final regulations are adopted.
Occasionally, when a major change of a particular code section has
been enacted and the commissioner of internal revenue subsequently
issues new regulations, two sets of regulations will appear covering
the same code section for a time. The regulations currently published
under section 170, on charitable contributions, are a case in point.
Due to the major revisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, new
regulations were issued in 1972 to govern section 170. New regulations
are distinguishable from those applicable to tax years prior to 1970
through addition of a capital letter A . That is, Treasury regulations
section 1.170A-1 applies to years after 1969, Treasury regulations
section 1.170-1, to years before 1970. To identify current and
noncurrent regulations, the researcher must be aware of this proce
dure.
Revenue Rulings

Another interpretive tool used by the Internal Revenue Service to
apply tax laws to specific situations is the letter ruling. Letter rulings
generally are official replies given by the IRS to inquiries from
taxpayers concerning the tax consequences of a proposed transaction.
If, in the opinion of the Internal Revenue Service, the issue is of
significant general application, the essence of the reply will be
published in the form of a revenue ruling. Care is taken to protect
the identity of the actual taxpayer making the initial request to comply
with statutory provisions prohibiting the disclosure of information
obtained from the public.
Initially revenue rulings are published in the weekly Internal
Revenue Bulletin. The same rulings later appear in the permanently
bound Cumulative Bulletin, a semiannual publication of the Govern
ment Printing Office. A typical citation for a revenue ruling would
appear in the following forms:
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Rev. Rul. 79-194, 1979-26 I.R.B. 13
or
Rev. Rul. 79-194, 1979-1 C.B. 145
The first citation refers to the 194th revenue ruling published in 1979
in the twenty-sixth weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin, on page 13.
The second citation refers to the same revenue ruling; however, in
this instance its source is the first volume of the 1979 Cumulative
Bulletin, page 145.
Prior to 1953, rulings by the Internal Revenue Service appeared
under various titles, such as general counsel’s memorandums
(G.C.M.), appeals and review memorandums (A.R.M.), internal
revenue mimeographs (I.R.-Mim.), and tax board memorandums
(T.B.M.), to name just a few. While some of these rulings still have
potential value, in Revenue Procedure 67-6, 1967-1 C.B. 576, the
IRS announced a continuing review program of rulings.7 If the IRS
revokes or modifies a prior revenue ruling, open tax years can be
retroactively affected for all taxpayers other than the taxpayer who
initially requested the ruling. The modification will affect the latter
party only if a misstatement or omission of material facts was involved.
In researching a problem, the tax practitioner should consult a current
status table to avoid the embarrassment of relying on a ruling that
has been revoked or modified. The current rulings volume (vol. 7)
of Mertens’ Law o f Federal Income Taxation is particularly helpful
for this task. The CCH Standard Federal Tax Reporter also contains
a Finding List in the index volume, which lists the current status of
revenue rulings. The Federal Tax Coordinator 2d features a main
table of revenue rulings and procedures that are still valid. In
addition, this tax service includes a separate table listing of obsolete,
revoked, and superseded rulings and procedures.
Published revenue rulings generally have less force than Treasury
regulations because they were intended to cover only specific fact
situations. Consequently, published rulings provide valid precedent
only if a second taxpayer’s facts are substantially identical. In dealing
with revenue agents and other Internal Revenue Service personnel,
however, one might remember that regulations, revenue rulings, and
acquiesced Tax Court decisions constitute the official policy of the
service. Thus, an agent is often more easily persuaded by a revenue
ruling than by a district court or even a circuit court decision. An
agent’s work must be approved by a supervisor and sometimes by
the review staff; these persons tend to minimize litigation hazards.
7Supplemented by Rev. Rul. 67-112, 1967-1 C.R. 381.
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Revenue Procedures

Revenue procedures announce administrative practices followed by
the Internal Revenue Service. The depreciation guidelines announced
in Revenue Procedures 62-21 and 65-13 are an example. If a taxpayer
will accept the estimated lives recommended in these revenue
procedures, as liberalized by the Revenue Act of 1971, the service
will not challenge the result of their application if proper procedures
were followed.
Publication and identification methods for revenue procedures are
identical to those used for revenue rulings. That is, they are initially
published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and subsequently in the
Cumulative Bulletin and are numbered in the sequence of their
appearance. Only the prefix “Rev. Proc.’’ is different.
Technical Information and News Releases

Until March 30, 1976, technical information releases (T.I.R.s) were
used by the Internal Revenue Service to disseminate important
technical information on specific issues. T.I.R.s were not published
in the Internal Revenue Bulletin but were distributed via a practi
tioners’ mailing list. In addition, the major tax services published
them in their current-matters volume. If the IRS decided that a
T.I.R. had enough general application, it was reissued as a revenue
procedure. In such an instance, of course, the T. I. R. appeared in the
Internal Revenue Bulletin and subsequently in the Cumulative
Bulletin. A T.I.R. usually included a statement indicating the extent
to which the practitioner could rely on the announcement.
The information formerly contained in T.I.R.s is now published in
news releases (I.R.s), which are distributed only to the press. The
reason for discontinuing the T.I.R.s, according to the IRS, was simply
a matter of cost; the mailing list for T.I.R.s had grown too large. I.R.s
are announced in the CCH Standard Federal Tax Reporter and the
P-H Federal Taxes via the Finding List in the index volume, and the
text is published in the current-matters volume.
Letter Rulings and Technical Advice Memoranda

To further clarify provisions of the code, the Internal Revenue Service
has furnished interpretive rulings in the form of private letter rulings
and technical advice memorandums. Private letter rulings are issued
to taxpayers who formally request advice about the tax consequences
applicable to a specific business transaction. Such ruling requests
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have been employed frequently by taxpayers to assure themselves of
a preplanned tax result before they consummate a transaction and as
a subsequent aid in the preparation of the tax return. The Internal
Revenue Service may refuse a ruling request; even when a ruling is
given, it is usually understood that the ruling is limited in application
to the taxpayer making the request, and IRS personnel are instructed
not to accept private rulings as precedent when offered by taxpayers
other than those for whom the rulings were originally rendered. In
the past, however, private letter rulings have often inspired the
publication of revenue rulings or revenue procedures describing
similar situations.
The technical advice memorandum, a special after-the-fact ruling,
also may be requested from the technical staff of the Internal Revenue
Service. For example, if a disagreement arises in the course of an
audit between the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s representative and the
revenue agent, either side may request formal technical advice on
the issue(s) through the district director. If the advice is favorable to
the taxpayer, IRS personnel usually will comply with the ruling. In
some instances, such technical advice also has been used as the basis
for the issuance of a revenue ruling.
During the 70s, the continuation of private rulings was placed in
serious jeopardy. Through legal action brought by various taxpayers
against the Internal Revenue Service under the Freedom of Infor
mation Act (FOIA), the IRS was ordered to release unpublished
rulings.8 Some experts thought that the release of such rulings to the
general public would diminish their usefulness because confidential
information relating to important prospective business deals could be
jeopardized.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 inserted section 6110 into the Internal
Revenue Code, allowing the public disclosure of IRS written deter
minations issued after October 31, 1976. Under this provision private
rulings and other written determinations are generally open to public
inspection once the material has been “sanitized” to remove means
of identifying the taxpayer requesting the information.
Both CCH and P-H are now publishing looseleaf services that
contain technical advice memorandums and letter rulings issued by
the IRS. Although such rulings cannot be used as precedent, they
help taxpayers and their advisers to determine current IRS thought
on a particular topic. Publication of rulings has apparently not slowed
8 Tax Analysts and Advocates, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); also Fruehauf Corp.,
369 F.Supp. 108 (D. Mich. 1974), aff'd 6th Cir. 6/9/75.
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requests significantly because the IRS continues to issue thousands
of these rulings annually.
Judicial Interpretations
In situations in which statutory authority alone does not provide a
clearcut solution for a particular problem, taxpayers or their advisers
must consult judicial as well as administrative authority in forming
an opinion. Judicial interpretations provide varying degrees of prec
edent, depending upon the nature of the conflict and the jurisdictional
authority of the court that rendered the opinion.
While a vast majority of all disagreements with the Internal
Revenue Service are settled on the administrative level, unsettled
disputes may be litigated by the filing of suit in one of three courts
of original jurisdiction: the U.S. Tax Court, a U.S. district court, or
the U.S. Court of Claims. Appeals from both the Tax Court and the
district courts are heard by the circuit courts of appeals. Appeals
from a circuit court or the Court of Claims must be directed to the
U.S. Supreme Court. The judicial alternatives available to a taxpayer
can be depicted as in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1

C o u rts of
O rig in a l
J u ris d ic tio n

A p p e lla te
C o u rts

U n ite d States
T a x C o u rt

U nited S tates
D is tric t C o u rts

U n ited States
C o u rt o f C la im s

U n ite d States
C irc u it C o u rts
o f A p p e a ls
U n ite d States
S u prem e C o u rt

After receiving a request for certiorari from either the government
or the taxpayer, the Supreme Court decides whether or not it should
review a case. Certiorari is most commonly granted in situations in
which a conflict already exists between two or more circuit courts of
appeals and/or the Court of Claims. Sometimes the Supreme Court
will grant certiorari without a prior conflict if it deems a case to have
special significance. In order to understand fully the weight of a court
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decision, and the degree to which it sets precedent, an elementary
understanding of the jurisdiction of each court is essential.
United States Tax Court

The U.S. Tax Court consists of nineteen judges, separate and distinct
from the Treasury Department, appointed by the President for
fifteen-year terms. Although the principal office of the Tax Court is
located in Washington, D.C., the court conducts hearings in most
large cities in the United States. The Tax Court is organized by
divisions, which usually consist of only one judge, although they may
consist of more than one. Commissioners may be assigned to assist
a judge. Proceedings before the Tax Court may be conducted with
or without trial; if sufficient facts are stipulated, the assigned judge
may render an opinion without a formal trial.
After hearing a case, the assigned judge will submit the findings
of fact and an opinion, in writing, to the chief judge, who then decides
whether or not the case should be reviewed by the full court. Should
the chief judge decide that a full review is not necessary, the original
decision will stand and be entered either as a “regular” or a
“memorandum” decision. Regular decisions are published by the
Government Printing Office.
Prior to 1943, the Tax Court was known as the Board of Tax
Appeals, the decisions of which were published in forty-seven volumes
covering the period from 1924 to 1942. These volumes are cited as
the United States Board o f Tax Appeals Reports (B.T.A.). For
example, 39 B.T.A. 13 refers to the thirty-ninth volume of the Board
o f Tax Appeals Reports, page 13. Beginning with the latter part of
1942, when Congress changed the name of the body, the proceedings
have been published as The Tax Court o f the United States Reports
(T.C.). Thus, an illustrative citation would be 12 T.C. 101. Bound
volumes of the Tax Court reports are published only by the U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Tax Court memorandum decisions are reproduced by the govern
ment in mimeograph form only. However, Commerce Clearing
H o u se p u b lish es m e m o ra n d u m decisions in th e ir Tax C o u r t M em o 

randum Decisions (T.C.M.) series, and Prentice-Hall makes them
available as the Prentice-Hall Memorandum Decisions (P-H T.C.M.).
In recent years the Tax Court has handed down more memorandum
opinions than regular opinions. Memorandum opinions usually in
volve conclusions that, in the opinion of the chief judge, have been
well established and require only a delineation of facts. Nevertheless,
in 1945 Judge Murdock publicly pointed out the precedent value of
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memorandum decisions and acknowledged that they could be cited
in briefs.9
If, in the opinion of the chief judge, a case contains an unusual
point of law or one on which considerable disagreement exists among
the judges of the Tax Court, the chief judge may assign the case to
the full court. After each judge has had an opportunity to study the
case, the court meets for an expression of opinions and a vote. In
such instances it is possible that one or more majority and minority
opinions will be prepared and that the trial judge—possibly the only
one to have actually heard the proceedings—could write the minority
opinion. The majority opinion will be entered as the final decision
of the Tax Court.
As a general rule, the Tax Court’s jurisdiction rests with the
determination of deficiencies in income, excess profits, self-employ
ment, estate, or gift taxes. Specifically excluded are claims for refunds
if the commisssioner did not first assess a deficiency10 and matters of
administrative policy.11 Claims for refund must be tried in either a
district court or the Court of Claims. Thus, in order to bring suit in
the Tax Court of the United States, a taxpayer must have received
a notice of deficiency and a so-called ninety-day letter and, subse
quently, have refused to pay the deficiency.
Some Tax Court transcripts disclose that a “decision has been
entered under Rule 155’’ (prior to 1974 known as Rule 50). This
notation signifies that the court has reached a conclusion regarding
the facts and issues of the case but leaves the computational aspects
of the decision to the opposing parties. Both parties will subsequently
submit to the court their versions of the refund or deficiency
computation. If both parties agree on the computation, no further
argument is necessary. In the event of disagreement, the court will
reach its decision on the basis of the data presented by each party.
Data submitted or arguments heard under Rule 155 are usually not
a part of the trial transcript.
As part of Public Law 91-172, Congress enacted IRC section 7463,
which authorizes the creation of special trial procedures within the
Tax Court for disputes involving $5,000 or less.12 A taxpayer may
9J. Edgar Murdock, ‘“What Has the Tax Court of the United States Been Doing?”
American Bar Association Journal (June 1945): 298-99.
10Scaife Co., 47 B.T.A. 964 (1942).
11Cleveland House Brewing Co., 1 B.T.A. 87 (1924).
12The $5,000 limitation includes the initial tax contested, potential additional
amounts, and penalties, but excludes interest.
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request trial before the Small Tax Case Division by executing Form
2 of the Tax Court and paying a filing fee of $10. Even this fee may
be waived if in the opinion of the court the petitioner is unable to
make the payment. Legal counsel is not required, and taxpayers may
represent themselves. Trial procedures are conducted on an informal
basis with the filing of briefs permitted but not required. Only an
informal record of the trial proceedings is prepared, and every
decision is final, making an appeal from a decision of the Small Tax
Case Division of the Tax Court-impossible. Decisions of this division
may not be cited as precedent in other cases.
Acquiescence policy In some instances the commissioner of internal
revenue will publicly announce an “acquiescence” or “nonacquies
cence” to a regular Tax Court decision. This policy does not encompass
Tax Court memorandum decisions or decisions of other courts. In
announcing acquiescence, the commissioner publicly declares agree
ment with a conclusion reached by the Tax Court. This does not
necessarily mean that the commissioner agrees with the reasoning
used by the court in reaching the conclusion, but only that in the
future, unless otherwise announced, the Internal Revenue Service
will dispose of similar disputes in a manner consistent with that
established in the acquiesced case. In those situations in which the
Tax Court has ruled against the government, the commissioner may
wish to express nonacquiescence to inform taxpayers that similar
disputes will continue to be contested in the future.
Acquiescence and nonacquiescence are announced in the weekly
Internal Revenue Bulletin and are republished in the semiannual
Cumulative Bulletin. In addition, citators of the major tax services
indicate whether the commissioner has acquiesced or refused to
acquiesce in a particular decision, giving specific reference to the
Cumulative Bulletin in which the commissioner’s announcement can
be found. If the tax adviser plans to rely on a specific acquiesced
case, it is important that he or she check the original announcement,
because it is possible that only a partial acquiescence exists. For
example, a single Tax Court case may involve multiple issues, and
the commissioner may acquiesce in only one of those issues. An
interesting example of this is found in The Friedlander Corporation,
25 T.C. 70 (1955), in which the Tax Court considered three issues.
The commissioner remained silent on the first issue, expressed
nonacquiescence to the second, and acquiesced to the third.13
13Cumulative List of Announcements Relating to Decisions of the Tax Court, 19722C .B . 2.
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The commissioner’s acquiescence may also be withdrawn with
retroactive effect. For example, in Caulkins, 1 T.C. 656 (1943), the
commissioner initially published a nonacquiescence but later changed
this to acquiescence when the court of appeals sustained the Tax
Court.14 Eleven years later another commissioner reinstated the
initial nonacquiescence.15 A taxpayer who claimed reliance on Caulk
ins before the acquiescence was retroactively withdrawn found no
relief when, in Dixon, the Supreme Court upheld the commissioner’s
right to do so.16
United States District Court

The federal judicial system is divided into twelve judicial circuits, as
illustrated in figure 4.2, page 100. Eleven of the circuits are numbered;
the twelfth covers Washington, D.C. Each of the twelve circuits is
further divided into districts. At least one district judge is assigned
to each federal district. Depending upon need, however, two or more
federal district judges may hear cases in any district. Taxpayers may
bring suit in a federal district court only after they have paid a tax,
either with the return or as a deficiency assessment, and have
processed a request for refund.17 A U.S. district court is the only
court in which a taxpayer can request a jury trial in a tax dispute.
Published proceedings of the federal district courts can usually be
found in the Federal Supplement reporter series, published by West
Publishing Company. However, some district court opinions (like
Tax Court memorandum decisions) are apparently never officially
published in a primary source such as the Federal Supplement, and
a researcher must consult a secondary source, such as United States
Tax Cases (CCH) or American Federal Tax Reports (P-H) for the text
of a district court decision.
United States Court of Claims

The U.S. Court of Claims was created by Congress in 1855 to dispose
of claims against the U.S. government. The Court of Claims is a
single court consisting of a chief judge and four associate judges
appointed by the President. By statute, the court is required to hold
14See T.C. 1943-24-11581, 1943-1 C.B. 28; see T.C. 1944-24-11907, 1944-1 C.B. 5.
13Rev. Rul. 115-136, 1955-1 C.B. 7.
16W. Palmer Dixon, 381 U.S. 68 (1965).
17Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sec. 7422.
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an annual term in Washington, D .C .18 Most of the hearings are held
by fifteen commissioners who report their findings to the judges. The
prerequisites for filing suit in the Court of Claims are identical with
those applicable to the district court; that is, the petitioners must
have paid a tax and subsequently filed a request for refund that the
commissioner rejected. The proceedings of the Court of Claims can
be found in the Court o f Claims Reporter series published by the
U.S. Government Printing Office. In addition, West’s Federal Re
porter includes all Court of Claims cases between 1929 and 1932 and
after 1959. From 1932 to 1960 the Court of Claims cases were
published in the Federal Supplement series (West Publishing Com
pany).
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals

In addition to the District of Columbia Circuit, the states and U.S.
territories are geographically partitioned into judicial circuits num
bered from one through eleven (see figure 4.2).19 Decisions of the
Tax Court and a district court may be appealed by either the taxpayer
or the government to the circuit court in which the taxpayer resides.
Hearings before a circuit court are conducted by a panel of three
judges.
Depending on need and policies within each particular circuit,
federal district judges may be asked to serve on a panel during a
session. Upon request by any circuit judge, regardless of whether or
not the judge was a member of the trial panel, the full circuit court
(that is, all the judges in that circuit) may review the decision of a
trial panel. The proceedings of the circuit courts are published by
West Publishing Company in the Federal Reporter (1st and 2d
series).
United States Supreme Court

Final appeals from the Court of Claims or from a circuit court of
appeals rest with the Supreme Court. As previously explained, appeal
requires a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court may or may
not grant. Supreme Court decisions are of special importance because
they constitute the final judicial authority in tax matters. The Supreme
18United States Code Annotated, Title 28, sec. 174 (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing
Co., 1968).
19The eleventh circuit was created by a division of the fifth circuit effective July 1,
1981 (P.L. 96-452).
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Court decisions can be found in any one of three publications: the
United States Supreme Court Reports, lawyers’ edition (L.Ed.),
Lawyers’ Co-Operative Publishing Company; Supreme Court Re
porter (S.Ct.), West Publishing Company; the United States Reports
(U.S.), Government Printing Office.
Special Tax Reporter Series

All tax decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, the circuit courts
of appeals, the Court of Claims, federal district courts, and some
state courts are separately published by Commerce Clearing House
in the United States Tax Cases (U.S. Tax Cas.) series and by PrenticeHall in the American Federal Tax Reports (A.F.T.R. and A.F.T.R. 2d)
series. These two special judicial reporter series provide a tax
practitioner with two major advantages: First, by collecting only tax
cases in one reporter series, it is economically possible for most tax
practitioners to acquire at least one complete set of all judicial
authority dealing with tax problems; second, the space required to
store one complete tax reporter series is minimal when compared
with the many volumes that would otherwise have to be maintained
were all judicial tax decisions readily available (tax cases would be
mixed among other civil and criminal proceedings).
Tax Court decisions, which comprise a separate volume, are not
included in either the U.S. Tax Cas. or A.F.T.R. series. In addition
to the Tax Court reporter series published annually by the Govern
ment Printing Office, however, both CCH and P-H provide a current
looseleaf service that offers all regular and memorandum Tax Court
decisions in an expeditious manner. If these looseleaf volumes are
retained, it is unnecessary to purchase the government (T.C.) series
to obtain a complete set. Most practitioners, however, make that
purchase anyway in order to obtain bound volumes of the regular Tax
Court decisions. As noted earlier, unlike the government, both
Commerce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall publish bound volumes
of the Tax Court memorandum decisions.
Although the duplication of a single judicial proceeding in several
court reporter series has the advantages noted earlier, that same
duplication creates the problem of multiple citations. The extent of
the present duplication is shown in exhibits 4.2 and 4.3, pages 104
and 106. In preparing tax communications, a writer can never be
certain of which reporter series is most readily available to the reader;
therefore, it is difficult to know which series should be cited. In
order to standardize citation presentation, most formal publications
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have accepted the practice of presenting at least an initial reference
to the “official” or “standard” reporter series. If other (secondary)
citations are also given, they generally follow the standard citation.
Thus, one might properly cite the decision in Harris as Harris v.
Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950), 39 A.F.T.R. 1002, 50-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. ¶10,786. Obviously, additional secondary references could be
added to the two in the above illustration.
The Citator

The tax researcher who must consider judicial authority has a most
useful tool at his or her disposal in a citator, which is simply a
compilation of cross-references to judicial decisions. Following the
initial entry of each judicial proceeding in an alphabetical sequence,
a citator includes later cross-references to additional citations—that
is, to other cases—that in some way contain a reference to the initial
entry. To illustrate, assume that only five judicial decisions have ever
been rendered (those being Able, Baker, Charlie, Daley, and Evert,
in chronological order). Assume further that the court in Baker made
some mention of the Able decision; that the court in Daley made
some reference to the decisions in Able and Charlie, but not to that
in Baker; and that the court in Evert made reference only to the
decision in Baker. Given these assumptions a complete citator could
be prepared as follows:
Able (initial citation)
. . . Baker (cross-reference to page in Baker that “cites” Able)
. . . Daley (cross-reference to page in Daley that “cites” Able)
Baker (initial citation)
. . . Evert (cross-reference to page in Evert that “cites” Baker)
Charlie (initial citation)
. . . Daley (cross-reference to page in Daley that “cites” Charlie)
Daley (initial citation only)
Evert (initial citation only)
Obviously, there are thousands of judicial decisions and many
thousands of cross-references. Were there no citators (or other
equivalent data retrieval systems), it would be virtually impossible
to locate much of the pertinent judicial authority on most tax
questions. With citators available, the task is at least feasible. To
illustrate, consider the problem of interpreting what the words
“ordinary” and “necessary” mean as they are used in code sections
162 and 212. This task was undertaken by the Supreme Court in
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1933 in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). Since that 1933
decision, Welch v. Helvering has been “cited” in more than 350
subsequent court decisions. A citator greatly facilitates the task of
locating any or all of these decisions, which just may offer additional
perspective on the meaning of the words “ordinary” and “necessary, ”
because it identifies a reasonable set of cases to examine further. In
most instances, of course, the list of cases suggested by a citator will
be much smaller than the 350 noted here.
Using the Citator To demonstrate the methodology applied in
searching for pertinent judicial decisions, assume that a tax researcher
has somehow identified a potentially important case with a primary
citation. If that practitioner has only the U.S. Tax Cas. or A.F.T.R.
reporter series available, an “equivalent” secondary citation must first
be found before the decision he or she is interested in reviewing can
be read. If the A.F.T.R. series is available, the practitioner should
begin with the P-H Citator; if the U.S. Tax Cas. series is available,
the practitioner should begin with the CCH Citator. Each citator
will give the secondary citation for its own reporter series only. The
case “names” (technically called style) are arranged in alphabetical
sequence in both citators. However, the P-H Citator consists of five
separate volumes, whereas the CCH Citator consists of only one.
Thus, in working with P-H materials, tax researchers may have to
consult more than one volume if they want to locate all of the
subsequent decisions that have cited the initial entry. The number
of volumes to be consulted will depend on the year the initial case
was heard. If a case was first tried sometime between 1796 and 1941,
the researcher using the P-H series must consult all three volumes
of the A.F.T.R. series, volume 1 of the A.F.T.R.2d series, and the
looseleaf volume for current citations. On the other hand, if the case
being examined was first tried sometime between 1948 and 1954, the
researcher would consult only volume 3 of the A.F.T.R. series,
volume 1 of the A.F.T.R.2d series, and the current (looseleaf)
volume. Exhibit 4.4 compares the CCH Citator with the P-H Citator;
exhibit 4.5 cross-references the P-H Citator to other judicial reporters.
Exhibit 4.4
Key to Citator Services

Prentice-Hall
Commerce Clearing
House

1796-1941

1941-1948

1948-1954

1954-1977

Since 1977

1st Series
vol. 1

1st Series
vol. 2

1st Series
vol. 3

2d Series
vol. 1

Loose
leaf

Only one looseleaf volume covering all dates

107

108

Volume 1

Volume 2

Volume 3

Volume 1(2d)

Prentice-Hall Citator Volume
Current Volume

1-313(450)
1-61(1011)
1-85
—

313-332(126)
61-67
86-91
—

332-345
68-73
92-97
—

346-434
74-98
98-100
1-52

4349810052-

_________

a Where a volume is split, the break-off page number is indicated in brackets (-) if known.

Tax Court
(T.C.)
1-10
11-22(850)
22-69(544)
69(P-H T.C.M.)____________________________________________ 13-17______________ 18-22______________23-46 ______________ 47-_______________

Board of Tax Appeals
(B.T.A.)
1-45(629)
45-47
—
—
—
(P-H B.T.A. Memo)___________________ 1-10_______________11-12_________________ — _________________ —____________________ —__________

Court of Claims (Ct. Cl.)_________________ 1-93_______________ 94-110 _____________ 111-127____________ 127-210____________ 210-

Federal Supplement (F. Supp.)___________ 1-41(907)__________ 41-72(925)__________ 72-112_____________ 113-437(1104)_______ 437-______________

Federal Reporter
1st Series (Fed.)
1-300
—
—
—
—
2d Series (F.2d)_______________________1-123(746)_________ 123-163(286)________ 163-205(73)_________ 205-564(53)_________ 564-______________

U.S. Supreme Court Reports
(U.S.)
(S.Ct.)
(L.Ed-1st Series)
(L.Ed-2d Series)

American Federal Tax Reports—2d
Series (A.F.T.R. 2d)________________________ —_________________ —_________________ — ______________ 1-40 _______________ 40- ______________

American Federal Tax Reports
(A.F.T.R.)______________________________1-27_______________ 28-35 ______________ 36-43 ______________ 44-52 ____________________ —_________

Years covered__________________________ 1919-1941__________ 1941-1948__________ 1948-1954___________1954-1977__________ 1977 to date_______

Judicial Reporter Volumesa
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Any meaningful comparison of these two citator services must go
beyond the apparent convenience factor of working with one CCH
volume as opposed to five P-H volumes because the usefulness of
either citator becomes a function of what the researcher wants to
find. Should he desire to obtain a brief judicial history of a case, the
CCH Citator is a handy research tool. For example, assume that the
researcher wants to trace the history of Germantown Trust Co. This
case came to the researcher’s attention in a tax periodical, where it
was cited as 309 U.S. 304 (1940). A simple check in the one-volume
CCH Citator, which is arranged in alphabetical order, discloses that
Germantown Trust Co. was originally tried by the Board of Tax
Appeals in 1938 and entered as a memorandum decision; this decision
was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and in turn was
reversed by the Supreme Court (see exhibit 4.6, page 110). In
addition, the CCH Citator discloses that Germantown Trust Co. has
subsequently been cited in over twenty additional cases, most recently
in 1973. All of this information may or may not be pertinent to the
researcher’s tax problem. Finally, of course, the CCH Citator gives
the cross-reference of the case in the U.S. Tax Cas. series.
To gather this same information through the use of the P-H Citator,
the researcher would proceed along the following lines (see exhibits
4.7 through 4.11, pages 111-115). The original citation, Germantown
Trust Co., 309 U.S. 304 (1940), discloses the decision year; thus, the
researcher turns to volume 1 of the P-H Citator (1796-1941) to learn
that the Board of Tax Appeals was the court of original jurisdiction,
which tried the case twice. Furthermore, the P-H Citator shows that
the B.T.A. decision was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals and that the text of the Supreme Court decision may be
found at 23 A.F.T.R. 1084. W hether that decision sustained or
reversed the circuit court cannot be determined from the citator.
Additional cases in which Germantown Trust Co. has been cited are
listed, but, in order to compile a more complete listing, all five citator
volumes must be consulted, that is, volumes 2 and 3 of the A.F.T.R.
series, volume 1 of the A.F.T.R.2d series, and finally the looseleaf
edition covering cases since 1977.
It should be apparent that the CCH Citator is the more convenient
source for locating a particular case in order to determine its original
trial court, to trace its history through the appeals courts, and finally
to compile a summary of cases in which the decision was subsequently
cited. However, in the case of Germantown, the multiple-volume PH Citator, in the aggregrate, discloses a larger number of cases in
which Germantown Trust Co. has been cited than does the one109

Exhibit 4.6
CCH Citator Page
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Exhibit 4.7
P-H Citator—Volume 1 for A.F.T.R. Series (1919-1941)
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Exhibit 4.8
P-H Citator— Volume 2 for A.F.T.R. Series (1941-1948)
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Exhibit 4.9
P-H Citator— Volume 3 for A.F.T.R. Series (1948-1954)
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Exhibit 4.10
P-H Citator— Volume 1 for A.F.T.R.— 2d Series (1954-1977)
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Exhibit 4.11
P-H Citator— Loose-Leaf Volume for A.F.T.R.—2d Series (Since 1977)
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volume CCH Citator. Furthermore, the P-H Citator features several
other advantages not to be found in the CCH Citator, which may be
of considerable importance to the careful tax researcher. Most of
these advantages will assist the tax adviser in the process of assessing
potential tax authority; thus, a detailed discussion of these desirable
features will be deferred until the following chapter.
Editorial Interpretations
The sheer bulk and complexity of the tax statutes make it humanly
impossible for any individual to understand all of the rules and
regulations pertinent to a tax practice. Fortunately, tax practitioners
have at their disposal a variety of editorial interpretations, ranging
from extensive looseleaf tax services to brief explanations in profes
sional journals and pamphlets, much of which is invaluable to an
efficient tax practice.
Tax Services

Perhaps the most significant assistance is available through a sub
scription to one or more major tax services. Tax services are designed
to help locate statutory, administrative, and judicial authority quickly
and to give helpful editorial interpretations of those primary author
ities. The various tax services constantly update the information they
provide. Subscribers are regularly informed of changes in the statute
or regulations, new court decisions and revenue rulings, and other
pertinent matters. Nothing is more embarrassing to a practitioner
than to plan a tax strategy with an outdated authority. Current
subscription tax services are a tremendous time-saving device that
the tax practitioner can ill afford to be without.
A practitioner usually begins the research process with the service
with which he or she is most familiar. Dependence on one service,
however, can become detrimental. Each service is compiled and
maintained by editors with divergent approaches to solving the same
tax problem. Consequently, each service develops a distinct interpre
tive personality. While the salesperson representing the publisher
may believe that the product is adequate by itself, the experienced
researcher will discover that, because of their unique features, most
tax services really complement each other.
The key to utilizing each tax service effectively lies in the mastery
of its index systems. Access to materials in individual services may
be gained through code section numbers, topical references, or both.
The individuality of the 1980 indexes of at least two frequently
116

used tax services can be demonstrated by the following situation. A
double bass player in the local symphony orchestra is unable to
transport her instrument by means of public transportation and
therefore uses her personal automobile to cart the string bass to her
various engagements. A question arises about the deductibility of
transportation expenses for her instrument.
If the tax researcher begins the inquiry with the topical index of
the Prentice-Hall tax service, then, under the key word entry
“musicians,” the researcher will find the subheading “instruments”
and a further sub-subheading, “transportation of,” with a reference
to paragraph 11,407(10). Paragraph 11,407(10) presents a detailed
discussion entitled “Transportation of baggage, equipment or uni
forms.” The discussion refers to Revenue Ruling 63-100, which
allowed a musician to deduct transportation costs because the instru
ment was too bulky to be carried otherwise. However, Revenue
Ruling 75-380, which revokes Revenue Ruling 63-100, is also men
tioned; it declares that, based on the Supreme Court decision in
Fausner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973), since January 1, 1976, only transpor
tation expenses in excess of normal commuting expenses are de
ductible.
If the researcher begins with the Commerce Clearing House index,
he or she will find three subheadings under the entry “musicians,”
namely, “business expenses,” “traveling expenses,” and “withholding
of tax on wages.” None of the references direct the researcher to a
discussion involving the deductibility of transportation expenses for
a musical instrument. Although the Commerce Clearing House
editors chose not to include in their index transportation expenses
specifically referenced to musical instruments, the tax service does
include an equally detailed discussion of Revenue Rulings 63-100
and 75-380 as well as the Fausner case at paragraph 1354.2501. To
locate that discussion, the researcher must start with one of two key
words, “tools” or “transportation.” Should the researcher begin with
the key word “tools,” the subheading “transportation expenses”
directs the researcher to paragraph 1354.25. The same result is
achieved if the researcher commences with the key word “transpor
tation,” since the subheading “tools” also refers the user to paragraph
1354.25, with the needed discussion following at paragraph 1354.2501.
The foregoing example is not designed to recommend one particular
index and tax service over another; its purpose is to demonstrate the
trial-and-error approach necessary to locate pertinent authority.
Furthermore, it also demonstrates the advisability of having more
than one tax service available.
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In addition to variations in index systems, each tax service is known
for specific features that may prove to be helpful, depending on the
research problem in question. A summary of cost, organization, and
techniques of supplementation used by major tax service publishers
can be found in exhibit 4.12, page 120.
The following general comments outline some of the features of
each service. Commerce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall publish
major tax services annually in looseleaf binders under the titles
Standard Federal Tax Reporter and Federal Taxes respectively. In
many ways, these two services are similar. Both publications follow
the organization of the Internal Revenue Code. Each major division
begins with a preliminary discussion introducing the subject in
general terms; subdivisions include exact quotations of the code
sections and the related Treasury regulations. In addition, each
subdivision contains interpretive explanations by the editorial staff
and brief synopses of related court decisions, revenue rulings, and
revenue procedures. Each service also features a separate volume
containing the most recent developments regarding statutory, ad
ministrative, and judicial authority.
Mertens’ tax service, entitled Law o f Federal Income Taxation
(Chicago: Callaghan and Co.), is organized on a topical basis and,
therefore, does not follow the sequence of the code.20 The separate
looseleaf volumes of Mertens’ service can be divided into two
groupings: (1) the treatise volumes, each volume containing scholarly
discussions of the various tax topics (statutory, administrative, and
judicial authorities are cited in footnote form) and (2) volumes
containing the Internal Revenue Code, a code commentary, Treasury
regulations, and various rulings and procedures. Although the code
commentary volumes do not feature complete texts of the committee
reports, the editorial summaries do provide historical background
and suggest the apparent congressional intent for many sections. The
ruling volumes comprise revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and
miscellaneous announcements beginning with 1954. These volumes
embody an efficient index system that, in addition to showing the
current status of revenue rulings, assists in identifying all rulings
issued in connection with a particular Internal Revenue Code section.
Because of its encyclopedic approach to the subject matter, the
Mertens service is especially helpful to the individual with limited

20See also Jacob Mertens, Jr., Law o f Federal Gift and Estate Taxation (Chicago:
Callaghan and Co., 1969).
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knowledge of the topic to be researched. Due to its scholarly
excellence, Mertens is cited in court opinions.
Perhaps one weakness of Mertens is the fact that revised and new
material is organized on a cumulative basis and appears in the front
of each volume. This makes it somewhat cumbersome to locate the
most recent developments on any particular topic. Furthermore, the
revision process of Mertens occurs less frequently than that of
Commerce Clearing House or Prentice-Hall.
Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation (13 vols.), by Jacob
Rabkin and Mark H. Johnson (New York: Matthew Bender), is a
looseleaf tax service organized by subject rather than by code section.
For example, all material dealing with partnerships is found in one
cumulative discussion. The Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury
regulations are published in separate volumes. One of the outstanding
features of the Rabkin and Johnson service is the availability of the
legislative committee reports, which are interspersed in the Internal
Revenue Code volumes.
The Research Institute of America (RIA) publishes Federal Tax
Coordinator 2d, a compilation of professional tax research. The
service is divided into twenty-six separate chapters, each identified
by a lettered tab card. Each division begins with an explanation of
all problems in a given area, supported with citations to appropriate
authorities. Next is the text of the applicable code section and
Treasury regulation. Explanations of latest developments appear
immediately following the verbatim reprints of the code and regu
lations. Editorial explanations include illustrations, planning points,
tax traps, and appropriate recommendations. In addition to a number
of helpful aids, such as the weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin and
Internal Revenue Service audit manuals, the Federal Tax Coordinator
2d contains a “Parallel Reference Table,” which references court
decisions published in the United States Reports (U.S.), the Federal
Reporter, the Federal Supplement to the American Federal Tax
Reports (first and second series), and the United States Tax Cases.
Since Research Institute of America does not publish its own judicial
reporter series, the parallel reference table allows the researcher to
use the Federal Tax Coordinator 2d in conjunction with either the
United States Tax Cases (CCH) or the American Federal Tax Reports
(P-H).
The Bureau of National Affairs publishes a portfolio tax service
entitled Tax Management. At present the total service consists of
some 300 portfolios that range in length from fifty to 200 pages. Each
portfolio deals with a specific tax topic. The organization of the
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Publisher

Research Institute
of America, Inc.
589 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY 10017

Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs, NJ
07632

Callaghan & Co.
3201 Old Glenview Rd.
Wilmette, IL 60091

Tax Service

Federal Tax
Coordinator 2d

Federal Taxes

Mertens’ Law of
Federal Taxation
800

l,0082

$ 7321

Cost*

Indexed by topic (vol. 12)
and “Tables” (vol. 11)
converting I.R.C. and
cases to Mertens para
graph
numbers.
Se
quenced according to
Mertens paragraph num
bers.

Master key-word index in
volume 1. Organized by
code section.

Indexed by topic. 28
looseleaf volumes orga
nizing federal income, es
tate, gift, and excise taxes
into 24 broad subject cat
egories. Additional index
ing by code section,
cases, rulings, regula
tions.

Index &
Organization

Tax Services
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52 volumes, including
treatise, I.R.C., I.R.C.
commentary,
regula
tions, rulings, all as
amended. Treatise vol
ume cross-references ma
terial to all above-men
tioned volumes.

16 looseleaf volumes, in
cluding I.R.C., regula
tions, rulings, court de
cisions, editorial analysis
and comment, and a ci
tator. Covers income, es
tate and gift, and excise
taxes.

Thousands of individual
self-contained
analyses
covering specific tax sit
uations, including cita
tions to controlling au
thorities, applicable code
sections, regulations, de
velopments, finding aids,
and much more. Analyt
ical approach.

Content of
Complete Set

Supplementation

Rulings and regulations
supplemented monthly;
treatise volumes supple
mented quarterly.

Weekly

Biweekly
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Commerce Clearing
House, Inc.
4025 W. Peterson Ave.
Chicago, IL 60646

Standard Federal
Tax Reports

8454

4003

Indexed by code sections
and key words. Orga
nized by code section.

Indexed by topic, code
section, cases, and rul
ings. Organized by topic.

19 looseleaf volumes, in
cluding I.R.C., regula
tions, rulings, court de
cisions, editorial analysis
and comment, and a ci
tator. Covers income, es
tate, gift, and excise
taxes.

13 volumes; first seven
deal with tax topics, next
six with I.R.C. and leg
islative history of code
sections. Spotlight on
commentary, but refer
ences included in body of
text rather than as foot
notes.
Weekly

Bimonthly
permanent
supplements;
other
months current matters
such as cases and rulings.

* Prices shown are accurate as of September 1, 1980, and are subject to change without notice. Interested parties should consult publishers.

(Exhibit 4.12 continued overleaf)

1 Price is for a one-year contract. If purchased on a two-year contract, the price would be $681 per year.
2 Price is for a combination of income, estate and gift, and excise tax services on a one-year contract. It also includes a bound volume citator for court cases from 1954 through 1977 and a looseleaf volume for
recent citations. If purchased on a two-year contract, the price for the 16-volume service would be $915 per year. The service may also be purchased without the citator for $852 for a one-year contract or
$774 per year for a two-year contract. Each service may be purchased separately at the following prices:
Income
$621 for a one-year contract or $564 per year for a two-year contract
Estate and Gift $165 for a one-year contract or $150 per year for a two-year contract
Excise
$114 for a one-year contract or $105 per year for a two-year contract
Prentice-Hallalso has a three-volume bound citator for cases prior to 1954, which may be purchased for an additional $90.
3 Price is for one year’s monthly service. For two years’ monthly service the price is $500.
4 Price is for a combination of income, estate and gift, and excise tax services on a one-year contract. If purchased on a two-year contract, the price would be $770 per year. Each service may be purchased
separately at the following prices:
Income
$620 for a one-year contract or $565 per year for a two-year contract
Estate and Gift
$165 for a one-year contract or $150 per year for a two-year contract
Excise
$115 for a one-year contract or $105 per year for a two-year contract

Matthew Bender & Co.
235 E. 45th St.
New York, NY 10017

Rabkin and Johnson,
Federal Income,
Gift and Estate
Taxation
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$ 9035

Tax Management, Inc.
A subsidiary of the
Bureau of National
Affairs, Inc.
1231 25th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Institute for Business
Planning, Inc.
IPB Plaza
Englewood Cliffs, NJ
07632

Tax Management

Tax Planning

Indexed by topics and
paragraph numbers; also
alphabetic index of code
sections, cross-reference
tables, research aids by
topic, recent develop
ments by paragraph num
ber, and reference chart
to other tax services.

Indexed by topics, code
sections, and key words.
Bibliography at the end
of each portfolio refers to
other
services
and
sources.

Index &
Organization

2 looseleaf volumes and
letter binder. Oriented
toward tax planning. Cov
ers tax strategy, business/
corporate, personal, and
estate planning, real es
tate, investments, and tax
techniques for foreign op
erations.

Series of portfolios deal
ing with specific problem
areas of federal income,
estate, gift, trust, and for
eign business taxation.
Each portfolio includes a
detailed analysis, working
papers section, and bib
liography.

Content of
Complete Set

Supplementation

Volumes supplemented
monthly. Semimonthly
Tax Planning Ideas Let
ter.

Updated regularly. New
or revised portfolios is
sued periodically. Bi
weekly memorandum.

5 Price is for a combination of U. S. income, estate and gift, and foreign income tax services on a one-year contract. If contract is for two years or a renewal, the price would be $797 per year. Each service may
be purchased separately at the following prices:
U.S. Income
$531 new; $487 renewal
Estate and Gift
$199 new; $181 renewal
Foreign Income
$369 new; $337 renewal
or in various combinations at the following prices:
U.S. Income and Estate and Gift
$654 new; $593 renewal
U.S. Income and Foreign Income
$753 new; $687 renewal
Estate and Gift and Foreign Income
$447 new; $410 renewal
6 Price is for a one-year contract. If purchased on a two-year contract, the price would be $256 per year.
* Prices shown are accurate as of September 1, 1980, and are subject to change without notice. Interested parties should consult publishers.
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Cost*

Publisher

Tax Service

Tax Services (continued)

material within each portfolio follows a standard pattern. Part A
contains a detailed analysis of the subject matter. This analysis is
written in narrative form, with extensive footnotes to statutory,
administrative, and judicial authority. The format of discussion lends
itself to research progressing from general backgrounds through
specific problems within the topic under consideration. Part B
provides helpful working papers, appropriate forms, and illustrations,
and part C includes a bibliography of related resource material.
Previously noted were two special judicial reporter series, namely,
the Commerce Clearing House U.S. Tax Cas. series and the PrenticeHall A.F.T.R. series. To some extent, the cases appearing in these
series are “selected” by editorial staffs. In addition, the editors
prepare headnotes for each case published. Headnotes enumerate
the issue(s) contained in each case in brief form and give the court’s
conclusion. Thus, a researcher may gain a quick understanding of the
general subject matter of each case included in either series by simply
scanning the headnotes. The researcher must remember, however,
that the headnotes are in effect editorial comments and not an integral
part of any official opinion.
The decision to subscribe to only one tax service or to several must
be made on the basis of how many services a practice can support.
However, the tax adviser should keep in mind that, just as two heads
are better than one, two or more tax services can increase effective
ness. The real benefit of any tax service lies in the time-saving factor
that allows the tax practitioner to quickly find a correct answer to a
tax question. However, time constraints in a tax practice make it
impossible to consult all available services on every problem. Antic
ipation of which service will most efficiently direct research to an
acceptable solution comes only with experience.
Books

The economics of a tax practice demand that the researcher find
solutions quickly and without excessive cost to the client. Conse
quently, a tax adviser cannot afford the luxury of pulling a full-length
book from the shelf and spending a day or two pursuing the subject
in leisurely fashion. However, some treatises on specific tax topics
have attained significant reputations among tax practitioners. A few
of the more often cited works are Federal Income Taxation o f
Corporations and Shareholders, fourth edition (Boston: Warren,
Gorham & Lamont, 1979), by Boris I. Bittker and James E. Eustice;
Partnership Taxation, second edition (New York: McGraw-Hill/
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Shepard’s Citation, 1976), by Arthur B. Willis; Federal Taxation o f
Partnerships and Partners (Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont,
1978), by William S. McKee, William F. Nelson, and Robert L.
Whitmire; and Federal Income Taxation o f Corporations Filing
Consolidated Returns (New York: Matthew Bender, 1976), by Herbert
J. Lerner et al. Their special status implies that they contain
information discussed and summarized in a fashion not elsewhere
available.
Numerous tax institutes and seminars are held annually throughout
the United States. At such institutes, tax topics are discussed, and
papers are presented that usually deal with significant current issues.
Three very popular tax institutes—the New York University Tax
Institute, the University of Southern California Tax Institute, and
the Tulane Tax Institute—publish their proceedings in annual bound
volumes. Because of the emphasis on current and complex topics, tax
researchers may benefit from consulting such materials.

Tax Magazines

More than a dozen magazines are currently published dealing
exclusively with taxation and providing valuable assistance to the tax
practitioner. Their formats range from those appealing to the general
tax practitioner to those specializing in a particular field of taxation.
For example, the Journal o f Taxation features regular departments
dealing with corporations, estates, trusts and gifts, exempt institu
tions, partnerships, and so on. The Tax Adviser, published monthly
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, is another
popular tax journal for the general practitioner.
To locate pertinent articles in the periodical tax literature, a
researcher may consult the cumulative indexes provided in the
various issues. A more efficient means of locating journal material is
through CCH Tax Articles, a three-volume service including a topical
index, a code section index, and an author’s index. The P-H tax
service index volume also contains an “Index to Tax Articles’’ that is
organized by topic using the P-H paragraph index system. In 1975
Warren, Gorham & Lamont published an Index to Federal Tax
Articles compiled by Gersham Goldstein. The initial three-volume
publication will be periodically updated with additional volumes.
This service features both a topical and an author index. For a
complete list of available tax magazines that may assist the tax
researcher, see exhibit 4.13, page 126.
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Tax Newsletters

Most tax newsletters are published weekly and are, therefore,
excellent sources of the most recent developments. They keep the
tax adviser in touch with the dynamics of the tax laws. Occasionally,
in scanning a newsletter, a practitioner will spot an item that has
relevance to a client’s problem. More often, however, the newsletter
simply provides the practitioner with ideas that may be recalled and
used in later work. See exhibit 4.14, page 130, for a comprehensive
listing of the available publications.
How many technical publications a tax adviser should purchase is,
of course, an individual decision. Many publications duplicate infor
mation, and reading all of them would demand too much of a tax
adviser’s valuable time. The decision must, therefore, be based on
the size and nature of the practice. The larger the firm, the more
varied the personalities, and the greater the areas of specialization
represented, the greater the variety of subscriptions required.
Computer-Assisted Tax Research

In the 70s, Mead Data Central developed a computer storage and
retrieval system marketed under the trade name LEXIS, which
contains source materials needed in tax research. A recent addition
to the field of computerized legal and tax research is West Publishing
Company’s WESTLAW/System II. The systems are useful in situa
tions in which authority is scarce and a manual search may overlook
appropriate authority. The inherent speed of the computer also makes
computer research invaluable in situations in which authority is
voluminous and access must be obtained quickly. When used by a
knowledgeable tax practitioner, the computer search systems can be
thorough and accurate.
The researcher subscribing to the LEXIS or WESTLAW data base
communicates with the computer through a terminal (possibly in
stalled in the researcher’s office) that is connected via telephone lines
to the central computer. Access to the information stored in the
computer memory is accomplished through “key-words-in-context.’’
The researcher must select the words (or phrases) likely to be found
in the original text of any authority that might be pertinent to the
problem at hand. The computer scans all of the documents in its file
and indicates via the terminal video screen the number of documents
it has that include the selected words. The user may then narrow or
expand the original key-word selection, depending on the computer
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126

15

48

44

48

24

18

60

The Journal of
Corporate Taxation

The Journal of
Real Estate Taxation

Journal of Taxation

The Monthly Digest
of Tax Articles

National Tax Journal

Oil and Gas Tax
Quarterly

$36

Cost*

The Journal of the
American Taxation
Association

Estate Planning

Magazine

4

4

12

12

4

4

2

6

Issues
Per Year
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Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.
235 East 45th St.
New York, NY 10017

National Tax Association—
Tax Institute of America
21 East State Street
Columbus, OH 43215

Newkirk Products, Inc.
P.O. Box 1892
Albany, NY 12201

Warren, Gorham and Lamont
210 South St.
Boston, MA 02111

Warren, Gorham and Lamont
210 South St.
Boston, MA 02111

Warren, Gorham and Lamont
210 South St.
Boston, MA 02111

The American Taxation Association
c/o The American Accounting Association
5717 Bessie Drive
Sarasota, FL 33583

Warren, Gorham and Lamont
210 South St.
Boston, MA 02111

Publisher

Tax Magazines

Specialized coverage of oil and gas taxation topics.

Tax policy orientation; frequent theoretical eco
nomic analysis.

Digest of tax articles published in various profes
sional journals, magazines, and lab reviews.

In-depth analysis of current tax developments by
leading tax practitioners.

Tax planning with emphasis on real estate trans
actions.

Corporate tax planning articles by tax practition
ers.
j

A variety of articles, including those on tax
education, policy, and compliance.

Tax and nontax aspects of areas of interest to
estate planners.

Coverage

127

4

4

12

4

4

38

48

45

15

36

25

The Real Estate
Review

The Review of
Taxation of
Individuals

The Tax Adviser

The Tax Executive

Tax Law Review

The Tax Lawyer

In-depth coverage of tax topics for the lawyer in
tax practice.

American Bar Association
Section of Taxation
2d Floor, South Lobby,
1800 M St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

(Exhibit 4.13 continued overleaf)

Usually contains 2 or 3 in-depth articles on
particularly complex areas of taxation. Also has
Selected Tax Readings, a synopsis of 7-9 recently
published articles and books.

In-depth articles of particular interest to corporate
tax executives written by tax professionals, schol
ars, and management executives.

Tax Executives Institute, Inc.
1616 North Fort Myer Dr.
Arlington, VA 22209
Warren, Gorham and Lamont
210 South St.
Boston, MA 02111

Current tax developments, estate planning tech
niques, tax practice management.

Designed to meet the tax planning needs of
individuals in all phases of their lives.

Warren, Gorham and Lamont
210 South St.
Boston, MA 02111
American Institute of CPAs
1211 Ave. of Americas
New York, NY 10036

Articles dealing with taxation topics in real estate.

Selected articles on taxation for the general prac
titioner.

Warren, Gorham and Lamont
210 South St.
Boston, MA 02111

The Practical Accountant
964 3d Ave.
New York, NY 10022

1 After July 1980, The Practical Accountant will be issued 8 times per year.
* Prices shown are accurate as of January 1, 1980, and subject to change without notice. Interested parties should consult publishers for latest prices.

4

121

36

The Practical
Accountant

128

40

42

Taxes—The Tax
Magazine

Trusts and Estates

12

12

6

Publisher

Communication Channels, Inc.
6285 Barfield Rd.
Atlanta, GA 30328

Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
4025 West Peterson Ave.
Chicago, IL 60646

Warren, Gorham and Lamont
210 South St.
Boston, MA 02111

Warren, Gorham and Lamont
210 South St.
Boston, MA 02111

Coverage

Specialized emphasis on estate and trust taxation
and estate planning.

Selected articles covering current tax develop
ments. Includes a section dealing with tax laws.

General coverage of tax topics for the lawyer in
general tax practice.

General coverage of tax topics for the accountant
in general tax practice.

* Prices shown are accurate as of January 1,1980, and subject to change without notice. Interested parties should consult publishers for latest prices.

28

12

$ 36

Taxation for
Accountants

Taxation for
Lawyers

Issues
Per Year

Cost*

Magazine

Exhibit 4.13
Tax Magazines (continued)

response. If key words are used that are too common, the computer
simply will have too many entries to justify looking at each of them.
If key words are used that are too restrictive, the computer will
overlook authority that may be pertinent to the problem. For
example, if the researcher enters only the words “personal residence”
and “sale of,” the computer would be likely to locate 500 to 1,000
citations that contain those common words. In order to reduce the
number of documents to be examined, the researcher might add the
specific phrase “taxpayer 65 or over” and may find that this addition
reduces the number of available documents substantially. Comple
menting this request with “primary residence” may bring the number
of applicable documents down to an even more manageable size.
When the search has been sufficiently narrowed, the complete text
of actual documents can then be retrieved on the video screen and,
if necessary, printed out in hard copy (provided the terminal contains
a printer). The critical difference between a computer search and a
manual search is in the key words. Successful retrieval in the
computer system depends on the correct identification of key words
actually used in a tax authority; in the manual system it depends on
identification of the key word selected by the preparer of an index.
Nevertheless, experience with one system is usually helpful in the
other.
Exhibit 4.15 presents a summary of the basic features, as they
relate to tax research, found in either LEXIS or WESTLAW.
However, LEXIS and WESTLAW are not exclusively tax research
systems but have much broader capabilities. Basically, they are
designed to perform research in most legal areas; WESTLAW, for
example, contains Shepard’s citations. The LEXIS system has addi
tional features that may be of importance to accountants. Through its
computer, the accounting data banks of the AICPA National Auto
mated Accounting Research System (NAARS) can be accessed,
allowing the user to retrieve information on over 4,000 corporate
annual reports, extracts from selected proxy statements, statements
of auditing standards, and accounting series releases issued by the
AICPA, the SEC, the APB, and the FASB.
U ltrafiche

Maintaining a complete tax library often requires expensive office
space. To partially alleviate the space problem, Commerce Clearing
House has employed an ultrafiche technique to reproduce up to 1,700
pages on a single four-by-six-inch transparent plastic card. These
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130

$143.40

705

42

30

42

56

42

67

Daily Tax Report

Estate, Trust and Gift
Taxes Interpreted

Federal Taxes
Report Bulletin

J. K. Lasser Tax
Report

Kess Tax Practice Report

Kiplinger Tax Letter

Non-Profit Organization
Tax Letter

Cost*

Accountant’s Weekly
Report

Newsletter

18

26

12

24

52

24

250

52

Issues
Per Year
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Coverage

Organization Management Inc.
Box 34909
Washington, D.C. 20034

The Kiplinger Washington Editors
1729 H St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Warren, Gorham and Lamont
210 South St.
Boston, MA 02111

Current developments in taxation affecting taxexempt organizations.

General coverage of major tax developments.

General coverage of day-to-day tax problems;
emphasis on tax planning.

General coverage of tax developments.

Weekly reprint of bulletin sent to tax service
subscribers; general coverage of weekly devel
opments, some planning ideas.

Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632
Business Reports, Inc.
1 West Ave.
Larchmont, NY 10538

Report on current developments in estate, trust,
and gift taxation.

Summary and analysis of developments in taxation
and finance for preceding 24 hours.

Current developments in government regula
tions, accounting practices, and taxation of busi
ness.

Alexander Hamilton Institute
1633 Broadway
New York, NY 10019

Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
1231 25th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632

Publisher

Tax Newsletters

131

12

26

12
52

24

52

26

52

52

48

120

25

145

138

78

48

35

90

Real Estate Tax Ideas

Tax Barometer

The Tax Consultant

Tax Notes

Tax Planning Ideas

Tax Research Institute
Weekly Alert

Taxes Interpreted

Taxes on Parade

U.S. Tax Week

Analysis of real estate transactions with particular
attention to tax aspects and practical application.
Tax analysis of real estate transactions for real
estate professionals.
Digest and analysis of all leading tax decisions
and rulings. Scholarly approach.
Emphasis on individual taxation.
Tax analysis prepared by a public interest firm.

Tax ideas for future business and personal tax
planning.
Current tax developments written with emphasis
on tax planning. Also tax return guides and
opportunity checklists.
Interprets and analyzes current developments in
taxation.
Weekly reprint of report sent to tax service
subscribers; general coverage of weekly devel
opments.
Digest and commentary of current tax develop
ments.

Institute for Business Planning
IBP Plaza
Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632
Warren, Gorham and Lamont
210 South St.
Boston, MA 02111
National Tax Publications, Inc.
127 East 59th Street
New York, NY 10022
National Tax Training School
Monsey, NY 10952
Taxation With Representation Fund
6830 North Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22213
Institute for Business Planning
IBP Plaza
Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632
Research Institute of America
509 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY 10019
Alexander Hamilton Institute
1633 Broadway
New York, NY 10019
Commerce Clearing House
4025 W. Peterson Ave.
Chicago, IL 60646
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.
235 East 45th St.
New York, NY 10017

* Prices shown are accurate as of January 1, 1980, and subject to change without notice. Interested parties should consult publishers for latest prices.

24

138

Real Estate Investment
Ideas

132

Internal Revenue Code
Regulations (final, temporary, and proposed)
Cumulative Bulletins beginning in 1954, including
Rulings under ’54 code
Rulings under ’39 code
Administrative, procedural, and miscellaneous matters
Acquiescences and nonacquiescence matters, finding list tables,
announcements, technical and other releases
Private letter rulings
Cases
Supreme Court—1913 to present
Circuit court of appeals— 1945 to present
District court— 1960 to present
Court of Claims—1942 to present
Tax Court—1942 to present
B.T.A— 1924-1942
Legislative history
(Other libraries are also available in addition to the tax library,
including an accounting library and filings with the SEC.)

“Auto-Cite,” used to check validity of the cited case by giving citations
of cases that directly affect the validity of the case in question.

In reviewing the sources, the user may view the full text or limit the
screen to any number of words before and after the key words.

Searches on key words given by the user.

Citations

Text

Searching

Same as LEXIS.

Full text may be displayed, or the user may select editorial summaries
of the case or headnotes. It also searches summaries for key words.

Citation service based on Shepard’s Citations soon to be added to the
system. Provides subsequent history of any case retrieved.

In the process of assembling a federal tax library. It will include
Internal Revenue Code
Regulations
I.R.S. bulletins
Private letter rulings
Tax Court decisions
The current library includes federal cases reported in
Supreme Court Reporter—1972 to date
Federal Reporter 2d—1961 to date
Federal Supplement—1961 to date

___________________________ LEXIS___________________________ _____________________ WESTLAW/System II___________________
Terminal and printer are installed at clients’ facilities.
Terminal and printer may be installed at clients’ facilities, or the
central computer may be accessed by the clients’ compatible word
processing terminals or other existing CRT terminals.

Libraries

Hardware

Item

Exhibit 4.15
Summary of Computer Retrieval Systems

cards are read on viewers, similar to those used with microfilm, which
may be equipped with printing capacity. At the present time the
following texts have been reproduced by CCH using this technique:
Original Publisher
Board o f Tax Appeals Report (1924-1942)
United States Tax Court Reports (1943-present)
Cumulative Bulletins (1919-present)
United States Tax Cases (1913-present)
Tax Court Memorandum Decisions (1943-present)

GPO
GPO
GPO
CCH
CCH

This entire collection of ultrafiche plastic plates is filed in CCH
looseleaf binders and requires less than one foot of shelf space.
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5
. . . as the articulation of a statute increases, the room for
interpretation must contract; but the meaning of a sentence
may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody
is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can
ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear,
and which all collectively create.
JUDGE LEARNED HAND

Assessing and
Applying Authority
After a tax researcher has located authority that seems pertinent to
a given problem, the important task of assessing that material begins.
The researcher’s aim is to arrive at a course of action that can be
confidently communicated to the client along with identification of
the risks and costs accompanying it.
Locating appropriate authority for a particular tax problem is only
half the battle. The technical jargon of many portions of the Internal
Revenue Code and Treasury regulations requires the tax adviser to
read and comprehend unusually complex sentences in order to
determine congressional intent; other portions of the code and
regulations hinge upon deceptively simple words or phrases whose
definitions may be debatable. Furthermore, while available secondary
authorities or such interpretive sources as Treasury regulations,
revenue rulings, or court decisions may be more comprehensible
than are primary statutory authorities, they are frequently less
authoritative.
The researcher faces another, more serious hurdle when authorities
conflict. The applicable law may be questionable due to conflicts
between statutes or between interpretations of those statutes, be
tween the IRS interpretations and various federal courts, and among
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the courts themselves at various levels of jurisdiction. Finally, a
researcher may be unable to locate any authority at all on a particular
problem.
In attempting to assess authority and apply it to complex practice
problems, the researcher may encounter any one of four fundamen
tally different situations. The first involves clear, concise tax law that
could be applied if the researcher were able to gather additional facts
from the client. In two other circumstances, the adviser may be in
possession of clearly established facts but find (1) conflicting statutes
or (2) conflicting interpretations of those statutes. Finally, a researcher
may encounter a fourth situation in which existing tax law is
incomplete or inapplicable, requiring that issues be resolved through
interpolation from related authorities and application of creative
thinking.
The Law Is Clear—the Facts Are Uncertain
A tax adviser frequently finds it difficult to reach a conclusion and to
make a recommendation more because of insufficient knowledge of
the facts in the case than because of confusion in the applicable rules.
In many situations, the biggest single problem is gathering sufficient
evidence to support the taxpayer’s contention that he or she be
granted the tax treatment clearly authorized in a specific provision
of the Internal Revenue Code.
To illustrate this kind of problem, assume that a client, Mr. Jerry
Hill, includes what he describes as a “$16,000 casualty loss’’ with the
information he provides for the filing of his income tax return. A
cursory line of questioning by his tax adviser reveals that the loss is
claimed for a handwoven Indian wall carpet that, the client claims,
was chewed and clawed to bits by a stray dog. Mr. Hill explains that
while on vacation last summer, he left his residence in the care of his
housekeeper. Apparently one day the housekeeper neglected to close
a door securely and a stray dog wandered into the house. Upon the
Hills’s return from vacation, they were told the following story.
A ttrac ted by stran g e noises, th e h o u s e k e e p e r e n te r e d th e stu d y and

found a dog gnawing and tearing on the wall rug. As the housekeeper
entered the room, the dog turned and ran growling from the house.
Although not certain of it, the housekeeper reported noticing foam
around the dog’s mouth. Later a neighbor said that a rabid dog had
been seen roaming the neighborhood. The housekeeper, who cared
for Hill’s own dogs, stated that the dog discovered in the study was
not one of Mr. Hill’s. Mr. Hill checked with the city dogcatcher
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concerning the reported sighting of a mad dog. He was, however,
unable to confirm any such report with the dogcatcher. He did not
check with the police department.
Through a little research, the tax adviser is convinced that in order
for Mr. Hill to qualify for a casualty loss deduction under section
165(a) he must satisfy the following specific requirements:
1. The loss must have been sudden and unexpected (Matheson v.
Commissioner, 54 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1931)).
2. The loss could not constitute a mysterious disappearance (Paul
Bakewell, Jr., 23 T.C. 803 (1955)).
3. The amount of the loss deduction is limited to fair market value
(FMV) immediately before the casualty occurred, less the FMV
immediately after the casualty, less any insurance recovery, and
less a $100 floor (Treas. regs. sec. 1.165-7(b)).
4. The loss could not be attributable to the taxpayer’s own dog
(J. R. Dyer, T.C.M. 1961-705).
At this point a tax adviser would be faced with two alternatives:
accept the client’s statement at face value and claim the deduction,
or suggest that the client accumulate additional substantiation of the
loss if he desires to claim the deduction. An adviser following the
former alternative is simply postponing the collection of evidence
until a possible audit by the IRS, since the presence of a rather
sizable casualty loss on a client’s tax return undoubtedly would
increase the risk of an audit. Furthermore, it might be self-defeating
to defer the collection of evidence because two or three years from
now individuals who could render statements on matters now fresh
in their minds may be unavailable, or they may not recall necessary
details. Furthermore, helpful police records may be destroyed. Since
the taxpayer may be unaware of what is needed to substantiate the
loss deduction, he may, in the meantime, dispose of important
evidence, such as the ruined rug.
If a tax adviser pursues the second alternative, the client should
be presented with a list of instructions, including the suggestion
that he accumulate the necessary evidence to support the deduction
in th e e v e n t o f an a u d it o r e v e n tu a l litigation. T h e list could in clu d e

the following items:
1. Sworn statements from (a) the housekeeper and (b) the indi
vidual who sighted the apparently rabid dog in the neighbor
hood.
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2. Appraisal by a qualified expert or experts showing the value of
the rug before and after the casualty.
3. Color photographs of the rug before and after the casualty.
4. Instructions to retain the damaged rug as evidence, if possible.
5. Statements from, or correspondence with, insurance agents
relative to the amount of any insurance recovery.
6. Purchase invoice showing proof of ownership and cost.
A client may ignore an adviser’s request or he or she may be
unable to obtain all of the recommended evidence. Nevertheless,
the adviser will have informed the client on a timely basis of the
requirements necessary to sustain the right to the claimed deduction.
In tax research work involving situations in which tax laws are
clear but the facts of the situation are in question, it behooves the tax
adviser to establish the facts necessary to reach a conclusion and
either to accumulate appropriate supporting evidence or to suggest
that the client do so. Then, in the event of an audit, the tax adviser
would have only to persuade a revenue agent to accept the mass of
overwhelming evidence and, therefore, to reach the desired conclu
sion.
The Facts Are Clear— the Law Is Questionable
The tax researcher may encounter another kind of problem involving
situations in which facts are well established but the law is uncertain.
Uncertainty may arise either because of conflicting or ambiguous
statutes or because of conflicting interpretations of a statute, the latter
of which is the more common.
Conflicting Statutes

Although it is rather rare, the facts of a problem sometimes can be
analyzed in light of two entirely different provisions of the statute,
with each provision furnishing a different tax result. It is reasonable
under these circumstances for the tax adviser to report the transactions
u n d e r th a t section o f th e In te rn a l R ev en u e C o d e th a t w ould p ro d u c e

the lowest tax liability for the client. In this situation the adviser and
the client should be prepared for a possible IRS challenge.
In Haserot v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 562 (1964), the Tax Court
was faced with an apparent conflict in statutory authority.1 The facts
of the case reveal that a taxpayer transferred stock in two companies
1Aff ' d as John M . Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968).
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that he owned to a third corporation in exchange for that corporation’s
stock and boot (cash). After the transfer, the taxpayer owned more
than 82 percent of the third corporation’s stock. Accordingly, the
taxpayer treated the transaction as a nontaxable transfer under section
351, with boot received in the transfer taxable as a capital gain. The
government, on the other hand, claimed that section 304 was
controlling. Having to choose one of these statutory provisions, the
Tax Court said in part
Both parties present a multiplicity of arguments as to which section
controls. If section 351 controls, the gain is to be taxed as a capital
gain. If section 304 controls, then the gain is to be taxed as a capital
gain or the $64,850 cash payment is to be taxed as a dividend,
depending upon the relevant parts of section 302.

We have no reason to believe that Congress had any intent with
regard to the fact pattern of this case. However, the statements in
sections 301(a) and 302(d), “except as otherwise provided in this
chapter [or subchapter]’’ of the Code, indicate that Congress made the
policy decision that dividend treatment will result from the application
of section 302 only if no other provision in the relevant parts of the
Code requires other treatment. Section 351 has no such limitation.
That section is, by its terms, applicable. That section provides for tax
treatment of the payment in question in a manner other than and
different from the distribution treatment provided for by sections
302(d) and 301. Consequently, the very words of the latter sections
preclude dividend treatment in this case.2

The rather dubious conclusion reached by the Tax Court rests
importantly on a very careful reading of the code. It suggests, in fact,
that no statutory conflict exists even though the net result seems
clearly to be inconsistent with the general intent of section 304.
Fortunately, conflicting statutory authority is rare; when it is discov
ered, however, the taxpayer should be prepared to litigate his or her
right to rely on the more advantageous provision.
In a few instances, the drafters of the Internal Revenue Code
anticipated the possible application of two provisions of the statute
to the same situation and provided a statutory resolution of the
conflict. For example, section 368(a)(2)(A) explicitly provides that a
corporate reorganization that satisfies the rules of both a type C and
2Henry McK. Haserot, 41 T.C. 562 (1964).
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a type D reorganization will be treated as a type D reorganization
only. Unfortunately, not all conflicts in the statutes are so easily
resolved.
Conflicting Interpretations

A tax researcher more frequently encounters conflicting interpreta
tions of tax statutes by various authorities. Conflicts may be found
between the Treasury regulations and the code, between the Treasury
regulations and the courts, or between two federal courts. In such
situations, the tax adviser must consider the alternatives and weigh
the risks—including the cost of lengthy administrative battles with
the IRS and potential litigation—before recommending a particular
conclusion or course of action.3 While it is the responsibility of the
tax adviser to discover conflicting interpretations of the statutes and
to advise the client of the risks and alternatives, the client should
decide which course of action to pursue. Although only the client can
decide whether to incur the costs of an administrative or legal
confrontation with the IRS, he or she generally relies heavily on the
recommendation of the tax adviser in reaching that decision. Other
pertinent considerations include the general inconvenience associated
with such disputes, the risk of exposure to additional audits, and the
possibility of adverse publicity.
Regulations Versus Individual Interpretation During his or her
research efforts, every tax adviser will form a personal opinion
concerning the validity of specific regulations. Sometimes a tax
adviser may have serious reservations concerning the Treasury’s
interpretation of a statute and may so inform the client. However,
to plan a tax strategy that depends solely on having a particular
segment of the Treasury regulations declared invalid is certainly a
high-risk proposition. Nevertheless, if all other attempts to sustain
a client’s position fail, legal counsel may advise a taxpayer to challenge
the validity of a Treasury regulation.
In analyzing the validity of a specific regulation, a tax researcher
should determine, among other things, the age of that regulation.
Perhaps a life in excess of ten years would categorize a regulation as
“old” and anything short of ten years would warrant the designation
“new. ” Old regulations—especially those that have been unsuccess
3For additional discussion of factors to be considered by a CPA in giving tax advice,
see American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on Responsi
bilities in Tax Practice 8, Advice to Clients (New York: AICPA, 1970).
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fully challenged in the courts—should be considered as the equivalent
of the statute itself. This is especially true if, subsequent to the
unsuccessful court action, Congress revised other segments of the
statute but left unchanged the provision that had been challenged.
An example of a situation in which a regulation was challenged and
later upheld by the courts can be found in Paul J . Ussery.4 In this
instance the taxpayer took issue with the construction of Treasury
regulations section 1.117-4, which excludes from the terms “fellow
ship” and “scholarship” any payments granted for academic work
performed primarily for the benefit of the grantor. Because Congress
amended the Internal Revenue Code subsequent to the Ussery
decision but did not further clarify section 117, one might assume
that Congress has given its approval to the court’s interpretation in
Ussery. This conclusion is frequently stated by the court; see, for
example, Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938).
Tax advisers should generally consider old regulations that have
never been challenged to be well established. Most attempts to
overturn old regulations through court action would be futile, while
the possibility of successfully challenging a new regulation is signif
icantly greater. Before challenging a new regulation, however, the
tax adviser should determine the kind of regulation in question.5 The
likelihood of a successful challenge will be very slim if the regulation
has been issued under specifically delegated authority. In the event
that a tax adviser feels that a new and previously untested interpretive
regulation construes a statute contrary to the intent of Congress, legal
counsel must be obtained before embarking upon an all-out battle
against the regulation.
Regulations Versus Courts If a regulation has already been chal
lenged, one of three possible outcomes may exist. First, the Internal
Revenue Service may have lost the challenge and either revised or
withdrawn the contested regulation. Second, the government may
have lost one or more specific tests of the regulation but still be
unwilling to concede defeat. Third, the IRS may have been able to
4 Paul J. Ussery, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961).
5 Examples of statutory regulations are those under sec. 1502, where Congress
delegated the authority to the Treasury secretary in the consolidated tax return
area. Another example of statutory regulations is found in sec. 385, where the
secretary or his delegate has been granted authority to prescribe regulations that
offer guidelines for purposes of determining whether an interest in a corporation
is either debt or equity. Proposed regulations under section 385 were issued in
1980.
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defend a regulation successfully, and, therefore, further attempts to
challenge that regulation would not hold much promise.
During the sixties, an interesting and prolonged conflict developed
between certain Treasury regulations and a number of court decisions,
beginning in 1954 with the Kintner decision.6 Prior to 1962, selfemployed professionals, who were unable to incorporate under state
law, could not deduct for tax purposes contributions made to profitsharing or pension plans.7 At the same time, a tax deduction for
contributions to similar plans was available to corporations. In order
to obtain the benefits available to corporations, professional partner
ships attempted to assume the characteristics of associations, which
qualify as corporations for tax purposes. These characteristics were
first established in Morrissey and later adopted in the Treasury
regulations.8
In opposing the classification of professional partnerships as “cor
porate associations,” the commissioner lost numerous court battles.
In an attempt to strengthen its position, the Treasury amended the
regulations barring corporate treatment for unincorporated profes
sional partnerships. This move resulted in the passage of state laws
permitting the formation of professional corporations.
In a further move to strengthen the service’s position, subsection
h was added to Treasury regulations section 301.7701-2 on February
2, 1965. Subsection h provided that all professional corporations
would be taxed for federal income tax purposes as partnerships, even
if incorporated under state professional corporation acts. Interested
taxpayers declared war on the so-called Kintner regulations and
consistently won one decision after another.9 The issue was finally
settled when, on August 8, 1969, the IRS announced that henceforth
organizations formed under state professional corporation acts would
be treated for tax purposes as corporations.10 Treasury decision 7515
(approved October 5, 1977) eventually deleted subsection h of
Treasury regulations section 301.7701-2.11
6 Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).

7 In 1962 the “H.R. 10” or “Keogh” plan was passed by Congress, allowing selfemployed individuals a contribution deduction for retirement plans of up to the
lesser of $2,500 or 10 percent of earned income. The amounts were amended in
1974 to read $7,500 and 15 percent respectively.
8 See Morrissey, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), and Treas. regs. sec. 301.7701-2.
9 See, for example, Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969); O’Neill, 410 F.2d 888
(6th Cir. 1969); Kurzner, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
10T.I.R. 1019, Federal Taxes (P-H, 1969), 5155, 334.
111977-2 C.B. 482.
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During the time of controversy, tax advisers and their clients were
faced with the options of accepting the Treasury regulations at face
value or casting their lot with court decisions, which time after time
proved to be successful for the taxpayer. Many taxpayers were willing
to invest time and assume the risk and expense of battling the IRS
through administrative appeals procedures and the courts. While in
this instance the final result was favorable to the taxpayers, in other
conflicts taxpayers have been less successful.12
What has been said here concerning conflicting authority between
Treasury regulations and judicial opinions is, obviously, equally
applicable to conflicting authority between judicial opinions and
revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and other official IRS pro
nouncements. While any dispute between the IRS and the courts is
still in progress, taxpayers with similar questions become prime
targets for future litigation if they adopt a position contrary to the
service’s. The service is often looking for a “better” fact case (from
its point of view) or for a more favorable circuit in which to litigate
further. Any time a tax adviser recommends a position contrary to
that of the Internal Revenue Service, even if that contrary position
is adequately supported by judicial authority, the adviser should also
explain to the client the potential risks and extra costs implicit in
taking that position.
As far as revenue agents and appellate conferees are concerned,
the IRS position is the law, and they will challenge a departure from
this position. A tax adviser should recommend an intentional disregard
of the official IRS position only if the client is aware of the potential
disagreement and the possible need to litigate.
One Court’s Interpretation Versus Another’s Disagreements be
tween courts on similar issues can be characterized as “horizontal”
and “vertical. ” Horizontal differences mean conflicting opinions issued
by courts at the same level of jurisdiction; vertical differences refer
to conflicts between lower and higher courts. Horizontal differences
can occur between federal district courts, between the Tax Court and
a district court, and between the several circuit courts. In such
conflicts, the service is under no obligation to follow, on a nationwide
basis, the precedent set by either court. Thus, a district court opinion
favorable to the taxpayer would technically have precedent value only
for a taxpayer residing within the jurisdiction of that district court.
12See, for example, B . Foreman Co., Inc., 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972), which deals
with the creation of income issue under I.R.C. sec. 482.
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Similarly, any circuit court opinion technically has precedent value
only within the circuit where the decision originated because one
circuit court is not bound to follow the precedent of another. If
appealed, conflicting district court opinions, from district courts
within the same circuit, are settled by the appropriate circuit court.
The Supreme Court, if it grants certiorari, settles conflicts between
circuits. Prior to the time that a circuit court or the Supreme Court
disposes of such opposing views, the tax adviser and client should be
fully aware of the risks involved when relying on a court decision that
may subsequently be appealed and overturned.
An interesting example of conflict between courts involves em
ployee expenses for transportation of the tools of one’s trade. Relying
on Revenue Ruling 63-100,13 which at that time allowed a musician
an automobile expense deduction for the transportation of his musical
instrument between his personal residence and his place of employ
ment, a taxpayer deducted his driving expenses because he trans
ported a thirty-two-pound bag of tools to work each day. The Tax
Court denied the deduction; however, the second circuit reversed
and remanded the case to the Tax Court. On rehearing, the Tax
Court allowed more than 25 percent of the total driving expenses
claimed by the taxpayer.14 Subsequently, in Fausner and in Hitt, two
airline pilots, who were required by their employers and by govern
ment regulations to carry extensive flight gear, attempted to deduct
transportation expenses between their home and the airport. In
Fausner, the Tax Court felt constrained by the Sullivan decision,
since Fausner resided in the second circuit, and it allowed the
deduction for the 1965 tax year.15 However, because Hitt resided in
the fifth circuit, the Tax Court, ruling on the same day, disregarded
Sullivan and disallowed the deduction.16 Fausner’s returns for 1966
and 1967 were again challenged by the Internal Revenue Service on
the same issue, and Fausner once more petitioned the Tax Court to
rule on the matter. Although Fausner had resided in New York
during 1966 and 1967, he had moved to Texas in 1968 and was thus
petitioning from the fifth circuit in the latter years. In this instance,
the Tax Court sustained the service, as it had done previously in
H itt.17 Fausner appealed to the fifth circuit and received an adverse
13Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 C.B. 34 (now revoked by Rev. Rul. 75-380, 1975-2 C.B.
59).
14Sullivan, 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966) and T.C.M. 1968-711.
15Fausner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971).
16Hitt, 55 T.C. 628 (1971).
17Fausner, P-H T.C.M. ¶71,277.
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ruling.18 At this point a conflict between the second and the fifth
circuit courts existed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
an appeal from Fausner.19 The Supreme Court finally settled the
controversy by ruling against the taxpayer.20
The foregoing example demonstrates both horizontal and vertical
differences injudicial decisions. In horizontal differences, a taxpayer
cannot rely on a decision rendered by another court at the same level
of jurisdiction, because courts at the same level of jurisdiction simply
are not bound by decisions of other courts at that same level. Vertical
differences are harder to explain because lower courts generally are
bound by decisions of higher courts. In the case of the Tax Court,
however, even vertical differences may exist because the Tax Court
has national jurisdiction. The Tax Court considers itself bound by the
decisions of the circuit courts of appeals only to the extent that
taxpayers reside in the jurisdiction of a circuit court that has rendered
a decision on that issue. This maxim is frequently referred to as the
Golsen Rule, since it was first expressed by the Tax Court in J . E.
Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970).
Since the Tax Court is not obligated to accept any circuit court
opinion on a nationwide basis, it has ample opportunity to express
its displeasure with a circuit court opinion by disregarding it in cases
involving taxpayers from other circuits. Such a result can be dem
onstrated with two cases, in which the Tax Court arrived at opposing
conclusions, involving two 50-50 stockholders in the same sub
chapter S corporation where each taxpayer had sued on an identical
issue. In both Doehring and Puckett, the issue to be decided revolved
around whether or not the two taxpayers’ loan company had lost its
subchapter S status.21 The IRS had previously disallowed the election
on the grounds that more than 20 percent of the corporation’s gross
revenue was derived from interest (passive income). The taxpayers,
relying on House v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1972),
argued that the ceiling did not apply to loan companies. The Tax
Court ruled against the taxpayer in Doehring, stating that House did
not apply since Doehring would be appealed to the eighth circuit. In
Puckett, however, the Tax Court upheld the taxpayer’s contention,
although disagreeing with it, since appeal would be to the fifth circuit,
18Fausner, 472 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973).
19Actually the conflict between the circuits involved another decision, in which the
court held for the taxpayer (Tyne, 385 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1967)).
20Fausner, 93 U.S. 820 (1973).
21K. W. Doehring, T.C.M. 1974-1035; and P. E. Puckett, T.C.M. 1974-1038.
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in which House was controlling. Subsequently, Doehring was ap
pealed to the eighth circuit, where the taxpayer prevailed.22 The
sequence of events demonstrates, however, the uncertainty created,
at least for a time, for taxpayers and their advisers with similar
situations.
One taxpayer tested the commissioner’s right to ignore established
judicial precedent. In that case the IRS sent deficiency notices to two
taxpayers claiming that certain distributions received from their
corporation were dividends. Both stockholders challenged the defi
ciency assessment in the Tax Court. While taxpayer Divine’s suit was
pending, the Tax Court ruled against taxpayer Luckman.23 Upon
appeal, however, the seventh circuit reversed the Tax Court.24 The
commissioner pressed on with the same position he had taken in
Luckman and obtained another favorable ruling from the Tax Court
in Divine.25 Taxpayer Divine then appealed to the second circuit
court, claiming that when the commissioner is relitigating an issue
that he has previously lost and the facts are distinguishable only by
virtue of the identity of the taxpayer, the commissioner should be
barred from again bringing suit. Although the second circuit court
held for taxpayer Divine, it struck down his contention that the
commissioner was prevented from bringing suit.26
The Facts Are Clear— the Law Is Incomplete
As explained earlier, whenever a statute is silent or imprecise on a
particular tax question, tax researchers must consult such other
interpretive authorities as Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, or
court decisions. In their search for interpretive material, tax advisers
soon discover that finding authority with facts identical to their own
will be the exception rather than the rule. In most circumstances,
therefore, the ability to distinguish cases on the basis of facts becomes
critical, for many times it is necessary to piece together support for
the researchers’ positions from several authorities.
An illustration of this third class of common tax problems follows.
Assume that a client, an Austrian named Werner Hoppe, presents
the following facts. W erner visited his brother Klaus, who had
22K. W. Doehring, 527 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1975). The government also appealed
Puckett, trying for a reversal of House. However, the fifth circuit affirmed the
original Tax Court decision (P. E. Puckett, 522 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1975)).
23Sid Luckman, 50 T.C. 619 (1968).
24Luckman, 418 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1969).
25Harold S. Divine, 59 T.C. 152 (1972).
26Divine, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974).

146

immigrated to the United States six years ago and resides in Dallas,
Texas. At the time of the visit, Werner was under contract to an
Austrian soccer team and was expected to return to the team to begin
play for the fall 1980 season. W erner’s brother Klaus had fallen in
love with American football and had become an enthusiastic fan of
the Dallas Cowboys. The Cowboys had recently lost their regular
kicker to an injury, and a replacement, picked up on waivers, proved
to be less than satisfactory. Knowing of W erner’s kicking ability,
Klaus was convinced that W erner could help the Cowboys if given
an opportunity. Klaus took Werner to a Cowboy workout and
introduced him to the kicking coach. As a result, W erner was given
a tryout by the Cowboys, who were desperate for a good kicker.
W erner’s performance was far superior to others at the tryout, and
the Cowboys offered him the kicking job. Werner, however, was
reluctant to accept the offer because he had planned to return to
Austria in a few weeks to continue his soccer career. Considerable
encouragement from Klaus and the Cowboy organization seemed to
be in vain until the Cowboys, at Klaus’s suggestion, offered Werner
a $40,000 bonus. At this point Werner overcame his reluctance and
signed a contract, which Klaus cosigned as witness and interpreter.
Economically speaking, the regular salary offered by the Cowboys
was considerably more attractive than was W erner’s salary as a soccer
player in Austria. Grateful to his brother for assisting as an interpreter
and negotiator, and for encouraging him to stay, Werner instructed
the Cowboys to pay $15,000 of the negotiated bonus directly to Klaus.
Klaus reported the $15,000 as other income on his 1980 income tax
return and paid the appropriate tax. After examining W erner’s 1980
tax return, the IRS made a deficiency assessment claiming that the
$15,000 paid to Klaus constituted income to Werner and should thus
be included in his income under section 61(a)(1). The IRS agent relied
at least in part upon the authority of Richard A. Allen, 50 T.C. 466
(1968).
After determining the foregoing facts, the tax researcher decides
that, according to the language of Treasury regulations section 1.612(a)(1), the total bonus payment should be included in W erner’s
return. The regulations specify that, in general, wages, salaries, and
bonuses are income to the recipient unless excluded by law. After
ad d itio n al re searc h , th e tax ad v iser locates th e decision in Cecil
Randolph Hundley, Jr., which appears to contain a similar situation.27
In Hundley, to which the commissioner acquiesced, the taxpayer
27Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr., 48 T.C. 339, acq. 1967-2 C.B. 2.
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included the bonus payments in his income but was allowed a
business expense deduction for that portion of the bonus paid to his
father. Before relying solely on the authority of Hundley, the tax
adviser must be certain that the facts of Hundley are in effect
substantially similar to W erner’s situation and that the expense of
further negotiations with the IRS is warranted and based on a sound
premise. Thus, the tax adviser will carefully compare the Allen and
Hundley cases with the facts presented by W erner Hoppe. In doing
this the adviser might prepare the following list of facts.
Allen

Hoppe

Hundley

1. Professional
baseball player re
ceived sizable bo
nus.

1. Professional foot
ball player received
sizable bonus.

1. Professional
baseball player re
ceived sizable bo
nus.

2. Taxpayer was
amateur prior to
signing contract.

2. Taxpayer was
professional soccer
player prior to sign
ing contract.
3. Ballplayer alone
signed contract, but
brother signed as
witness and inter
preter.

2. Taxpayer was
amateur player be
fore signing con
tract.
3. Parent and ball
playing minor child
signed professional
ball contract.

4. Some bonus
payments were ac
tually made to
mother.

4. Some bonus
payments were ac
tually made to
brother.

4. Some bonus
payments were ac
tually made to
father.

5. Mother knew lit
tle about baseball.

5. Brother had av
erage knowledge of
football.

5. Father was
knowledgeable in
baseball and taught
his son extensively.

6. Mother was pas

6. Brother was an

sive p a rtic ip a n t in

active p a rtic ip a n t in

negotiations for
contract and bonus.

negotiations for
contract and bonus.

6. Father handled
most of the negotia
tions for a contract
and bonus.

7. No oral agree
ment existed.

7. No oral agree
ment existed.

3. Parent and ball
playing minor child
signed professional
ball contract.
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7. Oral agreement
existed on how to
divide the bonus
payments.

Because Allen was decided for the government and Hundley for
the taxpayer, it may be important to distinguish the two cases on the
basis of facts. Utilizing a simple diagram technique, we begin with
seven facts identified in each case.
Figure 5.1
Allen

Hundley

Next the researcher should identify those issues that are very similar
in both cases and those that are more readily distinguishable.
Figure 5.2
Allen

Hundley

The second diagram shows that facts one through four are “neutral”
in that they are nearly identical in both cases, and that the important
facts, which perhaps swayed the outcome of the Hundley case in
favor of the taxpayer, appear to be facts five through seven. Comparing
Hundley with Hoppe produces the following result.
Figure 5.3
Hundley

Hoppe

This diagram shows that Hoppe and Hundley agree in facts one, four,
and six only. The following comparison of all three fact situations
might provide additional insight for the tax adviser.
Figure 5.4
Allen

Hundley

Hoppe
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This analysis shows that facts one and four are neutral in all three
cases and perhaps should not be considered to have an impact upon
the final outcome. Fact two, dealing with the professional status of
Hoppe, which can be distinguished from both Allen and Hundley,
might significantly bolster Hoppe’s claim for an ordinary and necessary
business expense under section 162. Hoppe has already established
his business as a professional athlete; fact three, the signing of the
contract by Hoppe alone (again distinguished from Allen and Hun
dley), seems to support the fact that Klaus was needed in the
negotiations as an interpreter, the capacity in which he signed the
contract. Facts five and six, which indicate the degree of expertise
exhibited by the respective relatives of the ballplayers and the roles
played by the relatives in the contract negotiations, seem to be of
much greater significance. In Hundley’s and Hoppe’s cases both
relatives took active roles in negotiating final contracts. In Hundley,
the father was knowledgeable about baseball and contract negotia
tions. Hoppe’s situation is certainly similar. Klaus exhibited an ability
to negotiate by recommending that a bonus be offered, and he
displayed his expertise as an interpreter. The final fact—number
seven—in which Allen and Hoppe are distinguished from Hundley,
appears to be a liability to Hoppe’s position and weakens his case
considerably.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates a situation in which the statute
is incomplete and a taxpayer and the adviser must rely on equally
incomplete interpretive materials. Careful analysis indicates that
previous interpretations appear to apply to some but not all the
existing facts. Once a thorough examination of the facts and a review
of the applicable authority have been completed, a decision must be
made about the course of action. Possible risks must be evaluated
and additional expenses must be estimated before the decision to
contest the deficiency assessment is made. Consultation with legal
counsel concerning litigation hazards will assist the taxpayer in
deciding whether to carry the case beyond administrative procedures
into the courts.
The Facts Are Clear—the Law Is Nonexistent
It is possible that a tax researcher may discover that a problem is not
clearly covered by any statutory, administrative, or judicial authority.
In such circumstances, the tax adviser has an opportunity to utilize
whatever powers of creativity, logical reasoning, and persuasion he
or she possesses. Since the revenue agent making an examination
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likewise will have little authority to substantiate any proposed
adjustment, it is up to the tax adviser to present a convincing
argument in support of the client’s position. However, as stressed
throughout this chapter, before the tax adviser proceeds with a course
of action, the client should be advised of the possible risks and
expenses associated with it. In these circumstances, the client may
want to ask the IRS for a letter ruling before a final decision is
reached.
We have suggested that in all questionable situations the cost and
risk factors be considered before reaching a conclusion. Risk should
be interpreted as any possible adverse consequence that might occur
as a result of a specific course of action adopted by the taxpayer. One
might ask whether the questionable treatment of a particular item on
the return will trigger an examination, and whether such an exami
nation is likely to subject other items on the return to scrutiny and
a possible proposed adjustment.28 Furthermore, proposed adjust
ments on one year’s tax return may lead to similar adjustments on a
prior year’s return. Thus, in addition to developing a strong case
against the IRS claims, potential risks must be considered in the final
decision process in the treatment of all tax matters. At the same
time, one should not forget that the cost of disputing a tax liability
is generally deductible. For the taxpayer in a high marginal tax
bracket, this may be a point in favor of continuing a dispute with the
IRS.
Working With the Citator
In addition to its usefulness in locating appropriate authority, the
citator can assist in the assessment process. Throughout this chapter
we have observed how conflicting interpretations of the code by
taxpayers, their tax advisers, the IRS, and the courts result in
considerable litigation. In the litigation process, court decisions
sometimes are appealed and, subsequently, either affirmed or re
versed by the appropriate appellate court. Furthermore, it should be
apparent that, while a particular court decision may support a
taxpayer’s position, subsequent decisions by the same court or by
other courts may reverse a previous decision. It is imperative,
therefore, that the researcher carefully investigate the judicial history
28A questionable treatment should not be confused with an illegal treatment. The
former refers to items supported by adequate authority that lend themselves to
honest disagreement between taxpayers and IRS.

151

of any decision before placing much emphasis on it. The citator can
assist the researcher in this evaluative process. Verifying the judicial
history of a particular case can be accomplished effectively only
through the P-H Citator; the CCH Citator simply does not include
the information necessary to make this determination. To illustrate,
let us return to exhibit 4.6, page 110. The entry in the CCH Citator
for the Germantown Trust Co. case discloses that Germantown was
cited in Automobile Club o f Michigan, 353 U.S. 180 (1957). Because
the latter case was decided by the Supreme Court, it would be
important to know which issue was involved and whether or not the
Supreme Court upheld its earlier decision in Germantown Trust Co.
Such information cannot be gleaned from the CCH Citator. As shown
in exhibit 4.10, page 120, the P-H Citator lists information similar to
that found in the CCH Citator. However, the symbol “n-1” precedes
the Automobile Club citation, and similar symbols precede other
cases in which Germantown was cited. The P-H symbol explanation
sheet (see exhibit 5.1, page 153), discloses that “n” denotes that
Germantown was cited only in a dissenting opinion. The number “1”
in connection with the symbol “n” refers the reader to the corre
sponding headnote number in the A.F.T.R. series, which identifies
the issue involved. A further examination of cases in which German
town was cited (exhibit 4.10) indicates that issue “3” is most frequently
cited, that in one instance Germantown was “explained,” and that in
another instance it was “distinguished.” (See exhibit 5.1 for an
explanation of the terms explained and distinguished, as well as other
interpretive symbols.)
How the P-H Citator can assist the researcher can be demonstrated
with the decision reached by the Supreme Court in Wilcox, 327
U.S. 404 (1946). In this decision the Supreme Court held that
embezzled money does not constitute taxable income to the embez
zler. The Supreme Court overruled the Wilcox decision in James,
366 U.S. 213 (1961). The extract from the P-H Citator shown in
exhibit 5.2, page 154, reveals that Wilcox was cited on various issues
in James and that in James the court overruled Wilcox on issues three,
four, nine, and twelve. Thus, reliance on Wilcox, simply because it
represented a Supreme Court decision, would be ill advised.
Before researchers rely explicitly upon the authority of any partic
ular judicial decision, they should take the few minutes it requires
to trace that case through the P-H Citator to be sure that subsequent
developments did not render the case invalid for their purposes.
In addition to the P-H Citator, Shepard’s Citations, Inc., publishes
a comprehensive legal citator that can assist tax researchers in tracing
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Exhibit 5.1
Prentice-Hall Citator Symbols

153

Exhibit 5.2
Prentice-Hall Citator Extract
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the history and current status of any case.29 Since Shepard's Citations
includes almost all federal and state cases, the publication consists of
numerous volumes, requiring extensive space. While it may not be
economically feasible to include Shepard’s citator in a typical tax
library, it can be found in nearly all law libraries, and the tax
researcher may wish to make use of it in unusual circumstances.

29Shepard’s Citations (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Shepard’s Citations, Inc.).
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6
True ease in writing comes from art,
not chance,
As those move easiest who have
learned to dance.
ALEXANDER POPE

Communicating
Tax Research
Throughout this tax study we have used the terms tax researcher and
tax adviser synonymously. If a distinction could be made between
the two forms of practice, it would be based on the tax adviser's task
of reporting the conclusion that has been so painstakingly pieced
together. While some tax conclusions can be communicated orally,
much of the information gathered by tax researchers must eventually
be placed in writing as either internal or external documentation.
The task of writing introduces two major problems for practitioners.
First, the ability of some to write well is more often than not an
acquired trait, the result of practice and more practice. Second,
communicating the conclusions of tax research requires the ability to
perceive how much or how little to express. This task is complicated
by the fact that highly technical solutions frequently must be distilled
into layman’s language. Also, tax advisers often must hedge on their
solutions because, as discussed in chapter 5, a definitive answer
simply is not available in every case. In addition, tax advisers must,
to protect their own professional integrity, foresee potential future
claims against them. Like writing skill, the ability to determine
precisely what needs to be said usually can be improved through
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practice. In larger offices, all inexperienced tax researchers should
be given an early opportunity to present much of their initial research
in written form. New researchers should also be assigned the
responsibility of preparing draft copies of correspondence that will
subsequently be reviewed by a supervisor for weaknesses in writing
style and technical presentation. Experience and assistance can mold
good researchers into good advisors with a mastery of writing style
and an ability to pinpoint the finer information required in tax
documents.
The form in which a written tax communication appears is deter
mined by the audience for which it is intended. Some documents are
prepared for internal purposes, or firm use, only. Other documents,
such as client letters, protest letters, and requests for rulings, are
prepared for an external audience. In the following pages we will
illustrate the appropriate formats and contents of some of the more
frequently encountered communications. Of course, firm policies
often dictate specific formats and procedures; nevertheless, certain
basic features are universal to most tax communications.

Internal Communications
Within the accounting firm, the client file is the basic vehicle used
to communicate specific client information between the various levels
of the professional staff. Pertinent information concerning each client’s
unique facts is contained in the file in the form of memos and working
papers.

Memo to the File

A memo to the file may be initiated as a result of any one of several
developments. Often such memos are the result of a client’s request—
in person, over the telephone, or in a letter—for a solution to a tax
problem. The importance of facts in tax research was explained in
chapter 2; a memo to the file is commonly used to inform the
researcher of the underlying facts needed to identify issues, locate
authorities, and reach solutions. In most large offices the initial
contact with the client occurs at the partner or manager level, while
much of the actual research will be performed by a staffperson. It is
critical, therefore, that accurate information be communicated be
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tween the various levels of the professional staff. A typical memoran
dum to the files may appear as follows.
October 30, 1980
TO:
Files
FROM:
Tom Partner
SUBJECT: Potential exchange of common voting stock for preferred
nonvoting stock in Allemania Electronic, Inc.
Today Jane Dietz, financial vice-president of Electric Supply Co.,
called to request information concerning the tax consequences of a
proposed recapitalization in Allemania Electronic, Inc., an 85 percentowned subsidiary. Allemania was acquired by Electric on June 1, 1975,
and has been carried in the financial statements as a temporary
investment on the equity basis. The auditors of Electric (Meyerson,
Garner, and Leavitt) are now insisting that continued association with
Allemania would require the inclusion of the subsidiary in Electric’s
financial statements on a fully consolidated basis. The directors of
Allemania are not in favor of such a disclosure and have suggested that
Allemania exchange sufficient common voting stock for preferred
nonvoting stock to reduce Electric’s ownership in the form of voting
stock from 85 percent to 50 percent or below. The board hopes,
through the reduction of ownership in voting stock, that inclusion of
Allemania on a consolidated financial basis with Electric can be
avoided. At the present time Electric and Allemania join in the filing
of a consolidated tax return on a May 31, fiscal-year basis. Responsibility
for preparation and filing of the return rests with Electric’s internal tax
department, which we review on an annual basis. Jane Dietz requested
that our report reach her prior to Electric’s next board meeting,
scheduled for November 22, and she requested that we contact her
personally for additional information.

The information contained in the above memo should be sufficient
for the researcher to begin work. Furthermore, the memo commu
nicates a specific deadline and indicates that the client is willing to
supplement this information with additional facts if necessary.
A less formal procedure is often followed when a long-established
client calls the tax adviser for an immediate answer to a routine tax
question on a well defined, uncontroversial topic. If the tax adviser
gives an oral reply, the conversation should be placed in writing,
thus creating a record for the files. Such a record serves as protection
against subsequent confusion or misinterpretation that may jeopardize
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the tax adviser’s professional integrity, and it can serve as a basis for
billing the client.1
Leaving Tracks

Once the necessary information has been recorded in a memo to the
files, the researcher may begin the task of identifying questions and
seeking solutions. Supporting documents for conclusions, such as
excerpts from or references to specific portions of the Internal
Revenue Code, Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, court deci
sions, tax service editorial opinions, and periodicals, should be put
in the files. All questions and conclusions should be appropriately
cross-indexed to facilitate subsequent retrieval of the information.
Pertinent information in supporting documents should be highlighted
to avoid unnecessary reading. Examples of the content and organi
zation of a client’s file are presented in chapter 7.
Because time is the most important commodity any tax adviser has
for sale, a well organized client file is of the utmost importance; it can
eliminate duplication of effort. Supervisory review of a staff person’s
research can be accomplished quickly, and additional time is saved
if and when it becomes necessary to refer to a client’s file months,
or even years, after the initial work was performed. Such a delayed
reference to a file may be required because of subsequent IRS audits,
preparation of protests, or the need to solve another client’s similar
tax problem. Because promotions, transfers, and staff turnover are
common occurrences in accounting firms, well organized files can be
of significant help in familiarizing new staff members with client
problems.
Another time-saving device used by practitioners is the tax subject
file. To prepare such a system, members of the practitioner’s tax staff
contribute tax problems together with documented conclusions,
which are then pooled and arranged on a subject basis. In a multioffice
firm such files are duplicated, in some instances on microfilm, and
1The question of whether oral advice should be confirmed in writing arises
frequently. The AICPA Subcommittee on Responsibilities in Tax Practice makes
the following recommendation: “Although oral advice may serve a client’s needs
appropriately in routine matters or in well-defined areas, written communications
are recommended in important, unusual or complicated transactions. In the
judgment of the CPA, oral advice may be followed by a written confirmation to the
client. A written record will limit misunderstandings and provide a basis for future
discussions, reference, planning, and implementation of suggestions.” (AICPA,
Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice 8, Advice to Clients (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1970)).
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made available to each office. A subject file can eliminate many hours
of duplicative research.
External Communications
A tax practitioner’s written communication to an external audience
takes on added significance because it demonstrates professional
expertise, renders professional advice, and exposes professional
reputation. Perhaps the most frequently encountered external doc
ument in a CPA’s tax practice is the client letter. Communications
with the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of a client to protest a
deficiency assessment or to request a ruling for a proposed transaction
are also quite common.
Client Letters

In a client letter the tax adviser expresses a professional opinion to
those who pay for his or her services. The significance of a client
letter can perhaps best be expressed as follows:
Tax opinion letters are emerging as a new work product for tax
professionals. Anyone who has written such a letter knows why he said
what he said and has reasons for discussing certain items in more or
less detail. It is no easy task to balance the proper degree of necessary
technicality with everyday English, trying all the while to foresee any
misunderstanding that could arise and to write only what is meant.
The ability to write good tax opinion letters has become one of the
finer attributes of the tax practitioner.2

The detailed format of client letters may vary from one firm to
another. Most good client letters, however, have several things in
common.
Style Like a good speaker, a good writer must know the audience
before beginning. Because tax clients vary greatly in their own tax
expertise, it is important to consider the technical sophistication of
a client or the client’s staff when composing a tax opinion letter. The
style of a letter may range from a highly sophisticated format, which
includes numerous technical explanations and citations, to a simple
composition that uses only laymen’s terms. In many situations, of
course, the best solution lies somewhere between the two extremes.
2W. J. DeFillips, “Developing a Tax Department in a Growing Organization,”
Journal o f Accountancy (June 1974): 64.
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Format and Content Regardless of the degree of technical sophis
tication, a well drafted client letter follows a well planned format. It
should begin with an enumeration of the facts upon which the tax
adviser’s research is based. In conjunction with a statement of the
facts, a statement of caution (see “Disclaimer Statements,” page 163)
should be included to warn the client that the research conclusions
stated are valid only for the specified facts. Next, the letter should
state the important tax questions implicit in the previously identified
facts. Finally, the tax practitioner should list his conclusions and the
authority for those conclusions. An example of appropriate form and
typical content of a client letter is shown in chapter 7. Additional
examples can be examined in the AICPA Tax Study 4, Tax Practice
Management, by William L. Raby.3
A client letter may identify areas of controversy (or questions that
are not authoritatively resolved) that might be disputed by the
Internal Revenue Service. Some highly qualified tax advisers seriously
question the wisdom of including any discussion of disputable points
in a client letter because that letter may end up in the possession of
a revenue agent at a most inopportune time. Furthermore, by
authority of section 7602, the IRS has the right to examine all relevant
books, papers, and records containing information relating to the
business of a taxpayer liable for federal taxes. Tax accountants are
well aware that documents in their possession, relating to the
computation of a client’s federal tax liability, are not considered
privileged communication. Those granted privileged communication
are usually based on an attorney-client or Fifth Amendment privi
lege—never on an accountant-client privilege.
The accountant in tax practice is thus faced with a dilemma. If a
client letter discloses both the strengths and weaknesses of the client’s
tax posture, exposure of the letter to a revenue agent may considerably
weaken the client’s position and even assist the revenue agent in
preparing the case. On the other hand, if the potential weaknesses
of the position are not clearly communicated to the client, the tax
adviser exposes himself to potential legal liability for inappropriate
advice.
Although many advisers do not agree, we believe that client letters
should contain comprehensive information, including some reference
to the more vulnerable factors that could expose the client to potential
challenge by the IRS. In our opinion, full disclosure and self
3William L. Raby, Tax Study 4, Tax Practice Management (New York: AICPA,
1974).
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protection against claims by clients, which may endanger the profes
sional reputation of all tax practitioners, is more important than the
risk of an IRS challenge. Any disclosure of weaknesses must be
carefully worded, and the client should be cautioned in advance to
control possession of the letter.
The issue of privileged communication is most frequently raised
in connection with tax fraud cases, and, in the long run, a tax
practitioner will do his or her practice more good by preserving a
professional reputation than by protecting a few clients who may be
guilty of tax fraud. In situations in which a CPA suspects that fraud
may be involved, the client should be immediately referred to an
attorney for all further work. If it is felt that the accountant may be
of assistance, the attorney may reengage the accountant or another
accountant and thereby possibly extend privileged communication to
the accountant’s workpapers.4
Disclaimer Statements Tax advisers deal with two basically dif
ferent situations. In the case of after-the-fact advice, tax practitioners
must assure themselves that they understand all of the facts necessary
to reach valid conclusions. Incomplete or inaccurate facts may lead
advisers to erroneous conclusions. In planning situations, in which
many of the facts are still “controllable,” tax advisers must assure
themselves that they fully understand their clients’ objectives and
any operational constraints on achieving those objectives. Further
more, planning situations frequently involve lengthy time periods
during which changes in the tax laws may occur, thus possibly
changing the recommended course of action. Statement 8, issued by
the AICPA Responsibilities in Tax Practice Subcommittee, noted
some of the problems associated with new developments in tax
matters.
The CPA may assist clients in implementing procedures or plans
associated with the advice offered. During this active participation,
the CPA continues to advise and should review and revise such advice
as warranted by new developments and factors affecting the transaction.
Sometimes the CPA is requested to provide tax advice but does not
assist in implementing the plans adopted. While developments such
as legislative or administrative changes or further judicial interpreta
tions may affect the advice previously provided, the CPA cannot be
4 See Robert E. Meldman and Thomas E. Mountin, “Strategies Available to the
Accountant to Protect a Client in a Tax Fraud Investigation,” Taxation fo r
Accountants (December 1978): 370-74.
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expected to communicate later developments that affect such advice
unless he undertakes this obligation by specific agreement with his
client. Thus, the communication of significant developments affecting
previous advice should be considered extraordinary service rather than
an implied obligation in the normal CPA-client relationship.5

On the advisability of including some type of disclaimer statement
in a client letter, the same subcommittee stated
Experience in the accounting and other professions indicates that
clients understand that advice reflects professional judgment based on
an existing situation. Experience has also shown that clients customarily
realize that subsequent developments could affect previous professional
advice. Some CPAs use precautionary language to the effect that their
advice is based on facts as stated and authorities which are subject to
change. Although routine use of such precautionary language seems
unnecessary based on accepted business norms and professional
relationships, the CPA may follow this procedure in situations he
deems appropriate.6

In summary, the AICPA subcommittee concludes that a disclaimer
statement is not required. The authors of this study, however, are
of the opinion that client letters generally should contain disclaimer
statements as a matter of policy. In our opinion, the client letter
should include a brief restatement of the important facts, a statement
to the effect that all conclusions stated in the letter are based on
those specific facts, and a warning to the client of the dangers implicit
in any changes or inaccuracies in those facts. In the case of tax
planning engagements, we also recommend that the tax practitioner
include a warning that future changes in the law could jeopardize the
planned end results. An example of such a disclaimer statement in
client letters appears in chapter 7.
Protest Letters
A n o th er ex tern al d o c u m e n t com m only p re p a re d by th e tax p ra c ti

tioner is the “protest” of a client’s tax deficiency as assessed by the
Internal Revenue Service. Formal written protests are only required
for proposed tax deficiencies in excess of $2,500 originating from field
audits. Some tax advisers feel, however, that a well written formal
5 AICPA, Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice 8.
6 Ibid.
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protest enhances the chances of resolving a disagreement successfully
even in cases resulting from office audits or deficiencies of $2,500 or
less. The Internal Revenue Service suggests that a protest include
the following information:
1. A statement that you want to appeal the findings of the examining
officer to the regional director of appeals.
2. Your name and address (the residence address of individuals; the
address of the principal office or place of business of corporations).
3. The date and symbols on the letter transmitting the proposed
adjustments and findings you are protesting.
4. The taxable years, periods, or returns involved.
5. An itemized schedule of adjustments of findings with which you do
not agree.
6. A statement of facts supporting your position in contested factual
issues. This statement and all major evidence submitted with the
protest is to be declared true under penalties of perjury. This may
be done by adding to the protest the following declaration, signed
by the taxpayer as an individual or by an authorized officer of a
corporation:
Under the penalties of perjury, I declare that I have
examined the statement of facts presented in this protest
and in any accompanying schedules and statements and, to
the best of my knowledge and belief, they are true, correct,
and complete.
7. Instead of the declaration required in 6 above, if your representative
prepares or files the protest, he or she may substitute a declaration
stating:
(a) That he or she prepared the protest and accompanying docu
ments, and
(b) W hether he or she knows personally that the statements of fact
contained in the protest and accompanying documents are true
and correct.
8. A statement outlining the law or other authority upon which you
rely.7

In principle, the body of a protest follows the format of a client
letter in th a t th e p ro te s t specifies im p o rta n t facts, d elin ea te s c o n te ste d
findings, and lists the authority supporting the taxpayer’s position.
An example of a typical protest letter follows.
7 IRS Publication 5, Appeal Rights and Preparation o f Protests fo r Unagreed Cases,
rev. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).

165

July 14, 1980
District Director of
Internal Revenue8
Federal Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re: Intermountain Stove, Inc.
1408 State Street
Moroni, Utah 84646
Corporate income taxes for
the year ended 12/31/78
Sir (or Madam):
Reference is made to your letter of May 23, 1980 (Reference—
B:S:59-A:FS:rs), which transmitted a copy of your examining officer’s
report dated May 8, 1980, covering his examination of Intermountain
Stove’s corporate income tax return for the year ended December 31,
1978. In the report, the examining officer recommended adjustments
to the taxable income (loss) in the following amount:

Tax Year
December 31, 1978

Amount of
Increase in Income Reported
$42,000

PROTEST AGAINST ADJUSTMENT
Your letter granted the taxpayer a period of thirty days from the
date thereof within which to protest the recommendations of the
examining officer, which period was subsequently extended to July
22, 1980, by your letter dated June 6, 1980, a copy of which is
attached. This protest is accordingly being filed within that period, as
extended.
The taxpayer respectfully protests against the proposed adjustment
stated below.
FINDINGS TO WHICH TAXPAYER
TAKES EXCEPTION_______
Exception is now taken to the following item:
Disallowance of the following expenses of
Intermountain Stove, Inc.
Description
Year
Professional Fees
December 31, 1978

Amount
$42,000

Although a conference is requested with the regional director of appeals, the
protest letter is directed to the district director. See IRS publication 5 (n. 7,
herein).
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GROUNDS UPON WHICH TAXPAYER RELIES
The taxpayer submits the following information to support its
contentions:

Expenses of Intermountain Stove, Inc.
Your examining officer contends that fees paid in the amount of
$42,000 in connection with the employment of certain individuals who
were experienced in various phases of the production and sale of cast
iron stoves should be considered as the acquisition costs of assets in
connection with expansion of operations and establishment of a new
cast iron stove division.
Taxpayer contends, for reasons set forth below, that the examining
officer’s position is untenable on the facts and in law and that such
costs are clearly deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses incurred
in its trade or business, deductible in accordance with section 162 of
the Internal Revenue Code.

Facts concerning the operations of Intermountain Stove, Inc.
Intermountain Stove, Inc. (ISI) is a manufacturer of campers. As a
result of the fuel crisis, orders in 1978 declined, and ISI decided, in
addition to their camper operation, to again produce wood and coal
burning stoves, a product ISI had manufactured until the end of World
War II and for which a strong demand suddenly developed. To begin
immediate operation in a new stove division, ISI contracted with a
consulting firm to locate personnel with experience in the production
and marketing of cast iron stoves. The fee paid for such services during
1978 amounted to $42,000.

Discussion of authorities
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
There shall be allowed as a deduction all of the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business. . . .

To contend, as the examining officer does, that assets were acquired
with the employment of the newly acquired employees is not within
the usual interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code.
There were no employment contracts purchased, as may sometimes
be found in the hiring of professional athletes; the employees were
free to sever their employment relationships at any time, and, in fact,
certain of these specific individuals have done so. The examining
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officer’s position was considered in David J . Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, in
which the court stated
It might be argued that the payment of an employment fee is capital in
nature and hence not currently deductible. Presumably under this view
the fee would be deductible when the related employment is terminated.
However, the difficulty with this view is to conjure up a capital asset
which had been purchased. Certainly the expense was not related to
the purchase or sale of a capital asset. . . . Certainly in the ordinary
affairs of life common understanding would clearly encompass the fee
paid to the employment agency herein as “ordinary and necessary
expenses in carrying on any trade or business” (Section 162) within the
usual, ordinary and everyday meaning of the term.

Your examining officer is here attempting to disallow deductions for
amounts paid to outside consultants in a situation in which the expenses
would clearly be deductible if the work had been performed by the
company’s own staff. No such distinction should be made. The
corporation employed the expertise of a knowledgeable consultant to
assist in the location of personnel with specific background and
experience. The payment of fees for such assistance may be compared
with the direct payroll and overhead costs of operating an “in-house’’
personnel department.
The examining officer apparently believes that such costs should be
capitalized primarily because they might be nonrecurring in nature.
This is not the test of whether an expense is ordinary and necessary.
As the Supreme Court stated in Helvering v. Welch, 290 U.S. 111, 3
U.S. Tax Cas. A1164, “Ordinary in this context does not mean that the
payments must be habitual or normal in the sense that the same
taxpayer may make them often.” The fees are ordinary and necessary
because it is the common experience in the business community that
payments are made for assistance in the procurement of personnel.
This is emphasized by the Court in Primuth by the following statement:
“ ‘Fees’ must be deemed ordinary and necessary from every realistic
point of view in today’s marketplace where corporate executives change
employers with a notable degree of frequency. ”
These expenditures, if paid by the individual employees and
reimbursed by the employer, would have been clearly deductible by
both the employee and the employer, with the employee having an
offsetting amount of income for the reimbursement. See Rev. Rul. 60223, 1960-1 C.B. 57, and Rev. Rul. 66-41, 1966-1 C.B. 233. The
expense is no less deductible when paid directly by the corporation.
It is, therefore, contended that the disallowance made by the
examining officer was in error.
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REQUEST FOR CONFERENCE
An oral hearing is requested before the regional director of appeals.

STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO PREPARATION9
The attached protest was prepared by the undersigned on the basis
of information available to him (or her). All statements contained
therein are true and correct to the best of his (or her) knowledge and
belief.

Signature of Tax Practitioner

Requests for Rulings and Determination Letters

Frequently tax practitioners find it necessary to seek a ruling from
the IRS to fix the tax consequences of a client’s anticipated business
transaction or to settle a disagreement with a revenue agent during
an examination. The general procedures with respect to the issuance
of advance rulings (before the fact) and determination letters (after
the fact) are outlined in Revenue Procedure 79-45, 1979-2 C.B. 508,
in which the IRS announced that a careful adherence to the specified
requirements will minimize needless delays in processing requests
for rulings and for determination letters. In addition to Revenue
Procedure 79-45, the IRS has on occasion issued procedures that
govern ruling requests dealing with specific topics. For example,
Revenue Procedure 73-10 suggests specific guidelines for ruling
requests involving section 351. Similarly, Revenue Procedure 74-17
delineates requirements for ruling requests concerning the classifi
cation of organizations, for example, partnerships versus associations.
Requests for rulings, which are addressed to the national office of
the IRS, generally take the following format.

It is assumed that an appropriate power of attorney has been filed with the IRS.
Otherwise, a power of attorney must be attached to the protest.
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November 15, 1980
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Washington, D.C. 20224
Attention: T:PS:T
Re: Allemania Electronic, Inc.
(I.D. 73-2113112)
1403 South State Street
Austin, Texas 78712
Request for ruling under
section 306 to fix status of
nonvoting preferred stock
to be issued under sec
tion 368(a)(1)(E) in ex
change for voting com
mon stock.
Dear Sir:
Allemania Electronic, Inc., is a Texas corporation with 10,000 shares
of common voting stock issued and outstanding. Of this issue, 8,500
shares are owned by Electric Supply Co., while the remaining shares
are owned by several minority interests. Electric and Allemania join
in the filing of a consolidated tax return on a calendar-year basis. A
plan has been proposed under which Allemania will exchange 3,500
shares of its common voting stock now held by Electric for 3,500 shares
of preferred non voting stock. The proposed exchange should constitute
a recapitalization to which section 368(a)(1)(E) applies. A ruling is
respectfully requested concerning whether or not the proposed issue
of preferred nonvoting stock would constitute section 306 stock.
FACTS
Electric Supply Co. acquired 85 percent of Allemania’s common
voting stock on June 1, 1975. Since that time Electric has included
Allemania’s stock as a temporary investment on its audited financial
statements. Considerable pressure is now being exerted by Electric’s
auditors to include Allemania as a fully consolidated subsidiary on its
audited statement or to dispose of the investment. Since Allemania is
a supplier of needed components to Electric, divesture is out of the
question. On the other hand, inclusion on a fully consolidated basis
is out of the question since the board of directors fears a negative
effect on Electric’s stock prices. Allemania has therefore adopted a
plan to exchange 3,500 shares of voting common stock for an equal
number of nonvoting preferred stock, thus making it possible to
continue to show Allemania on Electric’s audited financial statements
as a line-item investment, since ownership in voting stock does not
exceed 50 percent.
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DISCUSSION OF AUTHORITIES
Internal Revenue Code section 306(c)(1)(B)(ii) seems to imply that
the preferred stock to be issued would be tainted as section 306 stock.
Similar thoughts are expressed in Rev. Rul. 59-84, Rev. Rul. 66-332,
and Rev. Rul. 70-199. However, given the nature of the transaction
contemplated by Allemania, there also appears to be substantial
authority for arguing that the newly issued preferred stock should not
be section 306 stock. Since, after the proposed exchange of common
for preferred, the percentage interest in Electric’s voting stock would
be substantially reduced, the preferred stock should not be section
306 stock. This position seems to be supported by Rev. Rul. 59-84, in
which one of the shareholders reduced his proportionate interest in
the common stock of the distributor corporation from 55.8 percent to
0 percent. In that instance the Internal Revenue Service ruled that,
since the shareholder’s percentage interest in the common stock was
substantially reduced by the recapitalization, section 306 did not apply
to the newly issued preferred stock.

BUSINESS PURPOSE
Taxpayer also contends that avoidance of income taxes is not a
reason for the proposed recapitalization, but that recapitalization is
motivated entirely by a valid business purpose. The business purpose
in this instance is the avoidance of the negative impact on stock prices
that Electric contends will result if Allemania is included as a fully
consolidated subsidiary on Electric’s audited financial statements.

REQUEST FOR RULING
It is respectfully requested that the commissioner rule that the
proposed issuance of preferred nonvoting stock in exchange for common
voting stock under section 368(a)(1)(E) does not qualify the newly
issued preferred stock as section 306 stock.

STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO CONTENT
Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this
request, including accompanying documents, and to the best of my
knowledge and belief the facts presented in support of the requested
ruling are tru e, correct, and com plete.

Allemania Electronics, Inc.
b y -----------------------------------------------------Vice President and Treasurer
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STATEMENT REGARDING IDENTICAL ISSUES
To the best of the knowledge of the taxpayer and his or her
representative, none of the issues upon which a ruling is requested is
being considered by any field office of the Internal Revenue Service
or by a branch office of the appellate division.
Allemania Electronics, Inc.
b y -----------------------------------------------------Vice President and Treasurer
Signature of Tax Practitioner
STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO PREPARATION
The attached request for ruling was prepared by the undersigned
on the basis of information made available to him (or her). All
statements contained therein are true and correct to the best of his
(or her) knowledge and belief.
Signature of Tax Practitioner

As mentioned in chapter 4, under the Freedom of Information Act
and section 6110(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, rulings and the
background file are open for inspection by the public. However, the
IRS is required under section 6110(c) to delete certain information.
For that reason Revenue Procedure 79-45 suggests that a ruling
request be accompanied by a statement of proposed deletions via a
copy of the ruling request using brackets that show the material the
taxpayer suggests deleting.
As depicted in the sample ruling request, a request should also be
signed by the taxpayer or an authorized representative. If signed by
an authorized representative, the request should include an appro
priate power of attorney and evidence that the representative is
currently either an attorney, a certified public accountant, or an
enrolled agent in good standing and duly licensed to practice.
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7
These examples are the school of mankind, and they will
learn at no other.
EDMUND BURKE

Tax Research in the
“Closed-Fact” Case:
An Example
The preparation of a well organized working paper file cannot be
overemphasized because it proves that research efforts have been
thorough, are logically correct, and are adequately documented. The
elements of this chapter comprise a sample client file. The formats
of files used in practice vary substantially among firms; the new tax
accountant who uses this tax study as a guide for actual research
efforts should be prepared to modify this illustration to conform to
the format used by his or her employer. It is hoped that the general
format suggested here would be approved by most experienced tax
advisers, although any employer might disagree with any of several
specifics. The sample is based on a relatively simple incorporation
transaction. Because the tax problems illustrated are relatively simple,
the supporting file would be considered excessive by most advisers;
the cost of preparing such an elaborate file would be too great to
justify. In this case, the reader should concentrate more on general
working paper content and arrangement than on the substantive tax
issues illustrated, although in more complex problems this kind of
detail would be appropriate.
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Throughout this chapter it is assumed that the client has contacted
the accountant after all aspects of the incorporation transaction were
completed. In other words, the accountant’s task in this engagement
is restricted to compliance-related tax research. We have combined
the information for three clients into one file, that is, that of the new
corporate entity and that of its president and vice president. In
practice, however, three separate files would be maintained. Finally,
in practice a file would very likely include a substantial number of
photocopies of excerpts from the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury
regulations, revenue rulings, judicial decisions, commercial tax serv
ices, and other reference works. We have attempted to simulate a
real file by combining script and ordinary type. Anything in script
type would be handwritten in a real file. Anything enclosed by a tint
block represents material that would be photocopied.
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Reef E. Ink, Judith Dixon, Ready, Inc.
Tax File
December 19 8 0

IN D E X TO W O RKING PAPERS
Item
Client letter ( draft)

Page Ref.
1 to 3

General Client Information
M em o to File, R. U. Partner
M em o to File, Fred E. Senior

A-1 to A-3
A-4

Red E. Ink — Personal Account
Sum m ary o f Questions & Conclusions
Working Papers

B-1 & B-2
C-l to C-16

Judith Dixon —Personal Account
Sum m ary o f Questions & Conclusions

D-1 & D-2

Ready, Inc. — Corporate Account
Sum m ary o f Questions & Conclusions
Working Papers

E-1 & E-2
F-1 to F-5

Suggestions fo r Client’s Consideration

G-1
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R. U. Partner & Company

Certified Public Accountants
2010 Professional Tower
Calum City, USA 00001

December 24, 1980
Mr. Red E. Ink, President
Ms. Judith Dixon, Vice President
Ready, Incorporated
120 Publisher Lane
Calum City, USA 00002
Dear Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon:
This letter confirms the oral agreements of December 17, 1980, in which
our firm agreed to undertake the preparation of your respective federal
income tax returns along with that of Ready, Incorporated, for next year.
This letter also reports the preliminary results of our investigation into the
tax consequences of the formation of Ready, Incorporated, last March. We
are pleased to be of service to you and anticipate that our relationships will
prove to be mutually beneficial. Please feel free to call upon me at any time.
Before stating the preliminary results of our investigation into the tax
consequences of your incorporation transaction, I would like to restate
briefly all of the important facts as we understand them. Please review this
statement of facts very carefully. Our conclusions depend on a complete and
accurate understanding of all the facts. If any of the following statements is
either incorrect or incomplete, please call it to my attention immediately,
no matter how small or insignificant the difference may appear to be.
Our conclusions are based on an understanding that on March 1, 1980,
the following exchanges occurred in the process of forming a new corporation,
Ready, Incorporated. Ms. Dixon transferred two copyrights to Ready,
Incorporated, in exchange for 250 shares of common stock. Ms. Dixon had
previously paid $200 for filing the copyrights. In addition, the corporation
assumed an $800 typing bill, which Ms. Dixon owed for these two
manuscripts.
Mr. Ink concurrently transferred all the assets and liabilities of his former
sole proprietorship printing company, Red Publishings, to the new corpo
ration in exchange for 750 shares of Ready, Incorporated, common stock.
The assets transferred consisted of $20,000 cash, $10,000 (estimated market

(draft)
FES
12/24/80
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Red E. Ink
Judith Dixon
December 24, 1980
Page 2

value) printing supplies, $50,000 (face value) trade receivables, and $60,000
(book value) equipment. The equipment, purchased new in 1976 for
$100,000, had been depreciated on a double-declining-balance method for
the past four years. An investment credit was claimed in 1976 on the
purchase of the equipment. The liabilities assumed by Ready, Inc., consisted
of the $40,000 mortgage remaining from the original equipment purchase
in 1976 and current trade payables of $10,000. We further understand that
Ready, Inc., plans to continue to occupy the building leased by Red
Publishings on October 1, 1978, from Branden Properties until the expiration
of that lease on September 30, 1982. Finally, we understand that Ready,
Incorporated, has issued only 1,000 shares of common stock and that Mr.
Ink retains 730 shares; that Mr. Ink’s wife Neva holds ten shares; that Mr.
Tom Books, the corporate secretary-treasurer, holds ten shares; and that
Ms. Dixon holds the remaining 250 shares. The shares held by Mrs. Ink and
Mr. Books were given to them by Mr. Ink, as a gift, on March 1, 1980.
Assuming that the preceding paragraphs represent a complete and
accurate statement of all the facts pertinent to the incorporation transaction,
we anticipate reporting that event as a wholly non taxable transaction. In
other words, neither of you, the incorporators (individually), nor your
corporation will report any taxable income or loss solely because of your
incorporation of the printing business. Furthermore, no amount of invest
ment credit will have to be recaptured. However, in the future Ready, Inc.,
will be restricted to a 150 percent declining-balance depreciation deduction
on the equipment transferred. The trade receivables collected by Ready,
Inc., after March 1, 1980, will be reported as the taxable income of the
corporate entity; collections made between January 1, 1980, and February
28, 1980, will be considered part of Mr. Ink’s personal taxable income for
1980.
There is a possibility that the Internal Revenue Service could argue (1)
that Ms. Dixon is required to recognize $800 of taxable income and/or (2)
that the corporation could not deduct the $10,000 in trade payables it
assumed from the proprietorship. If either of you desire, I would be pleased
to discuss these matters in greater detail. Perhaps, it would be desirable for

(draft)
FES
12/24/80
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Red E. Ink
Judith Dixon
December 24, 1980
Page 3
Mr. Bent and myself to meet with both of you and review these potential
problems prior to our filing the corporate tax return.*
If you wish to report the first corporate taxable income on a cash method
fiscal-year basis, ending February 28, 1981, it is imperative that you have
Mr. Tom Books keep the corporation’s regular financial accounts on that
same basis. If he desires any help in maintaining those records, we shall be
happy to assist him. It will be necessary for us to have access to your personal
financial records no later than March 1, 1981, and to your corporate records
no later than April 15, 1981, if the federal income tax returns are to be
completed and filed on a timely basis.
Finally, may I suggest that we plan to have at least one more meeting
in my office sometime prior to February 28, 1981, to discuss possible tax
planning opportunities available to you in the new corporation. Among other
considerations, we should jointly review the possibility that you may want
to make a subchapter S election and that you may need to structure executive
compensation arrangements carefully and may wish to institute a pension
plan. It may be desirable to discuss these opportunities at the same time
that we meet with Mr. Bent to consider the two questions noted above.
Please telephone me to arrange an appointment if you would like to do this
shortly after the holidays.
Thank you again for selecting our firm for tax assistance. It is very
important that some of the material in this letter be kept confidential, and
we strongly recommend that you carefully control access to it at all times.
If you have any questions about any of the matters discussed, feel free to
request a more detailed explanation or drop by and review the complete
files, which are available in my office. If I should not be available, my
assistant, Fred Senior, would be happy to help you. We look forward to
serving you in the future.
Sincerely yours,

R obert U. P a rtn e r

* Some advisors would delete this paragraph and handle the matter orally.
(draft)
FES
12/24/80
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R. U. Partner & Company

Certified Public Accountants
2010 Professional Tower
Calum City, USA 00001

December 17, 1980
MEMO TO FILE
FROM:

R. U. Partner

SUBJECT:

Ready, Inc.—Tax Engagement

Mr. Red E. Ink (president) and Ms. Judith Dixon (vice president) this
morning engaged our firm to prepare and file their personal annual federal
income tax returns and that for Ready, Inc. During an interview in my
office, the following information pertinent to the first year’s tax returns was
obtained.
On March 1, 1980, Red E. Ink and Judith Dixon incorporated the sole
proprietorship publishing house that Mr. Ink has for six years previously
operated as Red Publishings. There were two primary business reasons for
incorporating: (1) The incorporators desired to limit their personal liability
in a growing business; (2) greater access to credit was desired, since it was
becoming increasingly difficult to obtain credit as individuals or as a
partnership because of the prevailing interest rates and the state usury laws.
Judith Dixon is a full-time practicing trial lawyer and has done a substantial
amount of work in media law. Several years ago she wrote, on her own
time, five articles in various professional journals. Her objective in writing
the articles was to establish a reputation among her professional peers and
to enjoy such resulting benefits as client referrals and seminar speaking
engagements. As a matter of fact, Ms. Dixon obtained such benefits. The
articles were written on a gratis basis.
For the past four years, Ms. Dixon has devoted many hours to writing
two full-length books, Trials and Tribulation and Media Law: Developing
Frontiers. Ms. Dixon has encountered unexpected difficulty in getting her
manuscripts published. This difficulty has been very frustrating to Ms.
Dixon.
Ms. Dixon met Mr. Ink at a seminar—entitled “Media and Its Place in
Our American Society’’—during the fall of 1979. This was one of several
seminars at which Ms. Dixon lectured annually on a fee basis. Red
Publishings had never been approached by Ms. Dixon because she had
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wanted to be associated with a larger organization. However, at this point
Ms. Dixon was fearing the possibility that her works would never appear in
print. Thus, after a period in which Ms. Dixon sold Mr. Ink on the quality
of her books and, conversely, Mr. Ink sold Ms. Dixon on the capability and
growth potential of his publishing house, they convinced one another that
their association would bring adequate returns to all concerned.
The following incorporation transaction was agreed upon: Judith trans
ferred the copyrights to her two manuscripts to Ready, Inc., a newly formed
corporation. Judith’s tax basis in the two manuscripts was $200, the amount
she paid another lawyer to file the copyright papers. She still owed $800 for
the manuscript typing. Ready, Inc., agreed to assume this liability and to
issue Judith 250 shares of Ready, Inc., common stock.
Red transferred all the assets and liabilities of his former proprietorship
to Ready, Inc., in exchange for 750 shares of Ready, Inc., common stock.
Immediately after receiving the 750 shares, Red gave ten shares to his wife,
Neva, and another ten shares to Tom Books, an unrelated and long-time
employee who was named the corporate secretary-treasurer. Red stated that
these two transfers were intended as gifts and not as compensation for any
prior services.
Tom Books provided me with a copy of the balance sheet for Red
Publishings just prior to the incorporation. It appears as follows:
Red Publishings
Balance Sheet
February 28, 1980
Assets
Cash
Supplies on hand
Trade receivables
Equipment (net)
Total assets

$ 20,000
10,000
50,000
60,000
$140,000

Liabilities & Equity
Trade payables
$ 10,000
Mortgage payable
40,000
Total liabilities
Red E. Ink, capital
Total liabilities & equity
A-2 ( RUP 12/17/80)
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90,000
$140,000
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The balance sheet was prepared at the request of Mr. Hal Bent, who
served as legal counsel to Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon during the Ready, Inc.,
incorporation. Mr. Bent and Ms. Dixon are members of the same law firm.
Incidentally, Mr. Bent recommended to Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon that our
firm be engaged to prepare and to file their federal tax returns.
During our interview Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon stated that they had always
reported their respective personal incomes on a calendar-year, cash basis.
It is their intention to report the corporation’s taxable income on a cash
basis in the future. They plan, however, to have the corporate (taxable)
fiscal year run from March 1 to February 28/29.
The $40,000 mortgage payable represents the balance payable on equip
ment that was purchased for $100,000 in 1976. This equipment has been
depreciated on a double-declining-balance method since then. Investment
credit was claimed when the equipment was purchased (new). The $60,000
shown on the balance sheet is book value. Red estimates that the fair market
value of the equipment transferred was approximately $75,000 at the time
of the incorporation transaction. The trade payables represent the unpaid
balances for supplies, utilities, employees’ wages, etc., as of the end of
February 1980. All of these accounts were paid by Ready, Inc., within sixty
days following incorporation. Tom has agreed to provide us with Ready’s
income statement and year-end balance sheet by no later than March 30,
1981. Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon will provide us with additional details
concerning their personal tax returns in early February.
I have assigned Fred E. Senior the responsibility of investigating all tax
consequences associated with the initial incorporation of Ready, Inc. He is
immediately to begin preparation of our file, which will be used early next
year in connection with the completion of the tax returns for these new
clients. All preliminary research should be completed by Fred and reviewed
by me before December 31, 1980. I have also asked Fred to prepare a draft
of a client letter confirming this new engagement and stating our preliminary
findings on the tax consequences of the incorporation transaction.
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December 19, 1980
MEMO TO FILE
FROM:

Fred E. Senior

SUBJECT:

Additional Information on Ready, Inc., Tax Engagement

After reviewing Mr. Partner’s file memo of December 17, 1980, and
subsequently undertaking limited initial research into the tax questions
pertinent to filing the Red E. Ink, Judith Dixon, and Ready, Inc., federal
income tax returns, I determined that additional information should be
obtained. Specifically, I observed that the February 28, 1980, balance sheet
included no real property, and I believed that it was necessary for several
reasons to confirm all of the facts pertinent to this client’s real estate
arrangements. Accordingly, with R. U.’s approval, I telephoned Tom Books
today and obtained the following additional information.
Tom explained that Red had signed a forty-eight-month lease with
Branden Properties, Inc., on October 1, 1978, and that Ready, Inc., had
continued to occupy the same premises and had paid all monthly rentals
due under this lease ($6,000 per month) since March 1, 1980. It is Tom’s
opinion that Red probably will construct his own building once this lease
expires but that he probably will not try to get out of the present lease
before its expiration on September 30, 1982. Tom said that the lease
agreement calls for a two-month penalty payment (that is, a $12,000 payment)
if either party should break the lease prior to its expiration. According to
this agreement, whichever party breaks the lease must pay the other the
stipulated sum. Tom further stated that the present lease “really is not a
particularly good one. ’’ In late 1978 it appeared to Red that office space in
Calum City was going to be scarce, and he thought that the lease then
negotiated was a wholly reasonable one. By the spring of 1980, however,
the available office space exceeded the demand. Tom suggested (and, based
on his square-footage estimates, I agree) that this same lease could now be
negotiated for about $5,500 per month. The penalty for breaking the lease
would just about equal the saving that could be obtained by renegotiating
a new lease today. Under the circumstances, Red has elected to continue
with the old lease for the present. This option allows him time to decide
whether to build or purchase another building sometime prior to 1982.
A-4 (FES 12/19/80)
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Sum m ary o f Questions Investigated
December 1980
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1.

Was the March 1, 1980, incorporation transaction be
tween Red E. Ink, Judith Dixon, and Ready, Inc., a
tax-free transfer under sec. 351?
Conclusion: Yes; all o f the requirements o f sec. 351 were
reasonably satisfied.
a.

Collateral Question: Do Ms. D ixon's copyrights
qualify as "property”fo r purposes o f sec. 351?
Conclusion: Although the answer is not wholly cer
tain, there is reasonable support to treat Ms. Dixon’s
copyrights as sec. 351 property.

b.

C-2 thru C-5

Collateral Question: Do Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon
"control” Ready, Inc., fo r sec. 351 purposes?
Conclusion: Yes. There are no control problems that
would preclude the application o f sec. 351.

c.

C-1 and C-2

Collateral Question: Could Ready’s assumption
o f liabilities cause partial taxability o f the incorpora
tion transaction

C-5 and C-6

C-6 thru C-12

(1) in regard to Mr. Ink?
(2) in regard to Ms. Dixon?
Conclusion: 1 (c) (1) — Mr. Ink would clearly receive
fu ll nontaxable treatm ent pursuant to sec. 357 (c)
(3).
Conclusion: 1 (c) (2) —Although the issue is not
totally fre e o f doubt, there is reasonable authority
fo r characterizing Ms. Dixon’s incorporation transac
tion as fu lly nontaxable.
2.

C-6 thru C-10

C-10 thru C-12

Is the portion o f the $ 60,000 in trade receivables
transferred by Red E. Ink to Ready, Inc., and collected
by the latter, properly considered to be the taxable in
come o f Mr. Ink (individually) or that o f Ready, Inc.
(the corporation)?
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Conclusion: Reasonable authority now exists to justify
treating the trade receivables collected after incorporation
as the taxable income o f Ready, Inc.
3.

C-13 and C-14

W hat is Mr. Ink’s tax basis in the 730 shares
o f Ready, Inc., common stock th a t he retained?
Conclusion: In our opinion, Mr. Ink’s basis in 730 shares
is $ 3 9 ,200.
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C-12 and C-13

M ust Red E. Ink recapture any portion (or all)
o f the investm ent credit claimed in 1976 because o f his
transfer o f the related equipment to Ready, Inc., on
3/1/80?
Conclusion: No recapture is required.

4.

W.P. Ref.

C-14 thru C-16

Red E. Ink (Personal Account)
Working Papers
December 1980
1.

W.P. R e f

Was the incorporation o f Red Publishings on 3 /1/80 a
tax-free transaction?
Conclusion: Yes; reasonable authority now exists tojustify
treating the incorporation of Red Publishings as a tax-free
transaction pursuant to sec. 351, 1.R.C. 1954, which reads
as follows:

Forfacts, see
W.P. A-1
thru A-4

SEC. 351. TRANSFER TO CORPORATION
CONTROLLED BY TRANSFEROR.

See collateral
question 1(b)

(a) General Rule—No gain or loss shall be recognized if propert y
is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely
in exchange for stock or securities in such corporation and
immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in
(control)(as defined in section 368(c)) of the corporation. For
purposes of this section, stock or securities issued for services
shall not be considered as issued in return for property.
(b) Receipt of Property— If subsection (a) would apply to an
exchange but for the fact that there is received, in addition to
the stock or securities permitted to be received under subsection
(a), other property or money, then—
(1) gain (if any) to such recipient shall be recognized, but
not in excess of—
(A) the amount of money received, plus
(B) the fair market value of such other property re
ceived: and

See
collateral
question 1(a)

the rule

N fA (no
boot rec’d by
Mr. Ink or
Ms. Dixon)

(2) no loss to such recipient shall be recognized.
(c) Special Rule.—In determining control, for purposes of this
section, the fact that any corporate transferor distributes part
or all of the stock which it receives in the exchange to its
shareholders shall not be taken into account.
(d) Exception.—This section shall not apply to a transfer of
property to an investment company.

N fA

(e) Cross References.—
(I) For special rule where another party to the exchange
assumes a liability, or acquires property subject to a liability,
see section 357.

See W.P. C-7
thru C-12
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(2) For the basis of stock, securities, or property received
in an exchange to which this section applies, see sections
358 and 362.

a.

(3) For special rule in the case of an exchange described in
this section but which results in a gift, see section 2501 and
following.

N fA

(4) For special rule in the case of an exchange described in
this section but which has the effect of the payment of
compensation by the corporation or by a transferor, see
section 61(a)(1).

N /A

Collateral Question: Are Ms. Dixon's copyrights
considered "property”fo r sec. 351 purposes?
Conclusion: The term "property” as used in sec. 351
is neither statutorily defined (the definition in sec.
317(a) is applicable only to part 1 o f subchapter C
and thus does not apply to sec. 351) nor interpreted
by Treasury regulations. Basically, the problem here
is whether income m ust be recognized on the incor
poration o f a going business when previously un
taxed rights, created by personal services, are trans
ferred fo r stock. As pointed out by Bittker and Eus
tice, Federal Income Taxation o f Corporations and
Shareholders, 4th ed., p. 3-13, this issue is reminis
cent o f cases in the capital gain area involving such
items as industrial knowhow, trade names, profes
sional goodwill, trade secrets, em ploym ent contracts,
etc. Profit on the sale of such assets has sometimes
been denied capital gain status, partly on the ground
that the transferred item did not constitute
property within the meaning o f sec. 1221. Since
sec. 351 was intended to p erm it the tax-free incorpo
ration o f going businesses, however, there is less
reason to interpret "property” in sec. 351 to exclude
such commonly encountered items. There is a lack of
an extensive body o f law in this area. There are no
cases which have held th a t copyrights are not sec.
351 property. However, it m ust be recognized that
C-2 (FES 12/20/80)
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the service could attem pt to characterize Ms. D ixon's
copyright transfers as a device, in whole or in part,
to compensate her fo r past services or to convert the
copyright ordinary income (per sec. 1221 (3) (A))
into a block o f stock th a t can qualify as a capital
asset upon sale. The service could argue th a t a
taxable disposition has occurred under sec. 1001,
with the am ount o f gain being determined under
sec. 1001(a) and sec. 1001(b). If th a t position were
sustained, Ms. D ixons gain would be ordinary in
come (since the copyrights are not capital assets as
defined in sec. 1221) in an am ount equal to the
excess o f the fa ir m arket value o f the shares o f
Ready, Inc., over her adjusted basis (determ ined by
sec. 1012 to be her cost o f $ 2 00) in the copyrights.

W.P. Ref.

Ms. Dixon could counter with m any arguments o f
various strengths. First, Ms. Dixon could point to the
wording o f other code provisions. For example, in all
three subsections 1001(a), 1001(b), and 1001(c),
there is reference to a "disposition o f property” or a
"sale or exchange o f property" ( emphasis added).
Doubtless the service would contend th a t "property"
did not possess identical definitions fo r the two sepa
rate code provisions, sec. 1001 and sec. 351.
Even more explicit code recognition o f copyrights
as property is fo u n d in the sec. 1221 definition o f a
capital asset. Section 1221(3) states th a t "a copyright,
. . . or similar property” under certain circumstances
is not a capital asset (emphasis added).
In addition to the above statutory language, vari
ous administrative references exist th at refer to
copyrights as property. For example, Rev. Rul. 53234, 1953-2 C.B. 29, held th a t the sale o f a manu
script would qualify as a casual sale o f personalty
eligible fo r installment sale reporting. The ruling
cited favorably two prior administrative releases,
G.C.M. 236, VI-2 C.B. 27 (1927), and I.T. 2735,
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X II-2 C.B. 131 (19 33). These prior releases dealt
with other issues, but both stated, inter alia, that
copyrights were personalty. Thus, Rev. Rul. 53-234
stated, "A literary composition is recognized as
property in the Internal Revenue Code.” In addition
to the statutory and administrative language argu
ments ju s t discussed, Ms. Dixon could make some
general arguments. The entire thrust o f any service
attack would be that the exchange was an abusive
attem pt to convert ordinary income property into
capital gain property. However, Ms. Dixon could
analogize to the situation where inventory o f a sole
proprietorship manufacturer is transferred upon in
corporation. Both situations involve previously un
taxed assets created by personal services being trans
ferred fo r stock. Presumably, the inventory-for-stock
exchange would raise no questions, so why should
the copyrights-for-stock exchange be different?
If it were held th a t copyrights are not sec. 351
property, Ms. Dixon would be placed in the inequit
able position o f having a currently recognizable tax
gain without any concurrent wherewithal to pay.
Any "cashing-in" in this case is certainly tenuous and
speculative in nature. Ms. Dixon’s minority
shareholder status places substantial restrictions on
her realization o f income. Real value is dependent
on the fu tu re success o f the corporation.
As can be gathered fr o m the above discussion,
authority regarding this issue is limited. This, in and
o f itself, m ay be the strongest argum ent fo r treating
Ms. Dixon’s copyrights as sec. 351 property. There is
certainly no direct authority th a t would dictate a
contrary treatment.
In summary, there is reasonable authority to ju s
tify treating the incorporation o f Red Publishings as a
tax-free transaction under sec. 351. The critical issue
is whether Ms. Dixon’s copyrights are "property"fo r
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December 1980
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sec. 351 purposes. Direct authority fo r answering this
issue does not exist. In this case it is reasonable to
adopt the position favorable to the taxpayer. How
ever, I recommend advising the clients o f the possi
bility th a t the service could argue fo r the taxability
o f the incorporation transaction because it did not
view the copyrights as "property”fo r sec. 351 pur
poses.
b.

Collateral Question: Do Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon
have any "control” requirement problems under sec.
351(a)? Specifically, since Mr. Ink individually owns
only 75%, o f Ready, Inc., common stock, is the sec.
351 (a) control requirement met?
Conclusion: There are no problems. The sec. 351(a)
control requirement is met.
In order fo r the general rule o f sec. 351(a) to
apply, the shareholders involved in the transfers
m ust be in control o f the corporation immediately
after the exchange. Section 351 "control” is statutorily
governed by the definition o f "control” contained in
sec. 368(c). The requisite ownership percentage in
sec. 368(c) is 80%. This control requirement is m e t
if, in the words o f both the statute and the regula
tions, "immediately after the exchange such person
or persons are in control” (emphasis added). In our
case Mr. Ink and Ms. Dixon are the "persons," and
they own 98%, o f the Ready, Inc., stock. "Control"
does not have to be maintained by a sole
shareholder. Treasury regulations section 1.351-1(a)
(2) example (1) illustrates a situation that contains
an ownership structure almost identical to our case,
th a t is, two shareholders, one owning 75%, and one
owning 25%,. The example states that no gain or
loss is recognized by either shareholder.
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TREAS. REGS. SEC. 1.351-1. TRANSFER TO
CORPORATION CONTROLLED BY TRANSFEROR.
(a) (1) Section 351(a) provides, in general, for the nonrecog
nition of gain or loss upon the transfer by one or more persons
of property to a corporation solely in exchange for stock or
securities in such corporation, if immediately after the. exchange,
such person or persons are in control of the corporation to
which the property was transferred. As used in section 351. the
phrase "one or more persons" includes individuals, trusts,
estates, partnerships, associations, companies, or corporations
(see section 7701(a)(1)). To be in control of the transferee
corporation, such person or persons must own immediately
after the transfer stock possessing at least 80 percent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to
vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of
all other classes of stock of such corporation (see section
368 (c)).
(2) The application of section 351 (a) is illustrated by the
following examples:
Example (1). C owns a patent right worth $25,000 and D
owns a manufacturing plant worth $75,000. C and D
organize the R Corporation with an authorized capital stock
of $100,000. C transfers his patent right to the R Corporation
for $25,000 of its slock and D transfers his plant to the new
corporation for $75,000 of its stock. No gain or loss to C or
D is recognized.

c.

Collateral Question: Could the liabilities
assum ed by Ready, Inc., exceed the adjusted basis
of the assets transferred so th a t the exception of sec.
557(c) m ight require the recognition o f some gain?
Conclusion: No; see below fo r reasons. Section 557
reads as follows.
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SEC. 357. ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY.
(a) General Rule.— Except as provided in subsections (b) and
(1) the taxpayer receives property which would be permit
ted to be received under section 351. 361, 371, or 374
without the recognition of gain if it were the sole consid
eration, and

the rule

(2) as part of the consideration, another party to the
exchange assumes a liability of the taxpayer, or acquires
from the taxpayer property subject to a liability,
then such assumption or acquisition shall not be treated as
money or other properly, and shall not prevent the exchange
from being within the provisions of section 351, 361, 371, or
374, as the ease may be.
(b) Tax Avoidance Purpose.—
(1) In general.—If, taking into consideration the nature of
the liability and the circumstances in the light of which the
arrangement for the assumption or acquisition was made,
it appears that the principal purpose of the taxpayer with
respect to the assumption or acquisition described in sub
section (a)—
(A) was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the
exchange, or

N /A

(B) if not such purpose, was not a bona fide business
purpose, then such assumption or acquisition (in the
total amount of the liability assumed or acquired pur
suant to such exchange) shall, for purposes of section
351. 361. 371, or 374 (as the case may be), be considered
as money received by the taxpayer on the exchange.
(2) Burden of proof.—In any suit or proceeding where the
burden is on the taxpayer to prose such assumption or
acquisition is not to be treated as money received by the
taxpayer, such burden shall not be considered as sustained
unless the taxpayer sustains such burden by the clear
preponderance of the evidence.
(c) Liabilities in Excess of Basis.—
(1) In general.

In the case of an exchange—

(A) to which section 351 applies, or

N /A

Exception to
rule in
§357(a)
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(B) to which section 361 applies by reason of a plan of
reorganization within the meaning of section
368(a)(1)(D), if the sum of the amount of the liabilities
assumed, plus the amount of the liabilities to which the
property is subject, exceeds the total of the adjusted
basis of the property transferred pursuant to such
exchange, then such excess shall be considered as a gain
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or of property
which is not a capital asset, as the case may be.

See collateral
question 1(c)
(1) fo r dis
cussion o f this
subsection
and the Red
Publishings
liabilities that
were as
sum ed by
Ready, Inc.

(2) Exceptions.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any ex
change to which—
(A) subsection (b)(1) of this section applies, or

N /A

(B) section 371 or 374 applies.
(3) Certain liabilities excluded.—
(A) In general.— If—
(i) the taxpayer’s taxable income is computed under
the cash receipts and disbursements method of
accounting, and
(ii) such taxpayer transfers, in an exchange to which
section 351 applies, a liability which is either—
(I) an account payable payment of which would
give rise to a deduction, or
(II) an amount payable which is described in
section 736(a),
then, for purposes of paragraph (1), the amount of
such liability shall be excluded in determining the
amount of liabilities assumed or to which the prop
erty transferred is subject.
(B) Exception.—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to
any liability to the extent that the incurrence of the
liability resulted in the creation of, or an increase in,
the basis of any property.

Per R. U. Partners m em o to file (12/ 17/80), p. 2, the
assets transferred to Ready, Inc., by Red E. Ink and
Judith Dixon were as follows:
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rule in
§357(a)

Collateral
question 1(c)
(2) : Would
Ready’s as
sumption o f
Ms. D ixon's
■typing bill o f
$ 8 0 0 fa ll
within the
exception to
the exception
o f sec. 357(c)
(3)?

N /A

Red E. Ink (Personal Account)
Working Papers
December 1980
W.P. Ref.
Asset

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Cash
Supplies
Trade receivables
Equipment
Copyrights
Total basis o f assets

FM V
$ 20,000
10,000
50,000
75,000
—

Basis
$2 0,000
-0-060,000
200
$ 80,200

FOOTNOTES:
(1) In response to my telephone inquiry o f today, Tom
Books confirmed th a t Mr. Ink has always expensed all
supplies fo r tax purposes when paid.
(2) Mr. Ink has always reported his taxable income on
a cash basis.
(3) Value estimated; adjusted basis is book value.
(4) Value unknown.
Liabilities assumed by Ready, Inc., were
Mortgage payable o f Red Publishings
Trade payables o f Red Publishings
Typing services payable o f Ms. Dixon
d.

$ 40,000
10,000
______ 800
$ 5 0,8000

Collateral Question: Will Mr. Ink recognize
taxable income as a result o f Ready’s assumption of
all Red Publishing liabilities? More specifically, how
does sec. 357(c) apply to the assumption o f Red
Pubblishing liabilities by Ready, Inc.?
Conclusion: In the incorporation transaction, Ready,
Inc., assum ed all the liabilities o f Red Publishings.
For tax purposes, the liabilities consisted o f the
mortgage payable in the am ount o f $ 40,000, the
trade payables in the am ount o f $ 10,000, and, ar
guably, Red Publishings’ lease obligation.
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In this case, sec. 5 5 7 (c) (1) would clearly not
apply to the assumption o f the mortgage by Ready,
Inc. The mortgage liability is$ 40,000 while the
adjusted basis o f the property is $ 60,000. Thus,
there is no excess o f liability over basis, and the
general rule o f sec. 557(a) would apply (meaning
no problems fo r sec. 551 purposes).

A-5

Section 557(c)(5), the exception to the exception,
would clearly apply to the assumption by Ready,
Inc., o f the remainder o f Red Publishings’ liabilities.
Thus, there will be no recognizable taxable income
as a result o f the assumption o f the Red Publishings
debt here involved.
e. Collateral Question: Will Ms. Dixon rec
ognize taxable income as a result o f Ready’s as
sumption o f her $ 8 00 typing bill?
Conclusion: No, probably not. Although the issue is
not fre e fro m doubt, I f e e l Ms. Dixon will not
recognize income as a result o f Ready’s assumption
o f her $ 8 00 typing bill.
The resolution of this question depends on how
sec. 557(c) applies to the assumption o f the typing
bill. The critical issue is whether the typing bill can
be characterized as a sec. 5 5 7 (c)(5 )(A )( ii)(1)
liability. In other words, if Ms. Dixon had paid it,
would it have been deductible?
The code provisions th a t authorize the largest
range o f deductions are undoubtedly sec. 162 (appli
cable to all taxpayers engaged in a trade or busi
ness) and sec. 212 (applicable only to individual
taxpayers). Section 162 allows the deduction o f "all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business.” Section 212 authorizes the deduction o f
"all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year — (1) fo r the pro
duction or collection o f income.” The sec. 212(1) test
C-10 (FES 12/20/80)
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o f deductibility is similar to th a t o f sec. 162 with the
exception th a t the expense need not be incurred in a
trade or business (Lonnie Hawkins, Jr., P-H T.C.M.
¶ 79, 101).
The main code provisions th a t lim it the range o f
the cited sections are sec. 262 and sec. 265. The
fo rm e r section disallows deductions o f personal, liv
ing, and fa m ily expenses, while the latter section
disallows deductions o f capital expenditures.
In our case, Ms. Dixon could argue th a t the $ 800
typing bill was an allowable deduction under either
sec. 162 or sec. 212. For example, Treas. regs. sec.
1.162-7 discusses the deduction o f a reasonable pay
m en t th a t is made in exchange fo r the performance
o f services. However, the service could counter that
the typing bill was a nondeductible capital ex
penditure or th a t it was a personal expenditure in
curred in a transaction where profit had not been
expected (th a t is, a hobby expenditure).
The capital expenditure claim would seem to be
the strongest argum ent fo r the service. Revenue Rul
ing 68-194, 1968-1 C.B. 87, involved a taxpayer not
engaged in a trade or business. It held th a t various
expenses (including expenses fo r secretarial help,
artwork, supplies, and postage) incurred in producing
and copyrighting a manuscript o f a literary composi
tion were directly attributable to the producing and
copyrighting o f the manuscript. Accordingly, the serv
ice said the expenses were not deductible fo r fe d e ra l
income tax purposes.
The service reaffirm ed this position in Rev. Rul.
75-595, 1975-2 C.B. 87. The latter ruling also stated
th a t the service would not follow the decision in
Stern v. U.S., 27A.F.T.R2d 71-1148 (D. Cal. 1971).
The taxpayer in Stern, a Los Angeles resident,
had spent considerable time in N ew York preparing
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a book. The necessary material fo r this book could
be obtained only in N ew York. The taxpayer
claimed his travel expenditures were deductible
under sec. 162. The service claimed th a t the ex
penditures were nondeductible capital expenditures.
The court, while holding in fa v o r o f the taxpayer,
summarily stated, "Nor were they expenses fo r se
curing a copyright and plates which remain the
property o f the person making the paym ents,” refer
ring to Treas. regs. sec. 1.263(a)-2(b).
A recent Tax Court decision also upheld an au
thors right to deduct nearly $ 5,000 in prepublication
costs (rent, postage, telephone, transportation, etc.).
The court rejected the IRS attem pt to require
capitalization o f these costs. See Fernando Faura e t
al. v. C om m ’r., 73 T.C. No. 68 (1980). The major
question in this instance may, therefore, be whether
or not Ms. Dixon is — a t this point in her life — an
author. That, o f course, is a. fa c t issue.
In sum m ary, although the treatm ent would not
be fre e fr o m attack fr o m the service, I f e e l Ms.
Dixon should not recognize taxable income as a
result o f Ready’s assumption o f her typing liability.
This resultflo w s fr o m the characterization o f her
typing bill as fitting within the exception to the
exception contained in sec. 3 5 7 (c)(3) (A )( ii)(1).
2.

Are collections o f the trade receivables transferred by
Mr. Ink to Ready, Inc., on 3/1/80 to be considered the
taxable income o f Mr. Ink or o f Ready, Inc.?
Conclusion: For m any years, in reliance on the
"assignment-of-income” doctrine, the courts held
th a t an individual transferor, rather than the controlled
corporate transferee, was taxable on the inchoate income
items transferred in a sec. 351 transaction (Brown v.
C om m ’r., 115 F.2d 337 (2 d Cir. 1940), and Adolph
Weinberg, 44 T.C. 233 (1965), a f f 'd per curiam 3H6
F.2d H36 (9th Cir. 1967)).
C-12 (FES 12/20/80)
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The Tax Court was finally persuaded, however, to
allow the cash basis taxpayer to transfer accounts receiv
able tax fre e under sec. 351-(Thom as Briggs, T.C.M.
1356-86). Since Briggs a t least two cases, H em pt Bros.,
Inc. v. U.S., 354 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Pa. 19 73), and Divine,
Jr. v. U.S. 19 62-2 U.S. Tax Cs s. ¶ 8 5,532 (W .D . Tenn.
19 62), have argued th a t the assignment-of-income doc
trine is inapplicable in such situations. Bittker and Eustice
also note th a t the implicit holding o f Peter Raich, 46 T.C.
604 (19 66), is that receivables transferred would not
have been recognized but fo r sec. 357(c) (Bittker and
Eustice, 4th ed., p. 3-67). Under the circumstances of
Ink’s case, there seems to be sufficient authority to argue
th a t any receivables collected by Ready, Inc., should be
treated as the taxable income o f the corporation and not
th a t o f Mr. Ink individually.
3.

M u st Mr. Ink recapture any o f the investm ent credit
claimed in 19 76 because o f his transfer o f the equipment
to Ready, Inc., in 19 80?
Conclusion: No; all conditions o f Treas. regs. sec. 1.473(f)(1 ) are satisfied. The pertinent regulation reads as
follows.

TREAS. REGS. SEC. 1.47 3(f)
(f) Mere change in form of conducting a trade or Business.—
(1) General rule.
(i) Notwithstanding the provision of § 1.47-2. relating
to “disposition" arid “cessation,” paragraph (a) of § 1.471 shall not apply to section 38 property which is disposed
of, or otherwise ceases to Be section 38 property with
respect to the taxpayer, Before the close of the estimated
useful life which was taken into account in computing
the taxpayer’s qualified investment by reason of a mere
change in the form of conducting the trade or Business
in which such section 38 property is used provided that

the rule
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the conditions set forth in subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph are satisfied.
(ii) The conditions referred to in subdivision (i) of this
subparagraph are as follows:
(a) The section 38 property described in subdivision
(i) of this subparagraph is retained as section 38
property in the saint; trade or business,
(b) The transferor (or in a case where the transferor
is a partnership, estate, trust, or electing small
business corporation, the partner, beneficiary, or
shareholder) of such section 38 property retains a
substantial interest in such trade or business.

OK here (all
prop. transf.)

(d) The basis of such section 38 property in the
hands of the transferee is determined in whole or
in part by reference to the basis of such section 38
property in the hands of the transferor.

OK here (see
W.P. C-15
and C-16)

W h a t is Mr. Ink’s tax basis in the 730 shares o f Ready,
Inc., stock th a t he retained after the 3/1/80 incorpora
tion?
Conclusion: I.R.C. sec. 358 determines the adjusted basis
o f stocks and securities received in a sec. 351 transaction.
It reads as follows.

C-14 (FES 12/20/80)

198

OK here
(73% re
tained)

(c) Substantially all the assets (whether or not section
38 property) necessary to operate such trade or
business are transferred to the transferee to whom
such section 38 property is tranferred. and

This subparagraph shall not apply te) the- transfer of
section 38 property if paragraph (e) of this section,
relating to transactions to which section 381 applies,
applies with respect to such transfer.

4.

OK here
(sam e bus.)
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SEC. 358. BASIS TO DISTRIBUTEES.
(a) General Rule.—In the case of an exchange to which section
351. 354, 355, 356, 361, 371(b), or 374 applies—

here,

$ 80,000

None

(1) Nonrecognition property.—The basis of property per
mitted to be received under such section without the
recognition of gain or loss shall be the same as that of the
property exchanged—
(A) decreased by—
(i) the fair market value of any other property
(except money) received by the taxpayer,
(ii) the amount of any money received by the
taxpayer, and
(iii) the amount of loss to the taxpayer which was
recognized on such exchange, and

$40,000
(See sec.
358(d))
N /A

(B) increased by—
(i) the amount which was treated as a dividend.

N /A
(ii) the amount of gain to the taxpayer which was
recognized on such exchange (not including any
portion of such gain which was treated as a divi

N /A

(2) Other property.—The basis of any other property (ex
cept money) received by the taxpayer shall be its fair market
(b) Allocation of Basis.—

N /A

(1) In general.—Under regulations prescribed by the Sec
retary, the basis determined under subsection (a)(1) shall
be allocated among the properties permitted to be received
without the recognition of gain or loss.

N /A

(2) Special rule for section 355.—In the case of an exchange
to which section 355 (or so much of section 356 as relates
to section 355) applies, then in making the allocation under
paragraph (1) of this subsection, there shall be taken into
account not only the property so permitted to be received
without the recognition of gain or loss, but also the stock
or securities (if any) of the distributing corporation which
are retained, and the allocation of basis shall be made among
all such properties.
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N /A

(3) Certain exchanges involving ConRail.—To the extent
provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary, in the
case of an exchange to which section 354(d) (or so much of
section 356 as relates to section 354(d)) or section 374(c)
applies, for purposes of allocating basis under paragraph
(1), stock of the Consolidated Rail Corporation and the
certificate of value of the United States Railway Association
which relates to such stock shall, so long as they are held
by the same person, be treated as one property.

N /A

(c) Section 355 Transactions Which Are Not Exchanges.—For
purposes of this section, a distribution to which section 355 (or
so much of section 356 as relates to section 355) applies shall
be treated as an exchange, and for such purposes the stock and
securities of the distributing corporation which are retained
shall be treated as surrendered, and received back, in the
exchange.
(d) Assumption of Liability.—

For result
refer to sec.
358(a)(1)
(A )(ii),
above

(1) In general.—Where, as part of the consideration to the
taxpayer. another party to the exchange assumed a liability
of the taxpayer or acquired from the taxpayer property
subject to a liability, such assumption or acquisition (in the
amount of the liability) shall, for purposes of this section,
be treated as money received by the taxpayer on the
exchange.
(2) Exception.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the amount
of any liability excluded under section 357(c)(3).
(e) Exception.—This section shall not apply to property ac
quired by a corporation by the exchange of its stock or securities
(or the stock or securities of a corporation which is in control
of the acquiring corporation) as consideration in whole or in
part for the transfer of the property to it.

N /A

According to sec. 358(a), therefore, Mr. Ink’s basis in the
750 shares he initially received would be $40,000 (th a t
is, $80,000 basis transferred less $40,000 liabilities as
sum ed by Ready, Inc.).
because Mr. Ink gave ten shares to Mrs. Ink and ten
shares to Mr. books, the basis in his remaining 980
shares would be $39,200 (98% o f $40,000). Each
donee would have a basis o f $ 4 0 0 in the ten shares
received per sec. 1015.
C-16 (FES 12/20/80)
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1.

Were the March 1, 1980, incorporation exchanges
between Ready, Inc., and Judith Dixon tax-free transfers
under sec. 351?
Conclusion: Yes, there is reasonable authority th a t all of
the requirements o f sec. 351 were satisfied.
a.

Collateral Question: Can Ms. Dixon s transfer o f
her copyrights be considered a sec. 351 transfer o f
"property”?
Conclusion: Although the answer is not fre e fro m
total doubt, there is reasonable support to treat Ms.
Dixon s copyrights as sec. 351 "property.”

b.

c.

See again
C-1 and C-2

See again
C-2 thru C-5

Collateral Question: Do Ms. Dixon and Mr. Ink
"control” Ready, Inc., fo r sec. 351 purposes?
Conclusion: There are no control problems that
would preclude the application o f sec. 351.

See again
C-5 and C-6

Collateral Question: Could Ready's assump
tion o f liabilities cause partial taxability o f the incor
poration transaction

See again
C-6 thru C-12

(1) in regard to Mr. Ink?
(2) in regard to Ms. Dixon?
Conclusion: Although the issue is not totally fre e o f
doubt, there is strong authority fo r characterizing
Ms. D ixons incorporation as fu lly nontaxable.
2.

See again
C-10 thru
C-12

W hat is Ms. Dixon s tax basis in the 250 shares o f Ready,
Inc., common stock that she obtained in the incorpora
tion transaction?
Conclusion: In our opinion, Ms. D ixons basis in her 250
shares is $ 200. Ms. D ixons basis in this case is determined
by sec. 35X. (See W.P. C-15 fo r a copy o f the code
section.) According to sec. 35X(a), Ms. D ixons basis in
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her 250 shares would be $ 200 (th a t is, the basis o f the
copyrights she transferred in exchange fo r the stock).
(See W.P. C-2 thru C-5 fo r the discussion relating to the
characterization o f the copyright as sec. 557 "property"
subject to nontaxability.)
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I.

M u st Ready, Inc., report any taxable income in its fir s t
tax year because o f its exchange o f previously unissued
stock fo r either the assets o f Red Publishings or Ms.
Dixon’s copyrights?
F-1

Conclusion: No (sec. 1032).
2.

Can Ready, Inc., claim a tax deduction under sec. 162
fo r the $ 10,000 expended within sixty days following
incorporation in pa ym en t o f the trade payables it as
sum ed fr o m Red Publishings?
Conclusion: The officers o f Ready, Inc., should be alerted
to the remote possibility that the IRS might challenge the
propriety o f the corporation s deducting the $ 10,000 ex
pended in paym en t o f these accounts. We believe, how
ever, th a t they are properly deductible.

3.

Is the portion o f the trade receivables transferred by Mr.
Ink to Ready, Inc., and collected by the corporation after
the incorporation, properly deem ed to be the taxable
income o f the corporation?
Conclusion: Sufficient authority exists to justify treating
the receivables collected as the taxable income o f Ready,
Inc.

4.

F-1
and F-2

See again
C-12 and
C-13

W hat is Ready’s adjusted tax basis in the various assets
it received on 3/11/80?
F-2 and
F-3

Conclusion:
Cash
Supplies
R e c e iv a b le s

Equipm ent
Copyrights

$ 20,000
-0-0 -

60,000
200
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5.

W hat is the m axim um depreciation method th a t Ready,
Inc., can utilize relative to the equipment acquired fro m
Red E. Ink. on 3 /1/80?
Conclusion: 150 percent declining-balance depreciation as
suming the equipment has a remaining useful lif e o f
three years or longer.

6.

M u st Ready, Inc., obtain the commissioner’s approval to
f i le its f irst tax return on a February 28/29 f is cal-year,
cash m ethod basis?
Conclusion: No; no special permission is required so long
as the corporate f in ancial records are maintained on this
same basis.

E-2 (FES 12/19/80)
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M u st Ready, Inc., report any taxable income in its fir s t
tax year because o f its exchange o f previously unissued
stock fo r various assets on 3 /1/80?
Conclusion; No; see code sec. 1032 below.

SEC. 1032. EXCHANGE OF STOCK FOR PROPERTY.
(a) Nonrecognition of Gain or Loss.—No gain or loss shall be
recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or other
property in exchange for stock (including treasury stock) of such
corporation.

the rule

(b) Basis.—For basis of property acquired by a corporation in
certain exchanges for its stock, see section 362.

2.

Can Ready, Inc., claim a tax deduction under I.R.C. sec.
162 fo r the $10,000 it expended within sixty days following incorporation in p a ym ent o f the trade accounts it
assumed fr o m Red Publishings?

For facts, see
W.P. A -1
thru A-3

Conclusion; Generally the courts have denied a deduction
fo r ordinary (sec. 162) expenses incurred by the trans
fero r but paid by the corporate transferee following a sec.
351 incorporation. As recently as 19 72 the Tax Court
declared

It is well settled that an expenditure of a preceding owner of
property which has accrued but which is paid by one acquiring
that property is a part of the cost of acquiring that property,
irrespective of what would be the lax character of the expend
iture to the prior owner. Such payment becomes part of the
basis of the property acquired and may not be deducted when
paid by the acquirer of that property.
[M. Buten and Sons, Inc., T.C.M. 1972-44]

Thus, the Tax Court in Buten indicates that a d e finite
uniformity of application exists in this area. Despite the
signific ant number o f cases supporting that conclusion,
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however, it m ay be significant th a t in Peter Raich, 46
T.C. 604 (19 66), the parties stipulated th a t the accounts
payable were deductible by the transferee corporation.
Furthermore, in Bongiovanni, 470 F.2d 321 (2d Cir.
19 72), the second circuit court in 19 72 noted th a t "where
the acquiring corporation is on an accrual basis, such
accounts are also deductible in its initial period.” (Note:
Ready, Inc., will be a cash basis taxpayer.) Perhaps the
m ost significant argum ent favoring deductibility was pre
sented in U.S. v. Sm ith, 41# F.2d 5#3 (5th Cir. 19 69).
There the court noted, "If this fa ctu a l inquiry reveals a
primary purpose other than acquisition o f property, the
court m ay properly allow a deduction to the corporation
if all the requirements of Title 26 USC, Sec. 162, are
met. . . .” In Ink’s incorporation it is arguable that the
liabilities o f Red Publishings were assum ed by Ready,
Inc., solely fo r business convenience reasons and not fo r
the acquisition o f property. I f Red’s decision to transfer
these liabilities can be demonstrated to have been moti
vated by this criterion, the reasoning in Smith might
support Ready s claim fo r deductibility. Given the weight
o f contrary authority, however, the officers o f Ready,
Inc., should be alerted to a possibility o f an IRS chal
lenge. See Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 334 (19 42);
Hold craft Transportation Co., 153 F.2d 323 ( 8th Cir.
19 46); Haden Co. v. C om m ’r., 165 F.2d 588 (5th Cir.
19 48); and Athol M fg. Co., 54 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 19 31).
3.

Are collections fro m the $50,000 in trade accounts re
ceivable transferred by Mr. Ink to Ready, Inc., on 3/1/80
to be considered the taxable income o f Mr. Ink or of
Ready, Inc.?
Conclusion: O f Ready, Inc.; see again W.P. C-12 and C-13.

4.

W hat is Ready s adjusted tax basis in the various assets
it received on 3 /1/80?
Conclusion: The basis o f the assets received by a corpoF-2 (FES 12/ 13/80)
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rate transferee in a sec. 351 transaction are determined
by sec. 362(a), which reads as follows.

SEC. 362. BASIS TO CORPORATIONS.
(a) Property Acquired by Issuance of Stock or as Paid-In
Surplus.—If property was acquired on or after June 22, 1954,
by a corporation—
(1) in connection with a transaction to which section 351
(relating to transfer of property to corporation controlled by
transferor) applies, or
(2) as paid-in surplus or as a contribution to capital,

the rule

then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of
the transferor, increased in the amount of gain recognized to
the transferor on such transfer.

Accordingly, Ready’s adjusted tax basis o f assets received
is as follows:

See W.P.
A-1 thru A-3

Cash
$ 20,000
Supplies
-0Trade receivables
-0Equipment
60,000
Copyrights
200
W hat is the m axim um depreciation method that Ready,
Inc., can utilize in depreciating the equipment acquired
fr o m Mr. Ink on 3 /1/80?
Conclusion: Because sec. 381 does not apply to sec. 351
transfers, all property received by Ready, Inc., is deem ed
to be used property. Such property cannot be depreciated
under any o f the rapid methods granted only to original
users in sec. 167(b)(2), (3), or (4). See Rev. Rul.
67-286, 1367-2 C.B. 101. However, according to Rev. Rul.
57-352, 19 57-2 C.B. 150, as modified by Rev. Rul. 67248, 19 67-2 C.B. 9 8, such property can be depreciated by
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a declining-balance method not to exceed 150 percent of
the straight-line rate if the used tangible property has an
estimated remaining life of three years or longer.
6.

M ust Ready, Inc., obtain the commissioner’s approval to
file its fir s t tax return on a March 1fiscal-year, cash
basis?

W.P. Ref.
Confirmed
by phone
with Tom
Books
12/19/80

Conclusion: See below Treas. regs. sec. 1.441-1 (b)(5).

TREAS. REG. SEC. 1.441-1(b)(3)
(3) A new taxpayer in his first return may adept any taxable
year which meets the requirements of section 441 and this
section without obtaining prior approval. The first taxable year
of a new taxpayer must be adopted on or before the time
prescribed by law (not including extensions) for the filing of the
return for such taxable year. However, for rules applicable to
the adoption of a taxable year by a partnership, see paragraph
(b)(2) of § l.442-1, section 706(b). and paragraph (b) of § 1.7061. For rules applicable to the taxable year of a member of an
affiliated group which makes a consolidated return, see § 1.150276 and paragraph (d) of 1.442-1.

See also Treas. regs. sec. 1.441-(e).

TREAS. REG. SEC. 1.441-1(e)
ie) Fiscal year.
(1) The term “fiscal year" means—
(i) A period of 12 months ending on the last day of any
month other than December, or
(ii) The 52-53-week annual accounting period, if such
period has been elected by the taxpayer.
(2) A fiscal year will be recognized only if it is established
as the annual accounting period of the taxpayer and only if
the books ot the taxpayer are kept in accordance with such

fiscal year.
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The courts have held th a t a corporate transferee is a
separate taxpayer fr o m that o f its transferor (Sid v. Ezo
Products Co., 57 T.C. 5X5 (1551); Akron, Canton, and
Youngstown Railroad Co., 22 T.C. 64X (19 55); and
Textile Apron Co., 21 T.C. 147 (19 53)). Consequently, if
Ready, Inc., will keep its financial books on the same
basis as it desires to report its taxable income, no special
permission is required.
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I f Mr. Ink or Ms. Dixon desires any assistance in future tax planning we
should discuss with either o f them , in the near future, the following
matters:
1.

Subchapter S election

2.

a.

The circumstances under which this would be desirable or
undesirable.

b.
c.

W hen the decision m ust be made (before 5/14/81).
N eed fo r every shareholder s approval (possibly getting buy
out agreements).

Executive compensation possibilities
a.

G roup-term life insurance (sec. 79(a)).

b.

Health and accident insurance (sec. 106).

c.

Death benefits (sec. 101).

d.

Travel and entertainment ( requirements and advantages).

3.

Pension plans ( costs and benefits).

4.

Future contributions to capital.

5.

a.

Consider advantages of securities.

b.

Section 1244 if additional stock is issued.

Could 85 percent dividend-received deduction be used
effectively?

(FES 12/23/80)
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8
It is too well settled to need citation of authorities that it is
no offense nor is it reprehensible to avoid the attachment
of taxes. One may employ all lawful means to minimize
taxes.
JUDGE WALTER A. HUXMAN

Research Methodology
for Tax Planning
This final chapter examines the research methodology appropriate to
tax planning. It considers (1) the general role of tax planning in the
CPA firm and (2) the technical differences between research meth
odologies for tax planning and tax compliance.
A survey in the 70s by an AICPA committee contained several
implications about the role of tax practice in the CPA firm.1 First, the
survey clearly established the fact that tax practice represents an
important source of revenue for the CPA. (Tax work accounts for
between 21 and 40 percent of the total billings in nearly 46 percent
of the responding firms.) Second, although return preparation ac
counted for the largest portion of the tax work revenues, consultation
and planning ranked second—ahead of representation before govern
ment bodies. Third, the larger practice units tended to generate a
larger proportion of their total tax work revenues from consultation
and planning than did the smaller practice units. Fourth, most of the
respondents anticipated that consultation and planning would account
for a greater proportion of future tax work fees.
1 Jerome P. Solari and Don J. Summa, “Profile of the CPA in Tax Practice,” Tax
Adviser (June 1972): 324-28.
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Although the study has not been replicated, informal responses
from practitioners seem to confirm the projections of the study. All
of this suggests, of course, that the CPA who limits his or her tax
practice to compliance work is not taking fu l l advantage of available
opportunities. An expansion-oriented CPA is likely to discover that
tax-planning work is a latent source of major growth. The continuing
relationship that a CPA has with a client ordinarily provides the CPA
with sufficient knowledge of facts to make tax-planning proposals with
minimal additional input from the client.
As we noted in chapter 2, a final tax liability depends on three
variables: the facts, the law, and an administrative process. A change
in any one of those variables is likely to change a client’s tax liability.
To devise a tax plan that relies for its success on an amendment to
the Internal Revenue Code is usually unrealistic. Very few taxpayers
wield that much influence and, even if they did, the response of
Congress in tax matters typically is unpredictable and slow. Attempts
to change the administrative process would be equally ineffective for
similar reasons. Good tax planning always gives adequate consider
ation to the administrative process, but it does not rely on changes
in that process for its success. Thus, tax plans generally must be
based on the existing law and administrative processes because only
the facts are readily modified. The ultimate significance of those facts
stems, of course, from existing options already in the code.
Tax-Planning Considerations
The fundamental problems encountered in tax planning might be
compared to those inherent in, say, a decision to transport an object
from New York City to Atlanta. Momentarily ignoring operational
constraints, there appear to be an almost unlimited number of ways
to achieve the objective. That is, the object could be shipped by a
commercial carrier (with air, rail, ship, or surface carrier possibilities);
it might be personally delivered, or a friend might deliver it.
However, only a few transportation methods are realistic because of
various o p eratio n al co n stra in ts, such as tim e (the o b ject m u st b e

delivered before 9 a. m . on Monday morning), cost (the object must
be shipped in the most inexpensive manner possible), or bulk (the
size of the object may exclude all but a few possibilities). The
transportation decision can be managed successfully only if the
decision-maker (1) knows which options actually exist and (2) under
stands the constraints. A tax problem has very similar boundaries.
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Statutory Options

The Internal Revenue Code already contains many options from
which a taxpayer must select alternative courses of action. For
example, a taxpayer generally can choose to operate a business as a
sole proprietorship, a partnership, or a corporation. By exercising
any option, a taxpayer automatically causes several different portions
of the code to apply to the business operations, any one of which may
create a drastically different tax result. In addition to selecting a basic
business form, a taxpayer may also have an opportunity to select a
tax year, choose certain accounting methods, determine whether the
entity selected should be a “foreign” or “domestic” one, choose
between a “taxable” and a “nontaxable” incorporation transaction, or
decide whether or not to capitalize certain expenditures. Selecting
the most advantageous combination of statutory tax options is ob
viously a difficult task, depending importantly on the decision-maker’s
knowledge of the very existence of those options.
Client Constraints

In addition to understanding all of the options implicit in the Internal
Revenue Code, a tax planner must also understand the objectives
and operational constraints inherent in the client’s activities. Those
objectives and constraints typically are a combination of personal,
financial, legal, and social considerations. For example, such personal
objectives as a desire to maximize wealth, to control the distribution
of property after death, to drive a competitor out of business, or to
retire with minimal financial concerns may dictate certain actions.
Personal objectives are often constrained by financial and legal
obstacles. A tax planner can understand a client’s objectives only if
the client is willing to confide in the adviser; therefore, it is absolutely
essential that mutual trust and openness exist between the client and
the tax adviser before a tax-planning engagement is undertaken.
Because tax plans often necessarily involve very significant financial
and legal implications, much tax planning is better achieved through
a team effort than through individual work. For example, in an estate
planning engagement, it is not unusual to include the taxpayer’s
attorney, the insurance agent, and a trust officer, as well as the CPA
on the tax-planning team. By combining the special expertise of
several individuals, the client is better served; and, more importantly,
the team approach generally protects the client from the danger of
“secondary infection,” that is, from the danger of putting into
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operation a plan that may succeed from a tax standpoint but that may
have undesirable legal or financial consequences.
Creativity

Even if a tax adviser knows all of the pertinent code provisions and
fully understands all of the client’s objectives and constraints, the
optimal tax plan may not be obvious. An optimal plan depends on the
creative resources of the planner. Using all of his or her knowledge,
the tax adviser must test tentative solutions in a methodical process
that rejects some alternatives and suggests others. Without a system
atic method of considering and rejecting the many alternatives, the
tax planner is likely to overlook the very alternative being sought. As
suggested earlier in this study, one common reason for overlooking
a good alternative is simply the tax adviser’s failure to think long or
hard enough about the problem. There appears to be a tendency to
rush to the books or to another person for help, hoping that the best
solution will automatically surface, when what is really needed is
more creative thought on the subject. The thinking process is often
stimulated by ideas found in books or suggested by other persons.
Our recommendation is not that books and consultants be avoided,
but rather that the ideas obtained from these sources be given an
opportunity to mature in quiet contemplation.
Tax-Planning Aids
Books

Tax library materials can help generate successful tax-planning ideas.
Many practical ideas are contained in AICPA Tax Study 4, Tax
Practice Management, by William L. Raby.2 In addition to the “tax
planning ideas’’ portion of a client file (suggested in chapter 2 of this
study), Raby recommends more complete “tax-planning surveys’’ and
“year-end tax reviews’’ to better evaluate and anticipate business and
estate-planning decisions. AICPA Tax Study 3, Guide to Federal Tax
Elections, edited by Irvin F. Diamond and Roger L. Miller, is a
useful aid in locating many of the options that exist in the code.3
2 William L. Raby, Tax Study 4, Tax Practice Management (New York: AICPA,
1974).
3 Irvin F. Diamond and Roger L. Miller, ed., Tax Study 3, Guide to Federal Tax
Elections, 3d ed., rev. (New York: AICPA, 1980).
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In addition to these two AICPA publications, most of the com
mercial tax services include, in some form or another, tax-planning
ideas intended to assist the CPA in his or her practice.4 For example,
Prentice-Hall’s service, Federal Taxes, contains a tax-savings-idea
“index” consisting of four major classifications: (1) types of taxpayers,
(2) income, (3) deductions and credits, and (4) miscellaneous. Subtopics within each classification refer the reader to editorial expla
nations scattered throughout that tax service. In addition, PrenticeHall publishes a separate, two-volume Tax Ideas service. Volume
one deals with everyday business and personal transactions; volume
two concentrates on somewhat more complicated tax problems. This
service features a transaction checklist of those tax matters that should
be taken into account for any given transaction.
The Standard Federal Tax Reporter, published by Commerce
Clearing House, contains a tax-planning section, organized on a
topical basis, in its index volume. The editorial comments found there
contain sufficient detail to handle the easier tax-planning problems;
they are cross-referenced to other CCH paragraphs that aid in the
solution of the more difficult problems. Volume 5A of Federal Income,
Gift, and Estate Taxation, published by Matthew Bender, contains
a Planning Aids section as well as a “tax calendar” for various types
of taxpayers.
Both Prentice-Hall (five volumes) and the Research Institute of
America (seven volumes) publish an estate planning service; however,
they consider not just tax ideas but all facets of the estate-planning
function.
Although neither the Tax Coordinator, published by the Research
Institute of America, nor the Tax Management Portfolios, published
by the Bureau of National Affairs, contains tax-planning volumes per
se, both include tax-planning recommendations throughout in the
commentary on the tax issues to which they relate. Matthew Bender
also publishes a two-volume family tax-planning service. In addition,
the same publisher supplies the three-volume Income Tax Techniques
and the three-volume Estate Tax Techniques, both edited by the J.
K. Lasser Tax Institute. The authors of these services are various
practitioners who have tried to anticipate the difficulties in tax
planning for clients.
Many other books, with varying degrees of sophistication, have
been written on tax planning; it simply is not practical to mention
4 For additional details concerning the publishers of the several commercial tax
services, see exhibit 4.12, p. 120.
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each of them individually. Suffice it to note that readers should not
be misled by all of the titles including the phrase tax planning. Many
of these publications are intended for specific taxpayers and their
unique tax problems, for example, tax planning for professionals, for
real estate transactions, for closely held corporations, or for inter
national operations. Topics covered in one publication are often
duplicated in another. Before deciding to purchase such a book, a
practitioner would be well advised to examine it in detail to make
certain that it actually adds something to the material already available
in his or her library. Although many of these publications can be of
material assistance in tax-planning work, there is no good substitute
for the ability that comes only from years of experience.

Continuing Education

The extension of formal classroom instruction beyond the college
campus during the past decade may be partially attributable to the
institution of mandatory continuing education requirements for sev
eral professions, including the profession of accountancy. For tax
practitioners, however, tax institutes provided continuing professional
instruction long before it became mandatory in any state.
Today, continuing education programs are a second major source
of assistance in successful tax planning. Well developed courses are
readily available from national, state, and local professional societies,
educational institutions, and private organizations. The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants annually publishes a catalog
describing most of the continuing education programs offered by the
AICPA and the state CPA societies. The 1980-81 catalog includes a
description of 100 different courses in taxation. The durations of the
courses described there vary from “one-half day” to “five nights.”
Costs of participation, when stated, vary from $55 to $350 per course.
Most courses are scheduled during the summer and fall, throughout
the United States.
In fo rm atio n ab o u t o th e r tax co u rses can fre q u e n tly b e fo u n d in tax

periodicals. Some courses are directed to the beginner, others to an
advanced audience. Some cover specific subjects; others are of general
interest. Some are well developed and taught by highly qualified
instructors; others have been hastily prepared and are poorly pre
sented. Obviously, the caveat “let the buyer beware” is applicable
in the selection of any course.
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Tree Diagrams

In tax-planning work, the alternatives that an adviser must consider
multiply quickly. After clearly identifying a general course of action
(based on an understanding of the client’s objective and knowledge
of the code), and before reaching a conclusion, an adviser might
consider structuring a problem in the form of a “tree diagram. ” This
technique is commonly used in management services work.5 Such an
exercise ensures a thorough and systematic consideration of each
alternative because it focuses on the critical questions in a sequential
manner. The branches of the tree derive from options existing in the
code, any one of which can achieve the client’s objective. After
ordering the options in this fashion, the adviser should quantify the
tax result implicit in each alternative. This quantification will facilitate
discovery of many of the risks and constraints that, in turn, eliminate
some alternatives and favor others. For an example of a tree diagram,
see figure 8.1 (p. 218).
As noted above, a tree diagram cannot be prepared for a tax
problem until a tax adviser fully understands the client’s objective
and determines the tax rules applicable to each available method of
achieving that objective. Knowledge of the client’s objective can
come only from a complete and open discussion of the problem with
the client. In an operational sense, objectives and constraints can
only be determined in the same way in which facts are established
in compliance engagements. Determination of the possible alterna
tives stems from a unique blend of prior experience, reading, and
thinking about the problem. Ascertaining the tax outcome for each
alternative is based on the same research techniques described in the
earlier chapters of this study. In summary, then, the only major
differences between the tax research methodologies applicable to
compliance work and to planning work are in the adviser’s ability to
identify possible alternatives and in the method for selecting the best
of the several alternatives considered. In an attempt to focus on these
aspects of tax planning, the following pages illustrate the process
involved in a relatively simple planning engagement. We will not
examine in detail the procedures by which the tax adviser determines
5 For further description of this technique in general, see R. J. Ainslie and Alan A.
Kenney, “Decision Tables—A Tool for Tax Practitioners,” Tax Adviser (June 1972):
336-45; see also Harley M. Courtney and Patricia C. Elliott, “Computing for Tax
Planning,” Tax Adviser (May 1974): 288-97.
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Figure 8.1
Tree Diagram

the tax result implicit in each option, since they are the same as
those followed in a “closed-fact” situation.6
A Tax-Planning Example
To illustrate the procedures that might be used in a tax-planning
engagement, assume that during 1977 a client, a recently retired
army general, purchased all 200 shares of outstanding stock in NNH
Corporation for $200,000. NNH’s only asset at the time of this
purchase consisted of seventy acres of unimproved (and unencum
bered) land with a tax basis of $90,000 and a fair market value of
$200,000. Assume further that NNH has no current or accumulated
earnings and profits.
In 1980 the city council approved construction of a new downtown
expressway that would pass directly alongside the NNH property.
Consequently, the fair market value of that property increased to
$300,000.
After discussions with several developers, the client decided to
have NNH improve the property with streets, sewers, water mains,
and so on, and to subdivide the property for sale to builders and
prospective homeowners. The anticipated additional investment re
quired is estimated to be $100,000; the client hopes that the additional
improvements will increase the value of the land to $450,000 within
the next twelve months.
Early in 1981 the client begins to discuss with his tax adviser the
potential tax implications of his proposed business venture. Before
leaving the adviser’s office, the client makes it clear that he intends
to make this his last business venture. He wants to make as large a
profit as possible from this land deal and then invest the proceeds in
a retirement annuity that, along with his military retirement pay,
will guarantee him and his wife a comfortable living for as long as
they live. He asks the tax adviser to make recommendations con
cerning the tax implications of his land development plans.
At this point the tax practitioner, using experience and creativity,
must identify alternative courses of action and recommend the one
that achieves the client’s predetermined objectives with the least
6 For additional general background information, see Ralph Steinman, Tax Study 1,
Tax Guide fo r Incorporating a Closely Held Business, rev. ed., and Stuart R.
Josephs and J. Michael Pusey, Tax Study 2, Tax Planning Techniques fo r Individuals
(New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1978 and 1980
respectively).
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possible tax cost. Several approaches are available to the practitioner.
One approach, for example, is simply to apply the client’s facts to the
announced plans and to determine the implicit tax result. This
approach, however, would really not be considered tax planning;
although a tax adviser must often recommend against the plan
originally proposed by a client, the adviser generally attempts to
recommend one or more alternatives that can achieve the most
important client objectives in a tax-preferred manner.
In order to keep this example simple, we have assumed that
1. The client is married and files a joint return each year.
2. The taxpayer claims two exemptions and has no excess itemized
deductions.
3. The client receives exactly $20,000 of ordinary taxable income
each year in addition to that specifically attributable to this land
development project.
4. The client does not qualify for income averaging.
5. The client sells all of the lots in one year.
6. The client personally invests the additional $100,000 necessary
to make the land improvements (with no interest cost assumed).
In an actual engagement, obviously, these constraints could only be
determined through consultation with the client. In fact, many of the
“constraints” assumed in this example would actually constitute
important tax-planning alternatives. For example, the opportunity to
spread the sale of lots over several years—either to qualify for capital
gain treatment under the “safe harbor” rules of section 1237 or to
obtain the benefit of lower marginal tax rates that necessarily
accompany a lower annual (ordinary) income—is an obvious alter
native to the solution suggested in this example. Another equally
obvious alternative would be to “bunch” the ordinary income in a
single year in order to take advantage of income averaging opportu
nities available under sections 1301 through 1305. As explained
above, we have made assumptions that disqualify alternatives in
order to keep the example simple.7
Given these assumptions, it appears that two major issues confront
the client. First, there is a prospect of double taxation because the
land is currently held by a corporate entity, and the client wants to
place all the proceeds from this venture in a private annuity after
7We have also assumed that the normal corporate tax rates with the five-step
progression effective for 1980 apply; i.e., 1st $25,000 = 17%; 2d $25,000 = 20%;
3d $25,000 = 30%; 4th $25,000 = 40%; over $100,000 = 46%.
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completion of the project. Second, there is a chance that some of the
gain on the sale of the land could be converted from ordinary income
into capital gain. The tree diagram in figure 8.1 outlines eleven
possible alternatives. The diagram helps to highlight the constraints
under which these alternatives must be pursued. Other alternatives
have been rejected on the premise that the client has specifically
ruled out those possibilities. For example, one obvious alternative
would have been for the client to sell his NNH stock for $300,000.
The diagram assumes that the client wants to develop the property
and sell the lots; that is, he has rejected the option of selling out and
settling for a smaller profit.
Without detailing the procedures used to determine the tax result
implicit in each of the eleven branches of this diagram, we shall
simply note the general tax consequence inherent in that branch. In
order to facilitate communication, each branch has been designated
by a combination of letters and numbers. Thus, the branch appearing
at the top of the diagram can be readily identified as option A(l)(a)(i),
the second option from the top as option A(l)(a)(ii), and so forth.
Liquidation Under Section 331, After Developing the
Property but Before Sale o f Lots— Options A(l)(a)(i) and (ii)
Although the land probably would not qualify as either a capital asset
(section 1221) or as a section 1231 asset, the liquidation of the
corporation and distribution of the property might be treated as full
payment in exchange for the stock (section 331). If so, because the
stock was held for more than one year, the gain would qualify as a
long-term capital gain. Although the client originally did not intend
to use the corporation with a view to collapsing it to convert ordinary
Personal Tax
I f sec. 341 is
not invoked
$ 20,000
150,000

(90,000)
$ 80,000
$ 29,398

Collapsibility
status
Ordinary taxable income
Surrender of stock
(FMV $450,000 - cost
$200,000 — improvements
$100,000)
Long-term capital gain
deduction
Total taxable income
Tax liability

I f sec. 341
is invoked
$ 20,000
150,000

$170,000
$ 85,272
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income into capital gains, the IRS might attempt to invoke section
341, which would convert the capital gain on liquidation into ordinary
income. The two possible tax results can be computed as shown on
p. 221.
Under this alternative, the subsequent sale of the lots would not
create any additional tax liability, since the client’s new basis in the
lots would be $450,000 (assuming the fair market value remained
firm at $450,000). Also, under section 336 the corporation would not
recognize gain as a result of the liquidation.
Liquidation Under Section 333, After Developing the
Property but Before Sale o f Lots— Option A(1 )(b)
If the liquidation is executed under section 333, no gain will be
recognized at the time of the liquidation and, according to section
334(c), the basis in the developed land distributed would be $300,000,
the same as the basis of the stock surrendered. (This again assumes
that the client contributed the additional $100,000 to NNH to make
the land improvements.) The character of the land to the taxpayer
would be the same as that to the corporation before liquidation; that
is, it would be neither a capital asset nor a section 1231 asset. No
gain would be recognized to the corporation upon liquidation (section
336). Thus, the tax liability would be as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Sale of lots (FMV $450,000 - cost $200,000
— improvements $100,000)
Taxable income
Tax liability

$ 20,000
150,000
$170,000
$ 85,272

Liquidation Under Section 331, After Developing the
Property and After Sale o f Lots— Option A(2)(a)
In th e e v e n t th e co rp o ratio n sells th e d e v e lo p e d p ro p e rty b efo re a

liquidation is effected under section 331, it will be required to report
the income from the sale of the lots. Undoubtedly the income would
be treated as ordinary income, since the property was considerably
improved and section 1237, which potentially allows capital gain
treatment on the sale of developed land, is not applicable to
corporations. Subsequently, the distribution of the cash in liquidation
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to the sole shareholder would be treated as in full payment in
exchange for the stock, and the client would thus realize capital gain
treatment (section 331). The tax consequence would be determined
as follows.
Corporate Tax
Sale of improved land
Basis of land (cost $90,000 + improvements
$100,000)
Ordinary corporate income
Corporate tax liability
Personal Tax
Cash distributed in liquidation ($450,000 —
corporate tax $100,350)
Basis in stock (cost $200,000 + improvements
$100,000)
Capital gain on liquidation
Ordinary taxable income
Long-term capital gain deduction
Total taxable income
Individual tax liability

$450,000
190,000
$260,000
$100,350

$349,650
300,000
49,650
20,000
(29,790)
$ 39,860
$ 9,312

Liquidation Under Section 333, After Developing the
Property and A fter Sale o f Lots— Option A(2)(b)
Because this alternative assumes a sale of all the property by the
corporation prior to liquidation, the corporate tax liability will amount
to $100,350, as in the previous option, leaving an after-tax distribution
of $349,650.
Under the provisions of section 333(e)(1), the amount of the gain
that is not in excess of the taxpayer’s ratable share of earnings and
profits will be recognized and treated as a dividend. Thus, since the
client in our example is a 100 percent shareholder, the ratable share
of earnings and profits would be $159,650 ($450,000 minus $190,000
(basis) minus $100,350 (corporate tax)), and the recognizable gain on
the section 333 distribution would be $49,450 ($349,650 (cash re
ceived) minus $300,000 (basis) minus $200 (dividend exclusion)), all
of which would be treated as a dividend. Thus, in addition to a
corporate tax of $100,350, the client will be liable for the following
personal income tax.
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Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Dividend income
Tax income
Tax liability

$ 20,000
49,450
$ 69,450
$ 23,701

Liquidation Under Section 331, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development and Sale
in a New Corporation— Option B(l)(a)(i)
Liquidating the corporation before land improvements have begun
would increase the basis of the property to $300,000. Under a section
331 liquidation, the client would be treated as having exchanged his
stock (a capital asset) for the property distributed to him.
FMV of land received
Basis of stock surrendered
Gain recognized

$300,000
200,000
$100,000

Because the surrendered stock constitutes a section 1221 capital
asset, the client would report a capital gain. Thus, the total personal
income tax due on the transaction would be computed as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Capital gain on surre nder of stock
Long-term capital gain deduction
Taxable income
Individual tax liability

$ 20,000
100,000
(60,000)
$ 60,000
$ 18,698

A subsequent tax-free transfer, under section 351, to a new
corporation, plus investment of an additional $100,000 for the land
development, would increase the basis of the property to $400,000.
The new corporation would then incur a corporate tax liability upon
sale of the land for $450,000.
Corporate Tax
Sale of improved land
Basis of land ($300,000 + $100,000 investment)
Ordinary corporate taxable income
Corporate tax liability
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$450,000
400,000
$ 50,000
$ 9,250

This alternative offers two major problems, however. First, once
the corporation has disposed of the land, a second liquidation must
occur, creating an additional tax.
Cash distributed in liquidation ($450,000 —
corporate tax $9,250)
Basis in stock (basis from section 351 transfer
$300,000 + improvements $100,000)
Gain on corporate liquidation

$440,750
400,000
$ 40,750

Therefore, according to this alternative, if all transactions occur in
the same tax year, the personal tax liability would increase, as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Capital gain on first corporate liquidation
Capital gain on second corporate liquidation
Long-term capital gain deduction
Taxable income
Individual tax liability

$ 20,000
100,000
40,750
(84,450)
$ 76,300
$ 27,400

The second and more serious problem associated with this alter
native is the risk associated with the liquidation-reincorporation
process. It appears highly likely that the IRS could invoke the judicial
doctrines of “business purpose” or “step transaction” and thereby
ignore the first liquidation entirely. That action would create the
same tax result described in option A(2)(a).
Liquidation Under Section 331, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development and Sale
as a Sole Proprietor— Option B(l)(a)(ii)
The tax consequences as a result of the liquidation will, of course,
produce the same result as in the previous alternative: The property
basis will increase to $300,000, and the client will recognize a
$100,000 long-term capital gain. The subsequent development costs
will add an additional $100,000 to the $300,000 basis. The sale of the
land for $450,000 will thus create a $50,000 recognizable gain that
would probably constitute ordinary income. The client’s tax liability
would be as follows.
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Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Ordinary gain on sale of land ($450,000 — basis
$400,000)
Gain on corporate liquidation
Long-term capital gain deduction
Taxable income
Individual tax liability

$ 20,000
50,000
100,000
(60,000)
$110,000
$ 46,718

Although this alternative appears to have a desirable tax result, it
exposes the client to a substantial financial risk, since the land
development would take place outside of a corporate entity. If a
major, unforeseen liability should arise during the development
process, all of the client’s assets would be available to settle creditors’
claims. This financial risk, and the cost of possible insurance to cover
the risk, would have to be assessed carefully in making a selection.
Because the illustration is already sufficiently complicated, and
because the added complication would add little if anything to the
point of the illustration, we have simply ignored this factor in the
remainder of the illustration. Unfortunately, the practitioner cannot
dispose of problems so easily.
Liquidation Under Section 331, Before Developing
the Property and Then Accomplishing Development and
Sale Through a Broker— Option B(l)(b)
The tax consequences here are similar to those in the previous
alternative. However, the critical question to be decided is whether
development and sale by an independent real estate broker would
cause the final gain on the sale of the property to be treated as a
capital gain rather than as ordinary income. In addition, the broker’s
fees would likely reduce the anticipated return from the development.
In order to simplify the solution, we have ignored this probable
additional cost for the purposes of the illustration. Accordingly, the
tax computation could be made as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Gain on liquidation of corporation
Gain on sale of improved land
Long-term capital gain deduction
Taxable income

$ 20,000
100,000
50,000
(90,000)
$ 80,000

Individual tax liability

$ 29,398

226

W hether the client would be able to sustain a claim for capital gain
treatment on the sale of the property through an independent broker
is questionable. There is some judicial authority to support such a
position; however, the consensus of available judicial authority does
not. Adoption of this course of action would appear to invite litigation.
In addition, this alternative might once again include a substantial
financial risk because it requires development of the land outside the
corporate entity.
Liquidation Under Section 333, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development and Sale
Through a New Corporation— Option B(2)(a)(i)
Under a section 333 liquidation, no gain would be recognized either
to the corporation or to the client. The land distributed in the
liquidation would assume the basis of the stock surrendered, in this
instance $200,000. Subsequent transfer of the land to a new corpo
ration for purposes of development would be tax free under section
351. The basis of $200,000 plus $100,000 of additional investment to
accomplish the development would increase the corporate basis in
the property to $300,000. The sale of the land by the corporation
would result in ordinary income as follows.
Corporate Tax
Sales price of land
Corporation’s basis in land
Ordinary corporate taxable income

$450,000
300,000
$150,000

Corporate tax liability

$ 49,750

The subsequent liquidation of the new corporation would create
the following gain.
Cash distributed (sales price $450,000 —
corporate tax $49,750)
Basis of stock surrendered
Gain on corporate liquidation

$400,250
300,000
$100,250

Thus, the client’s total personal tax liability would be computed as
follows.
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Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Gain on corporate liquidation
Long-term capital gain deduction

$ 20,000
100,250
(60,150)

Taxable income

$ 60,100

Individual tax liability

$ 18,747

As was true in option B(l)(a)(i), an adviser would again have to
question how the IRS would view a liquidation followed by an
immediate reincorporation and a subsequent liquidation with no
obvious business purpose other than converting ordinary income into
capital gain. This alternative, therefore, appears to be highly ques
tionable and full of litigation potential.
Liquidation Under Section 333, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development as a
Sole Proprietor— Option B(2)(a)(ii)
As mentioned in the explanation of the previous option, no taxable
gain would occur with a section 333 liquidation. The client would
surrender his stock and transfer his basis of $200,000 from the stock
to the land received in distribution. The subsequent land improve
ments would increase the basis of the land to $300,000. The sale of
the land would undoubtedly result in ordinary income in the amount
of $150,000 ($450,000 — $300,000). Thus, the client’s tax liability
would be determined as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Ordinary income from sale of lots
Taxable income

$ 20,000
150,000
$170,000

Individual tax liability

$ 85,272

This alte rn a tiv e also involves th e ex tra financial risk o f d ev e lo p in g

the land outside the safety of a corporate entity.
Liquidation Under Section 333, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development Through
an Independent Broker— Option B(2)(b)
As in the two previous alternatives, this option transfers the land
from the corporation to the client through liquidation and transfers
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the $200,000 basis in the stock to the land. The additional development
costs of $100,000 can again be added to the basis of the land. The
same critical questions encountered under option B(l)(b) are crucial
to the tax result in this alternative. If, as a result of sale through a
broker, capital gain treatment can be justified, the following tax cost
would be incurred.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income
Capital gain on sale of land ($450,000 — basis
$300,000)
Long-term capital gain deduction
Taxable income

150,000
(90,000)
$ 80,000

Individual tax liability

$ 29,398

$ 20,000

Summary

By adding the results of the foregoing computations to figure 8.2, we
can readily observe some very interesting results. Three alternatives—
A(l)(a)(ii), B(l)(b), and B(2)(b)—each produce an equally low tax
liability ($29,398). However, each of these alternatives involves a
rather high risk. If the alternatives are carried out as proposed, they
are likely to be challenged by the IRS and, in at least two instances,
may result in rather sizable deficiency assessments. That is, both
option A(l)(a)(ii) and option B(2)(b), if challenged during an audit,
could result in a deficiency assessment of $55,874 ($85,272 —$29,398).
For instance, if option A(l)(a)(ii) were found to involve a collapsible
corporation, the tax liability would amount to $85,272, not including
possible penalties. Similarly, if capital gain treatment were to be
denied on option B(2)(b), the revised tax liability would be $85,272,
not including any penalties. Although option B(l)(b) appears to be
much more appealing taxwise, it involves the added financial risk
common to all noncorporate operations. In the latter alternative,
even if challenged successfully, the deficiency assessment would
amount to only $17,320 ($46,718 — $29,398), excluding penalties.
Another highly uncertain result is implicit in option B(l)(a)(i). If
a revenue agent proposes to collapse the two liquidations into one
and if we consider only the second liquidation as a valid one, the tax
result would involve a liquidation after corporate development of the
land with a potential tax liability of $109,662, or a deficiency
assessment of $73,012 ($109,662 — $36,650), without penalties.
229

230
Figure 8.2
Tree Diagram
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Taking into consideration only the tax factors, alternatives B(l)(b)
and B(1)(a)(ii) appear to be the most attractive options. Option B(1)(b),
as already noted, projects a possible tax liability of $29,398, with a
potential deficiency assessment of $17,320, for a likely tax cost of
$46,718. Option B(l)(a)(ii), which requires immediate liquidation of
the corporation and assumes the development and sale of the land
by your client as a sole proprietor, offers the least litigation risk. The
total tax would amount to $46,718, the same as the maximum
projected under B(l)(b). Nevertheless, both these alternatives include
the financial risk of operating without the liability protection of a
corporation, and the latter option probably involves additional costs
for the broker’s services. As noted earlier, in an actual planning
engagement, both of these costs would have to be estimated and
added to our illustration before a recommendation could be made to
the client.8
Once all of the reasonable alternatives have been researched and
their tax results determined, a tax adviser should recommend a course
of action to the client. In some circumstances, the client may elect
to ignore tax results and base a decision on other considerations. In
the final analysis only the client can determine which alternative is
best for him or her. The qualified tax adviser will, however, give the
client all of the information needed to make an intelligent decision;
in most instances, the adviser’s recommendation will be accepted by
the client.
The foregoing example demonstrates a systematic approach to the
research of alternative courses of action available to a taxpayer. This
tax-planning process represents a serial rearrangement of facts over
which a client can still exercise control. Such a systematic creation
and evaluation of alternative strategies is the key to profitable tax
planning.
Tax-Planning Communications
Practitioners should recognize distinct differences between commu
nicating research conclusions in a tax compliance problem and making
recommendations in a tax-planning engagement. In tax compliance
work, the facts and the law pertinent to the solution are generally
8 In such an engagement, much of the computational work could be adapted to a
computer program, which would include calculations for income averaging, the
maximum tax on earned income, and so forth. Obviously computers can eliminate
many hours of labor in planning engagements, often at minimal cost through time
sharing arrangements.
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fixed. Therefore, once the appropriate statute and all related author
ities have been identified and evaluated, the researcher generally
can offer a conclusion to the client with reasonable certainty that it
is “correct.”
Reaching an optimal conclusion in a tax-planning engagement is
much less certain. The “facts” are merely preliminary proposals based
on many estimates and assumptions. Furthermore, the enactment of
a proposed plan is not fixed in time. It may occur next week, next
month, or two years hence. Consequently, at the time the plan is
finally executed, even the tax statutes upon which it is based may
have changed, and the tax alternative originally recommended may
no longer be the preferred one. Because of these uncertainties, the
tax adviser should prepare for the client a written memorandum
containing a statement of the assumptions and the recommended plan
of action, qualified as follows:
1. A statement should be included emphasizing the fact that,
unless the plan is actually implemented as originally assumed,
the tax results may be substantially altered.
2. It should be stressed that the recommendations are based on
current tax authority and that possible delays in implementation
may change the result because of changes in the law during the
interim period.
The foregoing recommendations generally concur with the opinion
expressed in the AICPA Statement of Responsibilities in Tax Practice
8, as quoted on pp. 163-164. Although the AICPA committee did
not recommend routine use of such precautionary language, tax
advisers should seriously consider the adoption of such standard
disclaimer statements in most tax-planning engagements.
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